Against intentionalism: a reappraisal of artefactual metaphysics, with an eye to weaponry by Fehross, Anson
Copyright and use of this thesis
This thesis must be used in accordance with the 
provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.
Reproduction of material protected by copyright 
may be an infringement of copyright and 
copyright owners may be entitled to take 
legal action against persons who infringe their 
copyright.
Section 51 (2) of the Copyright Act permits 
an authorized officer of a university library or 
archives to provide a copy (by communication 
or otherwise) of an unpublished thesis kept in 
the library or archives, to a person who satisfies 
the authorized officer that he or she requires 
the reproduction for the purposes of research 
or study. 
The Copyright Act grants the creator of a work 
a number of moral rights, specifically the right of 
attribution, the right against false attribution and 
the right of integrity. 
You may infringe the author’s moral rights if you:
-  fail to acknowledge the author of this thesis if 
you quote sections from the work 
- attribute this thesis to another author 
-  subject this thesis to derogatory treatment 
which may prejudice the author’s reputation
For further information contact the University’s 
Director of Copyright Services
sydney.edu.au/copyright
1 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for MSc, Unit 
for the History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney 
 
 
Thesis Title: 
Against Intentionalism: A Reappraisal of 
Artefactual Metaphysics, with an Eye to 
Weaponry 
 
 
 
 
Anson Fehross 
 
Year of Award: 
2014 
 
 
 
2 
 
Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 4 
Chapter One: Weapons Without Metaphysics? .................................................................................... 11 
1.1. An Unfortunate Lesson from History ................................................................................... 11 
1.2. Unintentional Creators? ........................................................................................................ 16 
1.3. A Non-Metaphysical Approach ............................................................................................ 18 
1.4. Ends-orientated Descriptions of Artefacts ............................................................................ 25 
1.5. Requirements for an Artefact Metaphysic ............................................................................ 29 
1.6. Features of an Artefact Theory Outlined .............................................................................. 30 
1.7.1. Means-to-an-end ................................................................................................................. 30 
1.7.2. Ends Appropriateness ......................................................................................................... 31 
1.7.3. Function-shifts .................................................................................................................... 32 
1.7.4. The Dual Nature of Artefacts .............................................................................................. 33 
1.7.5. Normative claims regarding artefacts ................................................................................. 34 
1.7.6. Non-functioning/broken/malfunctioning artefacts .............................................................. 34 
1.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 37 
Chapter Two: Intentionalist Accounts of Artefacts .............................................................................. 39 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 39 
2.2. Types, Tokens and Kinds ...................................................................................................... 40 
Part One: Dualism by Design ............................................................................................................... 43 
2.3. Natural versus Artefactual Kinds .......................................................................................... 43 
2.4. The Dual Nature Project ............................................................................................................ 49 
Part Two: Intentional Accounts of Artefacts ........................................................................................ 52 
2.5. The Ontogenetic Criterion Versus the Creator’s Intended Function Criterion .......................... 52 
2.5.1. The Ontogenetic Criterion .................................................................................................. 52 
2.6. Creator’s Intended Function....................................................................................................... 56 
2.6.1. Contexts of Use ................................................................................................................... 57 
2.6.2. Use-plans ............................................................................................................................. 58 
2.7. Answering the artefactual conditions ......................................................................................... 63 
2.7.1. Means-to-an-end/ends-appropriateness ............................................................................... 63 
2.7.2. The Dual Nature Thesis ...................................................................................................... 64 
2.7.3. Normativity and Artefacts ................................................................................................... 65 
2.7.4. Broken/Malfunctioning/non-functioning ............................................................................ 66 
2.7.5. Function-Shifts and the CIF Theory ................................................................................... 67 
3 
 
2.8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 72 
Chapter Three: The Optimality Approach ............................................................................................ 75 
3.1. Introduction: The Intentionalist Fallacy ..................................................................................... 75 
Part One: The Optimality Account Explained ...................................................................................... 84 
3.2. Guiding Intuitions of an Optimality Account ............................................................................ 84 
3.3. Artefacts as Physical Objects ..................................................................................................... 87 
3.4. System Relativity ....................................................................................................................... 89 
3.5. End-states ................................................................................................................................... 91 
3.6. Capacities ................................................................................................................................... 93 
3.7. Optimal function ........................................................................................................................ 96 
Part Two: The Optimality Account Tested ......................................................................................... 102 
3.8. Answering the artefactual conditions ....................................................................................... 102 
3.8.1. Means-to-an-end/Ends-appropriateness ............................................................................ 102 
3.8.2. Function-shifts .................................................................................................................. 103 
3.8.3. Artefact Dualism Explained Away ................................................................................... 107 
3.8.4. Artefact Normativity ......................................................................................................... 109 
3.8.5. Differences between broken/non-functioning/malfunctioning ......................................... 110 
3.9. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 116 
Chapter Four: The Artefactual Metaphysics of Weapons ................................................................... 118 
4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 118 
4.2. Substances as Artefacts ............................................................................................................ 118 
4.3. John Forge and Weapons ......................................................................................................... 121 
4.4. Weapons Optimised ................................................................................................................. 125 
4.5. The Bob Hope Objection ......................................................................................................... 129 
4.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 133 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 135 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 140 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 146 
 
 
4 
 
Introduction 
Taser use by police in New South Wales has now become quite common since the initial trial 
between 2008 and 2010. The NSW Ombudsman, looking at one six-month period, found that 
police ‘misused’ the weapon one in seven times.1 This included repeatedly applying a Taser 
on a man who was on his knees, shirtless, with his hands behind his head, as well as cases 
where the weapon was used in drive stun mode repeatedly on already restrained individuals. 
When a Taser is used in drive stun mode (intended by the manufacturers to be used only in 
cases where the weapon does not operate correctly) it does not incapacitate, instead causing a 
great amount of pain. But what makes these patterns of usage of the Taser ‘misuse’ rather 
than just a use, or perhaps another way of using Tasers? 
 Of course, the use of the word ‘misuse’ can be interpreted several different ways. 
First, by utilising the term ‘misuse’ we might mean that the Taser was used against legal or 
professional regulations, as when we say that one has misused a tax code to benefit oneself or 
others whilst in office. While this may be true, it only seems to tell half the story. There must 
be a reason why such usage of a Taser is illegal or against official regulations, pointing to 
something about the artefact that justifies the legislation. No-one would reasonably claim that 
legislation surrounding Taser use is a matter of mere convention. There must be good reasons 
why some interactions with the device are termed a ‘misuse’ while others are acceptable uses. 
 The more telling interpretation of the term ‘misuse’ is that the Taser has a prescribed 
role as a weapon, namely as a defensive (or ‘less-than-lethal’) weapon. 2 Whenever it has 
been used outside of a defensive context, as when police force compliance via its use, it has 
thereby been ‘misused’ in a way that contravenes its role as a defensive weapon. The 
underlying assumption is that weaponry can be characterised as defensive or offensive, which 
further requires the assumption that we can stipulate what a weapon is for before patterns of 
usage emerge. This implies that we can define, independent of usage, what a thing is for.  
                                                          
1
 Sean Rubinsztein-Dunlop, “Tasers Misused Once in Every Seven Cases: Ombudsman,” ABC News Online, 
October 23, 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-23/ombudsman-calls-for-changes-to-taser-use/4328890. 
It is worth noting that this talk of ‘misuse’ of Tasers is not restricted to the popular media. See: John Kleinig, 
“Ethical Constraints on Taser Use by Police,” Policing 1, no. 3 (January 1, 2007): 284–92; Michael R. Smith, 
Matthew Petrocelli, and Charlie Scheer, “Excessive Force, Civil Liability, and the Taser in the Nation’s Courts: 
Implications for Law Enforcement Policy and Practice,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies 
& Management 30, no. 3 (2007): 398–422; Rubinsztein-Dunlop, “Tasers Misused Once in Every Seven Cases: 
Ombudsman”; Philip Matthew Stinson, “Police Crime and Less-than-Lethal Coercive Force: A Description of 
the Criminal Misuse of TASERs,” International Journal of Police Science & Management 14, no. 1 (Spring 
2012): 1–19. 
2
 I return to the vexed question of whether there are any defensive weapons in Section 4.4. 
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As widespread as this view appears to be, it remains the case that this view rests upon 
a particular metaphysical understanding of artefacts themselves. This understanding relies on 
the notion that the designer sets constraints on the usage of an artefact, such that they can 
decide how a weapon (or, indeed, any artefact whatsoever) is to be understood. This basic 
intuition might be rephrased to say that the designer sets what an artefact is for, or was 
designed for, or intended for. Weapons are, in one sense, stunningly mundane. Insofar as they 
are technical artefacts, weapons are ‘just’ a means to a particular set of ends. They were 
designed by humans for those ends, and their capacity as artefacts to achieve their ends 
explains why we value them. In another sense, however, weapons are very special. They are 
for harming, and this, as I shall argue in the course of this thesis, is what makes them a 
special, separate class of artefacts. They are designed for, or employed in, the practical 
purpose of harming others, and they perform this purpose alarmingly well and increasingly so 
as time goes by.3  
If weapons are partially defined by their capacity to harm, there remains the problem 
of distinguishing between 1) those things that can be utilised as weapons and 2) those things 
that are properly regarded as weapons. The first class of artefacts is obviously going to be 
wider than the latter: many things, including rocks, scissors and kitchen knives, can be used 
to harm.4 Few would contend, however, that in virtue of this we should classify all rocks, 
scissors and knives as weaponry. Intuitively, we wish to keep the class ‘weapon’ for only 
such things we consider to be weapons through and through. How are we to decide between 
these options, and determine what is and is not a ‘real’ weapon, as opposed to something that 
just could be used to harm? 
There has been surprisingly little attention paid to this question in the literature, 
despite the fact that our attitudes toward weaponry are partially defined by our metaphysical 
conception of these artefacts.5 The tacit assumption, across a wide variety of domains, 
                                                          
3
 This position is highlighted by Forge in: John Forge, The Responsible Scientist (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2008); John Forge, Designed to Kill: The Case Against Weapons Research (New York, NY: 
Springer, 2013). I will return to Forge in Chapter Four. 
4
 John Forge, “A Note on the Definition of ‘Dual Use,’” Science and Engineering Ethics 16, no. 1 (March 
2010): 114. 
5
 There are exceptions to this rule. Sustained philosophical attention has been paid to several types of weaponry, 
such as nuclear weaponry (c.f. Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds., Objections to Nuclear Defence (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984); Joseph S. Nye, Nuclear Ethics (New York: The Free Press, 1986); Sohail H. 
Hashmi and Lee, eds., Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004)), non-lethal weapons (c.f. Brian Rappert, “A Framework for the 
Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 20, no. 1 (2004): 35–54; John Kleinig, 
“Ethical Constraints on Taser Use by Police,” Policing 1, no. 3 (January 1, 2007): 284–292; Chris Mayer, 
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remains the intentionalist account sketched above. Intentionalism undergirds the National 
Rifle Association’s de facto motto, ‘Guns don’t kill people; people kill people.’ Reflected by 
this motto is the idea that guns come with a particular intended context, and one set by the 
designer of the weapon (a view we will see again, in a general context, in Section 2.6.2). If a 
designer intends, as the NRA are keen to assume, that weapons are for defensive purposes, 
we should classify any usage of a weapon that is offensive to be a misuse. This kind of talk 
about misuse, indulged in by both philosophers and lay commentators alike, begs the 
question in favour of what we could call a ‘proper use’ criterion, where there are only good 
ways of using technology. We can, for example, meaningfully assert that a car is ‘misused’ if 
it is utilised to run over a person at a pedestrian crossing as, although it can perform the task 
if it is driven a particular way, a car is not for that particular purpose. This way of talking 
about weapons amounts to the claim that they belong in the class of ‘unproblematic’ artefacts 
such as automobiles.  
The problem, in short, is that academic authors have assumed that the following claim 
is true of all artefacts (including weapons): 
A) Proper use: Whether an artefact has a good, bad or neutral purpose 
depends on the intention of the artificer.6 
I intend to problematise this conception of artefacts within these pages. This viewpoint, 
which I take to be a hallmark of what I call intentionalism, takes designer intentions as 
definitive of artefact function. In other words, under this viewpoint, we can ask find out 
whether an artefact was misused or used by way of reference to the intentions of the designer. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“Nonlethal Weapons and Noncombatant Immunity: Is It Permissible to Target Noncombatants?,” Journal of 
Military Ethics 6, no. 3 (2007): 221–231), biological weapons (c.f. Mark Wheelis, “Biotechnology and 
Biochemical Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 9, no. 1 (2002): 48–53), and drones (c.f. P.W. Singer, 
Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York, NY: Penguin, 
2009); Noel Sharkey, “Saying ‘No!’ to Lethal Autonomous Targeting,” Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 
(2010): 369–83. 
 The philosophical discussion regarding guns has been largely relegated to questions regarding the 
ethics, or workability, of gun control (c.f. Hugh LaFollette, “Gun Control,” Ethics 110, no. 2 (2000): 263–81; 
Hugh Lafollette, “Controlling Guns,” Criminal Justice Ethics 20, no. 1 (2001): 34–39; Wendy Cukier, “More 
Guns, More Death,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival 18, no. 4 (2002): 367–79; Samuel C. III Wheeler, “Gun 
Violence and Fundamental Rights,” Criminal Justice Ethics 20 (2001): 19–24; Cynthia A. Stark, “Fundamental 
Rights and the Right to Bear Arms,” Criminal Justice Ethics 20, no. 1 (2001): 25–27; Whitley Kaufman, “Is 
There a ‘Right’ to Self-Defence?,” Criminal Justice Ethics 23, no. 1 (2004): 20–32; Miguel A. Faria, “Guns and 
Violence,” Medical Sentinel 7, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 112–15, 118; Nicholas Marsh, “Taming the Tools of 
Violence,” Journal of Public Health Policy, Special Section: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa: A 
Major Challenge to Public Health and Development, 28, no. 4 (2007): 401–9; Re’em Segev, “Fairness, 
Responsibility and Self-Defense,” Santa Clara Law Review 45, no. 2 (2005): 383–460; D. B. Kopel, “Trust the 
People: The Case against Gun Control,” Journal on Firearms and Public Policy 3, no. 1 (1990): 77–123. 
6
 C.f. Forge, The Responsible Scientist, 50. 
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If the designer of Tasers intended these artefacts to be used to defend life and limb, and not to 
be used as a torture device, then it seems clear that the Taser was misused when it was used 
as such. This is because the designer decides upon the conditions of usage of her device. 
Furthermore, if one sets out to design an herbicide, the intuitive response is that is what the 
designer has created, even if the herbicide turns out to only be useful as a weapon. Indeed, 
intentionalism holds that all artefacts follow this pattern: they are what they are because they 
were intended to be.  
 I hold that intentionalism is deeply problematic, and is unable to amply deal with 
central issues within artefactual metaphysics, and therefore is unable to adequately provide an 
account of weaponry. The primary failing, as we shall see, is that intentionalism is unable to 
adequately explain how artefacts lose and take on new functions, especially ones that the 
designer neither intended nor foresaw. I propose that we jettison intentionalism in favour of 
what I dub the optimality account. This requires that we give up on asking what the designer 
intended, and instead ask what function an artefact is best at performing. If this account is 
persuasive, it allows us to understand artefacts as wholly physical entities with particular 
causal powers, over and above the intentions of designers and users. As I will make plain, 
this entails that weapons are not weapons because they were intended to be used for defence 
or offence, but because they are good at harming. This thesis, then, is an attempt to provide a 
new way of looking at artefacts, unfettered by the failings of intentionalism.   
My account unfolds as follows. Chapter One addresses the role that metaphysics plays 
in coming to a better understanding of weapons, as well as illustrating the failings that 
beleaguers accounts that eschew such an approach. I begin the chapter with the famous 
example of Arthur Galston and his unfortunate discovery of the chemical compound 2,3,5-T 
which later became part of Agent Orange, despite Galston’s original intention to develop a 
new herbicide to aid with crop yields. As we will see, this renders the intuition that most 
people have that designers have the best idea of their inventions suspect. Nonetheless, there 
have been attempts to define weaponry without recourse to metaphysics, and I provide an 
analysis of one such account by Nicholas Fotion. As my analysis will show, such an account 
is unable to provide more than a cursory taxonomy of weaponry, rather than actually 
providing an account of why weapons are used for the particular ends they are useful for. 
Finally, I provide the standards by which any artefact metaphysic must meet in what follows 
as I enumerate the features of an artefact metaphysic.  
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In Chapter Two, I begin with an overview of a key debate within the philosophy of 
technology: whether artificial kinds are real. The standard position amongst metaphysicians 
has been that artefactual kinds, qua artificial kinds, are ‘ontologically deficient’ due their 
lacking some of the key attributes of natural kinds, i.e. the prototypically real. The key 
difficulty in granting artificial kinds the status of ‘real’ has been that artificial kinds are mind 
dependent. That is, without the intentions of human agents, artefacts would be nothing over-
and-above the particular physical stuff that constitutes them. This key position is bolstered by 
the entirely reasonable observation that all artefacts have authors or designers: that is, every 
artefact in existence was intentionally created, and that this means that any artefactual 
account should include, as a matter of definition, that the artefact is the product of intention. 
 Section two of chapter two is concerned with providing an account of two rival 
theories of intentionalist artefact metaphysics: the ontogenetic criterion, and the creator’s 
intended function criteria. The first of these is defined as the theory that x is an artefact iff it 
was created intentionally by a designer. This position will be found wanting in its incapability 
in adequately explaining cases of non-functioning putative artefacts. Next, I turn to creator’s 
intended function, which requires not just that a creator intended to create an artefact, but that 
the designer intended a particular function. This account fares better, and the last section will 
look at how the creator’s intended function theory fares in explaining the key features of an 
artefact metaphysic, before revealing its incapability to deal adequately with function shifts. 
 In Chapter Three I develop a rival theory that attempts to do away with intentions 
altogether: this is the optimality account. The beginning of that chapter deals with a primary 
motivation for accepting the optimality account: namely, that creators can simply be wrong 
about what they create. They are no more capable of holding fixed the meaning, or function, 
of their designs than the author of a novel can claim that her intentions determine ‘the’ 
meaning of her book. This leads to a puzzle: does this mean that there is no substantive 
distinction to be made between users and designers? Can we say that the designer of an 
artefact has no greater say regarding what an artefact is for than some group of users? I claim 
that there is a distinction that is possible, but only insofar as creators are simply more likely to 
have a good idea of the function of their artefacts due to their acquaintance with them through 
every step of the design process. After outlining the positive aspects to the theory, I end the 
chapter by anticipating and addressing some key criticisms of the theory—namely that such 
an account demands both that there are such things as optimal tokens, as well as ruling out 
the idea of broken artefacts being properly regarded as artefacts. 
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 In Chapter Four I develop an account of weaponry that amply illustrates the benefits 
of the optimality theory. I will show first how John Forge’s account applies as an example of 
the intentionalist school of thought, yielding a particular view: a weapon is a weapon because 
it was intended to be a means to harm by some designer. I take the means-to-harm criteria to 
heart, while jettisoning all talk of intentions. A gun, I will show, is not a means to harm 
because it was intended to be one, but because it is optimal as a means to harm. I will then 
briefly sketch some of the ethical consequences of this view, before concluding. 
 In sum, my thesis has two overall aims. In the first place, I wish to demonstrate , with 
particular attention paid to the case of weaponry, that intentionalist accounts of artefacts do 
not stand up to close examination. It is not satisfactory, however, to simply recommend that 
this canonical mainstay of artefactual metaphysics be jettisoned; insofar as my critique of 
intentionalism holds water, we require an alternative. My second aim, therefore, is develop 
and defend the optimality account as a viable challenger theory that can cope with the various 
difficulties intentionalism confronts. Inevitably, there will be more that can be said about this 
alternative than is articulated in the pages of this thesis. I hope to do enough, however, to 
both motivate the need for an alternative, as well as show, that the optimality account is a 
serious contender as a theory of artefactual metaphysics. 
Finally, a note on what I will conspicuously not do. Due to issues of space, I cannot 
address the morality of weaponry in any detail, and will instead focus upon the underlying 
metaphysics that supports any moral claims we may make of weaponry. This is beneficial for 
two reasons. First, I take it that if the metaphysics underlying a particular moral claim is 
flawed, the ethical claim cannot stand. This means that metaphysical inquiry can sometimes 
allow us to rule out certain avenues of inquiry tout court, or at the very least provide strong 
grounds for abandoning them.7 The optimality account that is sketched in Chapter Three will 
suggest a way forward for thinking about weapons. They are not neutral tools, and must be 
considered as intrinsically harmful. It does not follow directly from this that usage of 
weaponry is intrinsically bad. According to some theorists, using a gun for self-defence is 
                                                          
7
 Think here of the abortion debate, where both sides provide vastly different definitions of ‘persons’. Only one 
side has the metaphysics right (pro-choice theorists such as Peter Singer and Michael Tooley claim a person is 
an entity that consider itself as a continuing self through time—a capacity that is absent in foeti during 
gestation—whereas pro-life advocates have claimed that personhood is an essential feature of a foetus after 20 
weeks gestation) as the claims are mutually incompatible. Similarly, if the dichotomy is between ‘Weapons are 
morally neutral, because all artefacts are dependent upon intentions’ versus the negation of that, only one side 
can be right. It will become clear which side I fall upon. C.f. Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1972): 37–65; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 169–174. 
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justified, therefore guns themselves cannot be regarded as morally problematic.8 I don’t find 
this position convincing, although due to issues of length, I will leave off where this debate 
begins; I will largely bracket ethical concerns surrounding weaponry for the remainder of this 
work. In part, this thesis provides the first step towards a thoroughgoing ethics of weaponry, 
insofar as an ethical appraisal of weapons requires- as I think it does- a sound metaphysical 
basis. Any good theory of weaponry should be able to account for how best to understand 
artefacts in general, as weapons are not fundamentally apart from all other artefacts. Indeed, 
weapons are a subclass of artefacts in general. As a result, any account that attempts to 
understand a particular artefact should begin with a general metaphysical theory that 
undergirds our specific investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 A forceful example can be found in: Wheeler, “Gun Violence and Fundamental Rights.” 
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Chapter One: Weapons Without Metaphysics? 
1.1. An Unfortunate Lesson from History 
It is no secret that many tools can be used in ways that are contrary to the intentions of their 
creators. A new type of lens might be created with the intention of providing sports 
photographers higher zoom capabilities. Later, that very same technology could end up on a 
military drone. Dynamite was developed by Nobel to blast rock, but its military utility 
became clear soon after.9 The ‘dual-use dilemma’ involves those cases where a given piece of 
research, or a new technology, might be used in malicious ways that are contrary to the 
explicit intentions of the researcher or designer.10 This dilemma frequently appears in the life 
sciences, especially in the fields of immunology, epidemiology and virology. It is generally 
assumed that the researchers themselves should intend a ‘good’ (or at least neutral) outcome, 
such as advancing our knowledge of viral evolution.11 An ethical quandary emerges when the 
same research, however, can be utilised for evil ends, such as producing a virus that is 
resistant to vaccinations for use in a bioweapon. The US National Science Advisory Board 
for Biosecurity, for example, partially censored research related to the avian H5 HA/H1N1 
virus due to concerns that terrorists could have rendered the virus transferrable to humans, 
thereby producing a vaccine-resistant bioweapon.12  
The dual-use dilemma arises, then, when designers or researchers consider whether 
they should conduct or disseminate their research given that a) there are potentially malicious 
                                                          
9
 An enduring myth is that Nobel was unaware that his work would be used for military purposes. In fact, he 
oversaw the company Dynamit Nobel, which produced weaponry for the Reich. Nonetheless, when he produced 
dynamite it was to aid mining companies, not to produce weapons. 
10
 Technology and research in this context will be treated as roughly equivalent here. This is because the 
research of interest is only that research that brings about some tangible product that can be used (and misused). 
11
 Perhaps a counterpoint would be that some researchers do intend a harmful outcome, such as weapons 
researchers. Admittedly such individuals might not intend a ‘broadly’ harmful outcome as they might wish to 
create something that harms only the enemy, which we might call a ‘narrowly intended’ harm, or else intend to 
produce defensive weapons that cannot be rightly said to ‘harm’ at all (an issue I will return to in Section 4.4). 
In reply I note that discussion around the dual-use dilemma assumes that the researcher explicitly intends that 
her research not be used to produce, or improve upon, weaponry. See, for example Seumas Miller and Michael 
J. Selgelid, “Ethics and the Dual-Use Dilemma in the Life Sciences,” in Physicians at War : The Dual-Loyalties 
Challenge, ed. Fritz Allhoff (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008); Forge, “A Note on the Definition of ‘Dual Use’”; 
Wendee Holtcamp, “One Study, Two Paths: The Challenge of Dual-Use Research,” Environmental Health 
Perspectives 120, no. 6 (June 2012): 239–42; Zoe W. Li, “Dual Use Research: A Dilemma for Everyone,” The 
Science in Society Review 17 (Michaelmas 2012): 11–13.  
To be clear, for the remainder of this thesis whenever I speak of the intentions of designers, researchers 
and engineers in the context of dual-use, I refer solely to those individuals who hold the explicit intention that 
their research not be used to produce weaponry. 
12
 “Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H5N1 Research,” National Institutes of Health, US Department 
of Health and  Human Services, December 20, 2011, http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec2011/od-20.htm; 
Philip Hunter, “H5N1 Infects the Biosecurity Debate,” EMBO Reports 13, no. 7 (July 2012): 604–7. 
12 
 
uses of their discoveries and b) it is foreseen that there is an unwanted usage made possible 
by releasing the research (or technology) in question. Miller and Selgelid foreground the 
foreseeability requirement when they stipulate: 
For something to be an instance of a dual-use dilemma, both outcomes (the 
two horns of the dual-use dilemma) need to be (actually or potentially) 
intended (or at least foreseen) by someone.13 
An investigation of one such case will reveal something largely overlooked: that in some 
cases, something might be misunderstood as a dual-use technology, due to our largely 
intuitive assumption that creators determine the nature of what they create. Examining the 
dual-use dilemma will thus serve as starting point for the discussion to come. As will become 
clear, I dispute the claim that designers have any definitive role to play in determining what 
their creations are for. If so, someone can set out to create x but create y instead. I will begin 
with a famous example: Galston and his unwitting contribution to the creation of Agent 
Orange. 
During his graduate studies at the University of Illinios, Arthur Galston discovered 
that a chemical compound 2,3,5-T (2,3,5-triiodobenzoic acid) could increase the yield of 
soybean crops when used in small doses.14 This information, which was thought to have 
utility for farmers, was collated into his PhD thesis, which he completed in 1943. As Galston 
put it, his belief at the time was that “one could avoid involvement in the antisocial 
consequences of science simply by not working on any project that might be turned into evil 
or destructive ends.”15 Later the U.S. Army Chemical Corps studied 2,3,5-T and produced 
their own research, based upon both Galston’s original studies as well as those of his 
colleague Ian Sussex, and created the more potent compound 2,4,5-T. Using the basic 
findings of Galston and Sussex, the Corps were able to produce more effective defoliants, one 
of which is colloquially known as the weapon Agent Orange (made up of equal parts 
defoliants 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T).16 Agent Orange was infamously deployed in the Vietnam War 
to tactically clear forests and speedily destroy crops. Its deployment deprived the Viet Cong 
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(VC) of both food and cover, with the added ‘benefit’ of forcing rural populations to move 
south, where they could no longer aid the VC in their guerrilla activities against U.S. soldiers. 
Galston himself was entirely unaware of the uses of a defoliant as a weapon, and only 
learned that his research was utilised by the military years after he conducted his initial 
research.17 Given his stated position on the use of chemical and biological weapons, if 
Galston had foresight he may have either sought to control the dissemination of his thesis, or 
even refrained from submitting it altogether. In ignorance of this possibility, however, no 
such measures were undertaken by him. At the time of his research, the WWII theatres of war 
had no obvious use for a defoliant of the kind made possible by the discovery of 2,3,5-T. Had 
he known of this possibility, Galston might have honoured their commitments as signatories 
to United Nations Resolution of December 5, 1966. In part, that statement states that 
signatories will seek “cessation of the development and production of chemical and 
bacteriological weapons.”18 As it turned out, the United States did not honour this document 
(instead arguing that a defoliant did not count as a chemical weapon), and developed 
weaponry that Galston’s research made possible.  
Recall that the description of the dual-use dilemma provided above includes a 
foreseeability criterion. ‘Someone’ must foresee both the probable good and bad outcomes of 
releasing the work. Usually this someone is taken to refer to the designer or researcher.19 If 
so, it appears that we are in a position to claim that Galston’s case is not an instance of the 
dual-use dilemma, as he did not in fact foresee the ‘bad’ outcome of his research. This may 
be, but we can imagine that he could have had the foresight of Ezra Kraus, chair of the 
University of Chicago’s Department of Botany. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour, Kraus volunteered his services to the war effort. He produced a paper, “Plant 
Growth Regulators: Possible Uses”, by December 1941, outlining the possible military utility 
of a defoliant, such as the potential to destroy rice crops, and to reveal military depots hidden 
in dense forests.20 After studying 2,4-D, one half of the mixture that would eventually 
become Agent Orange, Kraus and colleagues conducted research into the utility of 2,4,5-T as 
a military defoliant. The end of the war cut short the research, but it proved invaluable for 
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later research into the compounds for military applications.21 Later, as outlined, the 
compounds were mixed together in equal parts to be used both in the Malaysian Emergency 
and during Vietnam, in much the same way that Kraus envisioned. Let us therefore accept 
that Galston could have foreseen the potential that his research showed potential as a weapon.  
Galston’s intention, as indicated, was that 2,3,5-T would be used for good. While the 
military research went on in secret, 2,3,5-T and the more potent 2,4,5-T, were disseminated 
for public usage as a domestic and commercial herbicide. A February 1945 issue of Better 
Homes and Gardens extolled the virtues of spraying of 2,4,5-T to control weeds, and was 
regarded as something approaching a miracle pesticide.22 Kraus himself spoke of the 
domestic utility of the compounds he had researched, claiming that they provided what he 
considered an unparalleled capacity to control the yield and quality of crops.23 The botanist 
Alden Crafts summed up the enthusiasm surrounding the new herbicides as follows:  
[they] not only killed plants by contact action; it translocated from the tops into the 
roots of perennial weeds; it was selective against many broad-leaved weeds in cereal 
and grass crops; it was absorbed from the soil by young seedlings with fatal results 
and hence could be used by the pre-emergence method; it was nontoxic to man and 
animals; and it was a cheap and potent chemical capable of controlling weeds at a cost 
as low as $1.00 per acre or less for the chemical.24 
This pattern of usage constitutes the ‘good’ use of the chemical compounds. Such usage was 
in line with Galston’s original intentions for the compound he researched, and indeed for 
many decades it looked as if the compound was particularly suited for such domestic 
purposes.  
 So it appears as if Galston’s case is, in the context of the dual-use dilemma, 
unremarkable. He produced research which produced a technology that could be used for the 
good and intended use, as well as for a bad, unintended, use. But there is a wrinkle in this 
narrative. Despite the widespread enthusiasm surrounding the domestic usage of 2,4,5-T, by 
1969 there were some doubts surrounding the suitability of the compound to act as a 
domestic herbicide. By June 1969, while 2,4,5-T was already being deployed militarily in 
Vietnam, a study emerged that linked low dosages of the compound to cancers in mice and, 
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later, the same researchers discovered that higher dosages produced stillbirths and 
mutations.25 Such findings were not widely accepted, mostly due to the efficacy of the 
herbicides for commercial purposes, a linkage the USDA made clear in their response to the 
findings: 
As you know, the herbicide 2,4,5-t is a major production tool, which has 
increased food production in the United States and abroad. Farmers use this 
herbicide to protect their crops against the devastation caused by weeds and 
brush, and to increase the production of pastures, rangelands, and grain crops 
[…] We believe it would be extremely unfortunate to permit those opposed to 
the war in Vietnam to center their anxiety in the defoliation program, and 
through the improper use and interpretation of the results of such a preliminary 
toxicological study, achieve cancellation of the use of an important 
agricultural tool, which has been so effective in increasing food supplies in the 
world, and in reducing the loss of lives through enemy ambushes in Southeast 
Asia.26 
 
Nonetheless, in late December 1969, the Association for the Advancement of Science called 
on government to limit human contact with 2,4,5-T in both the domestic United States as well 
as in Vietnam. By January 1970 an article in the New Republic broke the story that 2,4,5-T 
was toxic, containing teratogenic dioxins that are among the most toxic known.27 Finally, by 
April 1970 the federal government resolved to limit human exposure in the United States and, 
pointedly, South Vietnam. In short, by mid-1970 2,4,5-T was only useful utilised as a weapon 
(discounting those who continued to use the compound despite warnings).  
 What are we to make of purported cases of dual-use technology when the original, 
intended function no longer applies? Perhaps the most intuitive understanding of this affair is 
to claim that 2,4,5-T remains a herbicide that was merely misused by researchers working for 
the military. The fact that the compound was found to be too toxic for domestic purposes is 
neither here nor there if this viewpoint is to be believed.28 The intentions of the designer are 
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taken as definitive of the function of artefacts under this view, which I shall dub an 
‘intentionalist’ account of artefacts.29 This account allows us to speak of the proper usage of 
an artefact, even in the face of the artefact’s inability to be ultimately useful at its intended 
usage. There is a litany of quotidian cases of intentionalism available: it is perfectly natural to 
say, for example, duct tape has been shown to be singularly unsuitable for sealing heating 
ducts.30 Yet we still call this suboptimal duct sealant, pointedly, duct tape.  
 The only way we can make sense of the claim that 2,3,5-T is a dual-use technology is 
via reference to the intentions of Galston. Even though 2,3,5-T fails utterly to be a useful 
herbicide for domestic use, due to its extreme toxicity, it remains specifically listed in the 
internationally recognised Wassenaar Arrangement that specifically lists dual use 
technologies that are to be strictly controlled.31 Indeed, as we shall see, intentionalism 
pervades our common understanding of artefacts, and may be the source of our difficulties in 
understanding Galston’s case. However, as I shall argue in the course of this thesis, 
intentionalism is unable to explain cases such as Galston’s, where the intentions of the 
designer simply do not match the eventual function of the artefact. 
1.2. Unintentional Creators? 
Intentionalism has become the default view within artefactual metaphysics, partially because 
people intuitively categorise artefacts on the basis of designer intentions.32 If something was 
designed to be a mop, for instance, most will consider it to be a mop, even in cases where it 
functions badly at mopping. An explanation for why philosophers may wish to mirror this 
understanding could be because humans are adept tool users; it appears unlikely in the 
extreme that we could be anything other than authoritative about artefacts, given that they are 
a ubiquitous feature of our lived environments.33 The result of this view is that the dual-use 
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dilemma is meaningfully applied to cases such as Agent Orange, even when one of the uses 
falls out of favour. 
 The central aim of this thesis is to critique intentionalism, and provide a viable 
alternative. Instead of focusing upon the intentions of the designer, the account I will develop 
will claim that what matters is the capacities of the artefact itself to inhabit functional roles. I 
have dubbed this account the ‘optimality approach’, due to its grounding supposition that an 
artefact is defined by its capacity to occupy a functional role. Whereas the intentionalist 
claims that Galston’s intentions define 2,4,5-T as a herbicide, I claim that 2,4,5-T was never a 
herbicide. It may have been used as an herbicide, but it was not suitable for this use due to its 
extreme toxicity, in much the same way that one might drink vodka directly after a basketball 
game but that does not mean that vodka is thereby a sports drink. It is not enough that 
something can occupy a functional role, it must be the case that it occupies a functional role 
well—a factor that the intentionalist account leaves largely unaccounted for. Any herbicide 
intended for domestic usage on crops, in farms and in gardens, cannot be toxic to the degree 
that 2,4,5-T is and perform its intended function (hence why the product was restricted for 
these uses). That leaves just one functional role, namely, its function as a weapon. 
 This may sound uncontentious enough, until a consequence of an optimality account 
is spelled out: if we focus on functional roles rather than the creator’s intention, Galston did 
not create an herbicide at all. He created, somehow without knowing he was doing so, a 
weapon. Indeed, when we are faced with a dual-use technology, whenever the technology is 
better at its ‘bad’ use it is just for that bad use, even if the artificer intends only the good use. 
This amounts to the claim that in cases where an artefact is better at the ‘bad’ use than its 
potential good use, it is for the bad use, and therefore not really dual-use technology at all! I 
am therefore claiming that not only are artificers not the ultimate arbiters of their own 
creation, they can be entirely wrong about what they are creating. One can set out to create 
one thing and end up with something entirely different, and intentions have little, if anything, 
to say on the matter.34   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
no. 2 (2003): 261–89; Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers, “The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts,” Studies In 
History and Philosophy of Science 37 (2006): 1–2. 
34
 Daniel C. Dennett, “The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 50 (1990): 177–94; Don Ihde, “The Designer Fallacy and 
Technological Imagination,” in Philosophy and Design, ed. Pieter E. Vermaas et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2009): 
51-59. 
18 
 
Of course, intuition rebels almost immediately. The common-sense view of the 
relationship between designer and artefact is that technology is the product of an intention, 
and that this intention goes a long way (some, such as Hilpinen in the next chapter, would 
claim all the way) towards determining the nature of any given technology. Galston’s 
intention was to boost crop yields, and the mere fact that his technology was suboptimal at 
this task has no bearing on the matter. This explains why we say that his technology was 
misused, rather than simply ‘used’, as a chemical weapon.  
The intentionalist intuition is precisely what gives the dual-use dilemma its pull, as it 
would simply dissolve if all technologies that were primarily (or solely, as in Galston’s case) 
useful as weapons just were weapons. There would be no dilemma for those who want to 
refrain from designing weapons if this were so: simply do not produce the technology.35 If 
one wants to maintain this form of the dilemma, the fact that the technology was not intended 
to be a weapon must have some actual basis in the nature of the technology itself. This opens 
the door, inevitably, to metaphysics. We need to be clear on what exactly a weapon is to 
answer the key question of whether it is possible to create one without intending to.  
1.3. A Non-Metaphysical Approach 
While I will be providing an account in this thesis that focuses upon what could be called 
‘artefactual metaphysics,’ it is instructive to consider the benefits and drawbacks of relying 
on a pragmatic, non-metaphysical outlook upon weapons, despite whatever pragmatic 
benefits such an approach may offer. One variant of such a pragmatic approach could be 
termed ‘artefactual categorisation’. This involves ‘carving up’ the types of weapons in 
common use, looking for differences that will fall naturally into particular subclasses without 
feeling the need to ‘drill down’ into their essential, or intrinsic, natures. Nicholas Fotion 
divides weapons into the following broad categories: disabling, reaching and locating 
weapons.36 I will go through each in some detail, before revealing the shortcomings of this 
framework. Note, before I move on, that his account is entirely pragmatic; Fotion is not 
interested in the metaphysics of weaponry, nor artefacts, but he is interested in weapons 
insofar as they relate to just war theory. There is no need, as far as his analysis goes, to ‘carve 
nature at its joints’ and figure out how weapons fit in with the rest of artefacts. As we shall 
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see, this is the fatal flaw of this approach.  
His classificatory schema runs as follows: 
 Disabling/destructive-type weapons: disabling weapons are those artefacts that 
actually disable or destroy the enemy.37 This includes explosives, bullets, shells, flames, 
chemical agents, and the like. These weapons are sometimes regarded, strictly, as being the 
only ‘true’ class of weapons.38 Under this viewpoint, a gun is not a weapon, as the gun does 
not itself do any damage against the enemy; the gun is just the thing that houses and propels 
the thing that disables or kills. Fotion wisely notes that if we wished to take this view of 
weaponry as exhaustive it would be hopelessly narrow. By the same argument, a pen does not 
write, the ink does. It is for this reason that Fotion includes reaching and locating type 
weapons. 39 
 Reaching-type weapons: These are sometimes understood as delivery-type weapons, 
as they deliver a disabling weapon to their target. These would include cannons, guns, 
grenade launchers, etc.40 If we understand weapons in terms of their function (as Fotion 
urges), then these weapons are such as to enable the user to reach out to the enemy with a 
disabling/destructive type weapon. This broad understanding of a weapon (or at least a 
broader understanding than the above ‘narrow’ understanding whereby only bullets, rockets, 
etc. count as bone fide weapons) allows us to characterise weapons along the line of standard 
usage of the term. No one, including experts in the area, would balk at classifying an AR-15 
as a weapon, even if an unloaded AR-15 is strictly incapable of doing any damage to 
anyone.41 More contentious, though, is the third category of weapons: locating-type weapons. 
 Locating-type weapons: this final category in Fotion’s taxonomy includes those 
artefacts that are not directly involved in engaging the enemy, as they function to locate the 
enemy rather than disable or destroy them. Such artefacts include sonar, radar, telescopic 
sights for rifles, as well as GPS transmitters for such weapons as artillery pieces. Such 
locating technology allows for the user to discriminate targets from non-targets, find targets 
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that are present, and locate such targets reliably.42 The difficulty in considering such artefacts 
as weapons comes from the remoteness of the technology, as well as the use of disabling 
weapons. No telescopic sight has ever actually caused, in isolation, any damage to any 
individual, nor has radar or sonar, both of which have civilian applications. It is only when 
the sight is utilised in a particular way in tandem with a weapons system that is it possible for 
it to be involved in engaging with an enemy.  
 Fotion defends the inclusion of this class of weaponry on the basis of association. He 
states that: 
…these instruments, more often than not, are tied too intimately to other kinds 
of weapons to deserve being singled out for separate treatment. In this sense, 
the gunsight seems too closely associated with the gun not to count as a 
weapon. So does the radar installation used to guide the surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs). Homing devices on cruise missiles seem to be even more closely 
associated with that weapon’s other functions to permit any separate 
treatment.43 
While I see the utility of this approach, particularly given Fotion’s project of providing a 
book on military ethics that makes no substantive metaphysical claims, his approach falls 
short of providing an account that is explanatorily adequate. ‘Association’ is too loose a 
concept to do the work entrusted to it, given that a great many artefacts are closely associated 
with others without thereby being considered part of the same class of artefact (consider the 
association between a washer and dryer, for instance). Fotion goes on to state that ‘another 
possibility is to think of locating devices as parts of total weapon systems, where such 
systems are thought of as combinations of weapons and other war instruments rather than as 
weapons.’44 This view is equally unjustified, as it claims that a system can include artefacts 
within it that are to be considered ‘war instruments’ despite the fact that, in some cases, the 
‘war instrument’ in question is properly regarded as a necessary component of a weapon.  
 The difficulty with this third category, as far as I can see, is that of reconciling the 
character of these artefacts with the following intuitive condition: 
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B) Counterfactual dependence: for any component c, to be said to be a 
subcomponent of an artefact x, it must be the case that without c, 
x’s function would not come about. 
Obviously in some cases this condition is met (think here of a GPS transmitter being 
connected to an artillery piece such that it cannot fire without coordinates being entered). In 
many cases, though, locating-type weapons are not integral to any weapon’s functioning, 
where the technology instead enables efficient usage of a disabling-type weapon. A red-dot 
sight on a submachine gun aids the user to make more accurate shots without being overly 
cumbersome, for instance. The gun would certainly be usable without the addition of this 
sight, however, and thus fails to be counterfactually required, unlike the disabling and 
reaching functions of the firearm. 
 Nonetheless, the counterfactual condition is deleteriously narrow. Take, for example, 
the double action of a modern-day pistol. This enables the user to fire the pistol without 
having to manually cock the hammer between shots, increasing the shots-per-minute possible 
with the weapon. This would also fail the counterfactual conditional outlined above, as the 
function is still brought about in the absence of such a mechanism, albeit less reliably or 
easily.45 It thus cannot be the case that strict counterfactual dependence must be maintained, 
as it would rule out a great many artefacts/components that seem to clearly count. As a result, 
I think it is more plausible to require that we consider components as weapons when they are 
entangled with disabling/reaching in the following way: 
C) Entanglement: component c is entangled with the functionality of 
artefact x iff it were the case that if c were not present, x would be 
less capable of performing its function in situation(s) Sn, where Sn 
specifies the normal operating environment(s) of x. 
 This condition has the benefit of being applicable to non-weapon analyses, as well as 
the particular study undertaken here. Consider a functional, but non-essential attachment of a 
common artefact: a non-stick surface stuck on the underside of a computer mouse. While this 
is non-essential to the function of a mouse (namely, to enable the manipulation of a pointer in 
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a graphical user interface) this surface enables more fine-tuned manipulations of this pointer. 
Thus it can be considered part of the ‘mouse system,’ given that the component in question 
enables the mouse to function more reliably than otherwise, even if it could function in the 
absence of this non-stick surface. Locating weapons are entangled in the same way, as they 
enable the usage of the weapon at greater distances, or with greater ease, or with higher 
degrees of accuracy, and so on. Indeed, the entanglement condition helps explain why we 
should include reaching weapons as weapons, despite their inability to directly disable or 
destroy.46  
 We are now in a position to evaluate Fotion’s analysis, starting with the points in 
favour of such a study. A positive aspect of categorising artefacts according to these three 
classes is that it explains, in deliberately non-moral terms, how it is that an artefact disables 
or destroys, given that weapons all contribute to this ultimate goal. Thus we can claim that in 
the case of a firearm such as a rifle, the bullet (disabling-type) is fired by the rifle (reaching-
type) that is affixed with a telescopic sight (locating-type). Reaching-type and locating-type 
weapons can thereby to be represented as in figure 1a. 
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Figure 1a: A possible weapon system. 
 Here the function of the weapon system resides is in its capacity to deliver the 
disabling-type weapon to a target. Does this picture of weaponry suffice, such that we can say 
definitively that weapons are those artefacts that deliver a disabling-type ordinance on a 
target? At first blush, this seems adequate, as our focus is on the ‘primary’ weapon: the 
destructive or disabling capacity of the system as a whole. Nonetheless, such destructive or 
disabling capacity is merely necessary, not sufficient, for something to be a weapon. As 
mentioned, for an artefact to be properly understood, we must widen our frame of reference 
beyond mere physical capacities to encompass what could be properly understood as an end, 
or purpose  
Weapons, much like any artefact, are multiply describable. For a given description to 
be adequate, however, it must be capable of bearing explanatory power. Attempted 
reductions of artefacts to lower-level descriptions do not possess this capacity. If we 
described a gun, say, as being made out of carbon fibre and steel, and capable of propelling 
lead at a high velocity, this would not suffice as a description. Such lower-level descriptions 
do not explain why it is that such an object exists, nor enable us to predict its future 
behaviour or the environment in which this functionality is desirable. Even if we wished to 
describe chemical or biological weapons in this way (describing a weapon as being 
constituted by Bacillus anthrax, for instance) it does not tell us why it is that such items are 
weapons. Just as when we describe pain as C-fibres firing47 we lose our capacity to explain 
pain qua unpleasant sensation. 48 By operating at the wrong grain of analysis, we are unable to 
explain and predict patterns of usage of weaponry when we focus upon lower-level 
descriptions.  
 Fotion’s analysis fails in the task of providing an adequate account of weaponry as it 
is simply too fine-grained to adequately describe what end weaponry enables the user to 
achieve. Weaponry is described neutrally by Fotion, insofar as it is considered a means of 
delivering a disabling-type ordinance on a target. However, as I have suggested earlier in this 
chapter, this is not the end that is made possible by the usage of weaponry. The task that 
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weaponry is put to is to cause harm to others, be they human or nonhuman animals.49 Take a 
common type of weapon: the M7 bayonet (see figure 1b), issued to all members of the United 
States armed forces supplied with the M16 rifle during the Vietnam War. 
 
Figure 1b: The M7 bayonet.50 
While this may at first appear to be nothing other than an ordinary knife, the way the M7 
functions is quite unlike the nature of a kitchen knife. The morphological features of the M7 
offer some key clues. The most telling difference is in the indent starting at the middle and 
moving to the tip. This is known as a ‘fuller’, and it allows the blade to maintain its stiffness 
while being lighter to wield, a feature that is rarely found on domestic knives. Another hint as 
to its true function is found upon viewing the crosspiece (otherwise known as a ‘guard’) 
which is such that the hand is unlikely to slip downwards if the bayonet is used in a 
downward, stabbing motion (unlike an ordinary kitchen knife, which almost never utilises 
any such guard), and includes a hole through which a rifle barrel can fire. This design of this 
bayonet (an example of a particular subclass of bayonets known as a ‘ring fitting bayonet’) 
became standard upon the advent of breech loading rifles, as longer bayonets (which were 
closer in appearance to a sword than a knife) were unwieldy, and ultimately unnecessary as 
bayonet charges became obsolete. 
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 In describing this artefact, it is clear that the proper end towards which it is employed 
cannot be merely ‘to perform as a force multiplier,’ ‘provide a sharp edge’ or any such lower-
level description. The question of why anyone should wish to multiply their physical force, or 
possess a sharp edged object, would remain unanswered. The difficulty is that a lower-level 
description results in an inappropriate description of the ends that the technology is used to 
bring about. Rifles are not used to deliver disabling agents into targets (even if this is the type 
of talk that one can find within army manuals). The M7 bayonet above does not function as if 
it were an ordinary knife, for it includes features that are extraneous to that end. Admittedly, 
it could be used as a kitchen knife, but this would be a repurposing. In other words, whilst 
Fotion does provide an ends-orientated description of weapons, the ends he identifies are still 
too fine-grained. There is no attempt to show why people would want things that locate, reach 
and destroy. 
1.4. Ends-orientated Descriptions of Artefacts 
Fotion’s account had some promise. His account does factor in some key teleological features 
of the artefact in question, in that some weapons directly destroy, while other weapons either 
reach or locate. Under this account, we are capable of providing an answer as to what 
weapons are for: disabling or destroying directly, or else enabling the delivery of disabling or 
destructive agents. Thus if one wants to destroy or disable, one has a good reason for 
choosing a weapon to bring about this goal. However, under an optimality analysis, which I 
will develop in Chapter Three, this will not suffice: the artefacts themselves are not simply 
optimal at disabling or destroying. They do more than this: they harm.51  
Weapons are found on battlefields and on the hips of the police not due to their 
capacity to cause tissue damage, but their capacity to harm others. A good example of this is 
found in the types of bullets that are commonly sold. Rather than there being merely one type 
of bullet available to consumers, there are a great many subtypes with differing functional 
roles. Consider the difference between a full metal jacket round versus a hollow-point round. 
The first is composed of a core made of lead that is then commonly encased in a copper alloy. 
When fired, the high muzzle velocity means that the round is likely to enter the target and 
pierce through, with sufficient velocity as to be lethal to anyone who is struck subsequently. 
Meanwhile, a hollow-point round is composed of a soft tip, with a hollowed out section, 
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partially encased in a thinner copper alloy. This means that when the round enters a body, it 
expands and causes massive tissue damage, without penetrating entirely through the body.  
 If we left the story there, we would be none the wiser as to why these rounds are good 
choices for particular situations. Take the following scenario, common in the United States: 
discharging a firearm against a home invader, in a house with multiple inhabitants. It is quite 
common for persons who wish to own a firearm for home defence purposes to be advised to 
utilise a hollow-point loadout to prevent rounds punching through the intended target, 
continuing on through drywall (a common material in North American homes) and 
potentially harming a family member. Hollow-point ammunition also provides greater 
stopping power to the defender than full metal jacket rounds, due to the difference in severity 
of wounding. While full metal jacket rounds produce a very neat ‘channel’ through the body, 
hollow point rounds expand within the body, producing horrific internal cavities to anyone 
unlucky enough to be struck by one. The benefit of a full metal jacket is found when we 
consider open-air warfare, where rounds have to be relatively accurate at range. Full metal 
jacket rounds excel at this task, being far more accurate than their hollow point counterparts.  
 Harm fits this story better than mere tissue damage, as the focus is placed upon the 
capacities of the weapon to stop human beings qua beings who do not wish to be stopped. 
The capacities of this ammunition revolve around the ends of particular human beings, and 
the capacity to fit in with the needs of the gun-wielder, such that they can bring about the 
end-state they desire—namely, both a wounded intruder, and unharmed loved ones sleeping 
in the next room. If we left the story at the mere destruction of tissue, we would be unable to 
explain how this is a harm, where harm is both the desired function of the ammunition, as 
well as the actual capacity of the artefact. This represents a course-grained description of the 
ends of a weapon, as depicted in figure 1c: 
Lower-level physical 
description 
Fine-grained ends-orientated 
description 
Course-grained ends-orientated 
description 
A substance made up of 
1,3,5-Trinitroperhydro-1,3,5-
triazine. 
A substance capable of sustaining 
an exothermic reaction. 
An easily malleable plastic 
explosive, easily transported, and 
used to produce controlled 
explosions. 
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An object constructed of 
parts composed of carbon 
fibre, steel, lead and 
gunpowder. 
A reaching-type weapon, loaded 
with disabling-type weapons. 
A medium-range instrument to 
kill or wound. 
Figure 1c: A table of possible descriptions of weapons. 
One may wish to object here and state that this is a mere terminological dispute. 
Disabling/destroying just is harming, and it is a matter of taste whether or not this term is 
used.52 If one wished, one could go through all of Fotion’s remarks and substitute the term 
‘harm’ for disabling/destroying and there would be no difference. Perhaps so, but this is 
down to a tendency of those who write on this subject to slide, without clear justification, 
between destructive/disabling capacities of weapon and the more loaded description of 
harming. This tendency is unjustified because there are significant differences between 
destroying/disabling capacities, on the one hand, and harming on the other. 
 For one thing, there are many destructive agents that are not strictly weapons. 
Consider here explosives that are used for demolitions. Obviously, such substances are 
capable of destroying—indeed, this is what they are used for, and yet this is not their optimal 
use, nor their intended use, at least in their common configuration. Similarly, anaesthetic is 
used for disabling, and yet the gases used are not chemical weapons. The requirement is that 
weapons must be for something other than disabling or destroying, as there are too many 
artefacts that fulfil this role and yet are clearly not to be considered weaponry.  
 Secondly, the destructive/disabling capabilities are better understood as a method of 
bringing about the primary function of harming (see figure 1d). Consider an analogy: 
signage. To alert drivers that they should stop at an intersection, signs might have the word 
‘STOP’ emblazoned upon them, as they do in Australia. The same message could be 
communicated via the use of a red cross, or a purple circle. In this case there are two methods 
of bringing about the same function: alerting the driver that they should stop at an 
intersection. In the case of weapons, the pattern is reproduced. Disabling or destructive 
weapons are just methods of bringing about harm. In some cases, the user of a weapon will 
deploy a delivery system that will disable (Tasers being a particularly common example, with 
police officers deploying them at quite a high rate in Australia and the United States), in 
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others they will deploy a destructive weapon. 
 
Figure 1d: diagram of weapon delivery methods. 
 
 This is not to say that harm is intended in all uses of a weapon, however. The beliefs 
and intentions of the deploying agent may be not to harm. Think here of a police officer who 
deploys a Taser to stop someone who is likely to harm themselves, and who (wrongly) 
believes that a Taser is a relatively harmless way of subduing an escaping suspect. While this 
scenario is entirely possible, the function of artefacts is independent of particular users 
beliefs. In such cases, the user is simply mistaken as to what the function of their weapon is. 
A ‘pure’ disabling-type weapon—that is, a weapon that is designed intentionally to disable an 
assailant rather than kill—still harms. After all, preventing some harm via disabling an 
assailant is still a harm, even if it is ultimately morally justified. A Taser fires thousands of 
volts of electricity, at a distance of 3-5 metres, causing neuromuscular incapacitation. Such an 
artefact is decidedly sub-optimal for use for any purpose other than either deploying on other 
persons, or else threatening its use, and indeed it is the threat of pain that allows Tasers to be 
used as a threat. In short, it is used to stop people from moving who would otherwise wish to 
continue moving, and it is used for this purpose because it is good at fulfilling this role.53 
 Both intentionalism, and my alternative optimality approach, can be developed such 
that harming is a defining feature of weaponry. The key difference between the two is 
whether an artefact is to be considered as a weapon because it was intended to harm, or 
because it is particularly good at harming. Intentionalism has intuition on its side, insofar as 
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adult users of technology are largely in agreement that the creator’s intended function of an 
artefact is the function. This isn’t to say that intentionalism is solely grounded in 
commensensical notion. Rather, philosophically respectable, metaphysical accounts have 
been elaborated that are taken to justify this key intentionalist claim. These accounts are 
sophisticated, and in articulating my own alternative, I must, explain a key set of features that 
are taken by the public and philosophers alike as unique to artefacts.   
1.5. Requirements for an Artefact Metaphysic 
This section is concerned with elucidating exactly what is required from a thoroughgoing 
artefactual metaphysic. I will begin by highlighting particular conditions that any acceptable 
account of artefacts must be able to meet, both explanatorily and predictively. These features 
map onto particular key desiderata that any account much fulfil, as they correspond to 
observed features of artefacts as we experience them in everyday life. Of course, as I am 
articulating the requirements for an artefact metaphysic, the features enumerated are an 
attempt to provide an explanation of why these features are shared amongst artefacts, going 
beyond the mere appearances of the artefacts that we are familiar with to pick out particular 
commonalities that are taken as typifying of artefacts. As a result, any candidate theory of 
artefact metaphysics must be able to provide an explanation as to why these features, in 
combination, are shared by artefacts and only artefacts.54  
To begin with, any artefactual metaphysic must explain why it is that artefacts are: 
1) means-to-an-end (hereafter MTE). 
2) used as MTE for the particular ends in question, i.e. its particular end-
appropriateness.  
These two aspects are the most pressing for any artefactual metaphysic to explain. Artefacts 
are things that are to be used for achieving goals, such as building bridges, destroying ones 
enemies, fighting in wartime and so on. An account must give pride of place to this task, in 
both explaining how and why an artefact is a MTE, as well as why this particular artefact is 
used by its community of users to bring about that particular end.  
Assuming that a given account is capable of providing an acceptable account of 1 and 2, 
the next task is to explain the following features of artefacts: 
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3) Function-shifts, i.e. how it is that artefacts change function over time, and why. 
4) The ontological nature of artefacts, i.e. why it is that it seems as if artefacts are both 
concrete and mind dependent simultaneously, otherwise known as the dual-nature of 
artefacts theory. 
5) Normativity of artefacts, i.e. why we can speak meaningfully of there being ways that 
artefacts are supposed to be used. 
6) The differences between broken, non-functioning and malfunctioning artefacts. 
 Features 1-6, when taken together, are jointly sufficient to provide a minimally 
acceptable account of artefacts. If 1 through 6 are explicated under a candidate theory, it 
might be too much to say that it counts as a complete theory of artefacts. 1-6 represents 
merely the least one should require of a given artefact theory, although it is possible (as I 
shall show in chapter three) to radically reconsider our naïve intuitions regarding them. In 
other words, the task for an artefact theory is either to explain each of these features, or to 
explain them away. I take it that intentionalist accounts, which I will be canvassing in the 
next chapter, take each of these features as justified by common-sense experience. 
Meanwhile, the optimality account I will develop in Chapter Three will problematise our 
ordinary understanding of 4-6. Before any of this is achievable, I will first turn to these 
features to provide short explanations of what is meant by each. 
1.6. Features of an Artefact Theory Outlined 
1.7.1. Means-to-an-end 
Whenever I speak of an ‘artefact’, the term is intended to refer to solely technical artefacts. 
By restricting the usage of the term in this way, I disregard such objects as artworks, religious 
artefacts, and so on. My account focuses on things that are utilised by agents in a particular 
way: they are there to perform some job, whatever this job may be. In this way technical 
artefacts differ from rocks, for example, as when we take up a flat stone to form a makeshift 
hammer (although this is a matter to which I shall return in the next chapter).55 The solidity of 
the hammer allows such a use, but this does not transform the rock from a piece of granite 
into a hammer. We use hammers to drive in nails, rather than using rocks, as this is what 
hammers are for.56 In short, technical artefacts are means to some particular end (MTE), 
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where the end in question is conceptualised as some practical aim of agents.57 Thus, the 
relationship between an artefact and its ends is expressed as follows:  
D) MTE: artefact x is a means to an end, e, iff x is such that if an agent 
A wishes to bring about e then A has a reason to use x.58 
Much here hinges both upon what is meant by ‘has a reason to use x’, as well as how 
we are to understand the capacities of x, but I will bracket this issue at present. It will suffice 
here to point out that one does not need to recognise that x will bring about her ends for x to 
be a means to her ends, and thereby provide her with a reason to utilise x to bring about e. I 
may be ignorant, for instance, that a liquid I keep in my pantry doubles as a snakebite 
remedy, and yet that liquid is a MTE of relieving the pain associated with snakebites.59 If I 
knew that the liquid in question had these properties, I would thereby know that it would be a 
means to my particular ends. As a result, MTE has the character of a hypothetical imperative: 
if the agent knows enough about the features of x, and actually wants to bring about e, then A 
has a good reason to use x. Further, she has a reason to choose x over other objects that do not 
function specifically to bring about e, such as a rock in the context of hammering.60 
1.7.2. Ends Appropriateness  
Separable from any explanation of how an artefact can be utilised as a MTE is the question of 
why a particular artefact is utilised to bring about the particular end in question. This 
explanatory question is conceptually distinct, and answers to the how question will diverge 
from answers to the why question. For instance, we might come upon a person hammering in 
a nail with their shoe, thereby using their shoe as a means to an end- namely, a means to a 
hammered-in-nail. Nonetheless, this is not the particular end that shoes are for. Artefacts sit 
in a relation with their ends, such that a hammer is literally for hammering, a car is literally 
for road transportation, and a kitchen knife is literally for cutting up foodstuffs. An adequate 
artefact theory will explain how it is that we can speak of artefacts in this way, such that they 
are literally for the jobs they perform. In other words, out of the possible ends that an artefact 
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can be used for (which would be potentially infinite) we must be able to pick out the 
appropriate ends for that artefact. To illustrate briefly, anything of sufficient weight can be a 
paperweight, such as a pair of loafers, and yet loafers are not said to be both shoes and 
paperweights.  
To partially explicate this point, I will here introduce what can be called the further 
fact view:61 
E) For an artefact to be properly classified, we must make reference to 
some further fact about the artefact over and above bare 
morphological features, particular classificatory locutions, or bare 
capacities. 
We do not, for instance, place much stock in a child’s attempt at building a helicopter out of 
popsicle sticks, despite their loud and repeated protestations that this contraption is in fact a 
helicopter.62 Nor do we assume that because a model car looks like a normal car (albeit in 
much smaller form) that it is a car. Nor do we think that because something can be used for a 
particular purpose that it is thereby the sort of thing that is for that particular use. Instead, we 
in fact claim that there must be some further fact about them: something that is not explicable 
merely in terms of naming practices, outward appearance, or a given capacity. 63 This means 
that an adequate artefact metaphysic must be able to explain why that artefact is a means to an 
end via recourse to a further fact about the artefact, over and above its mere physical 
structure. In chapters two and three I will endeavour to provide this further fact: in Chapter 
two I will both articulate and critique arguments which identify it with the designers’ intent, 
while in Chapter Three I argue that optimality better occupies this role. 
1.7.3. Function-shifts 
In any metaphysical account, it is always useful to be able to pick out features that are unique 
to the given entity, or class of entities, that is under inquiry. One feature of artefacts that 
appears to be unique is their capacity to change their functional character depending on the 
environment, the community of users, or the patterns of usage among said users. At any given 
time, an individual artefact might be used in two entirely different ways in two disconnected 
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cultures. Consider, for example, a sad-iron, which was 64 designed to provide people with the 
capacity to iron their clothing. But as electronic irons became more readily available and 
affordable, people stopped using the sad-iron for its original use. Nowadays, it is not 
uncommon to find people using it as a doorstop, or bookend.  
 The sad-iron is an instance of what I shall term a ‘function-shift’. Under a function 
shift, an artefact that had one function takes on a different (sometimes radically different) 
function, without having undergone any substantial physical change. No designer changed 
the artefact to provide it with its new function, and so function-shifts may occur (as in 
Galston’s case, above) without the designer having any knowledge of this eventuality. An 
adequate artefact metaphysic will be able to explain function-shifts, either by validating them 
(i.e. claiming that an artefact has changed functionally to now occupy a new functional 
description, as under optimality), or by questioning whether function-shifts are genuine 
occurrences (as we will encounter in the next chapter). We will see the importance of this 
concept in the next two chapters, as intentionalism is unable to fully accommodate this 
feature, while optimality can (see sections 2.7.5 and 3.9.3). 
1.7.4. The Dual Nature of Artefacts 
It is no secret that in philosophy of mind, the so-called ‘mind-body problem’ has remained, 
despite the best efforts of many great thinkers, a problem. It just seems so obvious to so many 
that the mind and the body are vastly different, and any account that would attempt to reduce 
(as so many physicalists have) the mind to the body must be able to clear a key hurdle. That 
is to say, . the task is, in part, to explain why it is that the mind-body problem seems so 
intractable to so many. 
 Perhaps it comes as a surprise that there has been something of the same debate 
raging in the texts surrounding the philosophy of artefacts. The target is the long-held 
distinction between the natural and the artificial. This debate has been cast in various ways—
the real and the artificial; natural kinds versus artefactual kinds; indifferent and interactive 
kinds—but the moral has remained the same: there seems to be something ontologically 
special about artefacts. That is, while rocks, trees and tigers exist independently of us, 
artefacts exist because of us. They have, in short, a dual nature, as while they are made up of 
physical stuff (the same physical stuff that appears in nature), this stuff is not sufficient to 
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explain their nature. The claim is that artefacts should be properly regarded as hybrid “objects 
that can only be described adequately in a way that somehow combines the physical and 
intentional conceptualisations of the world.”65 Any artefact theory must explain this apparent 
dual nature, even if this explanation (as I shall claim in Chapter Three) attempts to undermine 
the intuition itself.  
1.7.5. Normative claims regarding artefacts 
Any acceptable account of artefacts will include an account that will capture the normative 
nature of artefacts. For instance, we want to be able to explain why it is that we can state 
intelligibly that if someone wants to get to Paris from Sydney in the shortest possible time, 
they should utilise an aircraft. Similarly, we want to explain why it is that one shouldn’t go to 
war armed with a rusty butter knife. We can call this ends-normativity, as it relates to 
standard means-end rationality, whereby artefacts are merely useful for bringing about 
particular ends. Under such an understanding, particular artefacts stand in a relation to their 
ends in the sense that their use increases the likelihood of the desired result. 
 Another layer of normativity that needs to be captured is the notion of acceptable 
usage. This variant of normativity relates to operating procedures of artefacts, such that they 
operate either optimally or as intended by the artificer. While this variant of artefact 
normativity is often regarded as separable from ends-normativity, I will treat acceptable 
usage as being a subclass of ends-normativity. Operating procedures, manuals, diagrams, and 
so on are normative insofar as they are intended to guarantee that the artefact operates so as 
to bring about a particular end. We can shorthand this variant of normativity thus: if you want 
to ensure that your artefact will have the best chance of operating properly, you should follow 
these directions.  
1.7.6. Non-functioning/broken/malfunctioning artefacts 
Any respectable artefact metaphysic will be able to provide an account that explains the clear 
intuitive differences between broken, non-functioning and malfunctioning artefacts. Where 
one might be tempted to lump these three distinct classes together into one, certain cases 
make it clear that our understanding of each renders them discrete. In fact, it appears very 
likely that each does not overlap with the other, such if an artefact is broken it is not 
malfunctioning, and so on. Allow me to give examples of each: 
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Non-functioning: Each year, inventors present prototypes of very peculiar class of 
artefacts to patent offices: perpetual motion (PM) machines.66 One such machine, patented in 
1971 is depicted in fig 1e. This machine purports to utilise gravity to produce centrifugal 
force, enabling the production of ‘free energy’ via the attachment of a generator to a shaft 
attached to the central spoke. Such an apparatus is intended to produce energy perpetually, as 
the wheel will continue to turn endlessly, or until the operator ceases its operation. 
 
Figure 1e: Diagram from a patent of a perpetual motion machine.67   
Obviously, such machines have never worked, and indeed can never work, due to the 
well-established principles of thermodynamics. Nor have any of the other artefacts referred to 
as PM machines, to date, worked. And yet particular examples of the machines abound. The 
source of the puzzle arises when we consider the term ‘technical artefact’ or ‘machine’ to 
refer to an entity that can actually perform its intended, or optimal, function. As it is 
impossible for any machine to do what PM machines promise, each and every example of 
these machines is strictly non-functional. They have never performed their function, and 
could never perform this function. 
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Broken: A rifle is fired hundreds of times in combat before it suffers a catastrophic 
failure, due to using overly powerful ammunition. The failure results in a cracked breach, 
rendering it permanently unable to perform its intended, or optimal, function (unless a repair 
is completed). Such an artefact is broken, as it once was capable of performing its function, 
but is now unable to function in its current configuration.  
Malfunction: A cluster bomb functions by releasing explosive submunitions (known 
as bomblets) across a wide area, with the intended effect of killing personnel or destroying 
vehicles (see fig 1f). The benefit of such a weapon is relatively obvious: rather than relying 
upon many bombs, the military can instead opt to utilise one bomb containing many 
explosive devices. Further, adding fuses to the bomblets allows some control over when the 
bomblets will detonate. For instance, they could be fused so as to allow for one explosion, 
followed by another explosion over much the same area some time later, when there may be 
personnel moving in to take care of the wounded soldiers affected by the first blast. 
 
Fig 1f: How a cluster bomb functions68 
Despite how (militarily) appealing such weaponry may be, these weapons have a 
relatively high rate of malfunction. Bomblets are well known to fail to detonate when they 
were intended to, exploding sometimes years after their deployment. It could appear that 
these bomblets are broken, rather than malfunctioning, but this is erroneous. The bomblets 
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are designed to explode, and indeed do explode, albeit not under the circumstances that were 
intended. This marks the difference between broken and malfunctioning artefacts: in the 
former case, the function is absent, in the latter case, the function did not come about in the 
right way, or at the right time, as desired. Other examples abound: a remote control that is 
sometimes unresponsive, sometimes responsive; brakes on a car that sometimes stick; an 
oven that takes far too long to warm up.  
1.7. Conclusion 
This chapter began with the task of puzzling over what exactly a weapon is, given the 
disparity between possible descriptions arising from the case of 2,3,5-T. Something being an 
herbicide just sounds too different to something being a weapon. We need a theory that is 
capable of clearly marking out the differences between something that can be used as a 
weapon (as the intentionalists would claim regarding 2,3,5-T and 2,4,5-T) versus something 
that actually is a weapon. One method of marking out the distinction is via Fotion’s account. 
We saw that his account- as an expressly pragmatic categorisation of weapons, intended to 
mirror our ordinary understanding- cannot succeed as an account. This is because Fotion is 
unable to provide an explanation that captures the particular ends that weapons are used to 
bring about. We do not use weapons to disable as an end-in-itself. We use weapons to harm. 
We need to forego pragmatic accounts that eschew metaphysics for precisely this reason. 
Indeed, we are not well placed to consider any categorisation of any artefact that eschews 
metaphysics, as there is a further fact that explains why artefacts are used the way they are. 
 An adequate artefact metaphysic will provide a theory of weapons that explains why 
it is that weapons are a means of harming. This is because an adequate artefact metaphysic 
will provide a detailed account of what distinguishes artefacts as being means to ends. Thus 
we need to weigh up the competing artefact theories on offer, and see how they address the 
necessary features of an artefact metaphysic sketched above. We will see that though both are 
respectable accounts, only the optimality approach I develop will be able to adequately 
explain not only why function-shifts occur but under what conditions we can say that it has 
occurred. By outlining the competing theories of intentionalism and optimality, we will be 
able to see later why it is that these theories come to such differing conclusions around 
Galston. Fortunately, we have enumerated the criteria by which we can evaluate an 
artefactual metaphysic, and I shall show how intentionalism and optimality handles the 
necessary features in the next two chapters. I will then be in a position to return to our case 
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study of weaponry and show how each theory accounts for them in some detail. This chapter 
serves to set the scene for what follows.  
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Chapter Two: Intentionalist Accounts of Artefacts 
2.1. Introduction 
Artefactual metaphysics, as it is practiced within the analytic tradition, is a relatively new 
subfield within philosophy. Since Aristotle, many have treated artefacts as ontologically 
suspect, and therefore less real, than natural objects.69 Only recently have metaphysicians 
turned toward artefacts in earnest, with an eye towards providing an account that captures 
their apparent specialness.70 It is somewhat surprising that it took philosophers as long as it 
has, given the ubiquity of artefacts. Our lived environments are, after all, utterly cluttered 
with artefacts, in many cases to the exclusion of natural objects.71 Recently philosophers, 
noting this, have started taking artefacts seriously. The result has been an unleashing of a 
veritable explosion of recent scholarship, notably from technological universities housed in 
the Netherlands, as well as an increasing focus on these topics within the traditional 
homelands of analytic philosophy.72 
 Despite the recent turn towards artefacts as worthy objects of philosophical 
investigation, a remarkable orthodoxy has emerged. Whereas there is a large degree of 
heterodoxy in other fields of metaphysics, it appears that intentionalism has become the 
default position. Philosophers have busied themselves either attempting to provide an account 
of intentionalism that will address the requirements enumerated above in section 1.7, or else 
they assume intentionalism before moving on to solve other puzzles. I will attempt, in the 
first part of this chapter, to explain this consensus i by framing it as a response to a well-
known threat to the ontological status of artefacts.  
 In Part One, I will outline the natural kind critique of artefacts, according to which 
artefacts are regarded as ontologically deficient insofar as they are dependent (in a way 
natural objects are not) on the beliefs and intentions of human agents. This key challenge has 
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 Lynne Rudder Baker, “The Ontology of Artifacts,” Philosophical Explorations 7, no. 2 (June 2004): 99–111; 
Risto Hilpinen, “Artifact,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed March 20, 
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led to a new project to ‘rehabilitate’ artefacts: the Dual Nature programme. This account 
accepts a necessary dualism regarding artefacts: artefacts, according to this account, have a 
hybrid nature, insofar as they are both physical and intentional objects. Acceptance of the 
Dual Nature thesis will thus set the stage for modern accounts of artefactual metaphysics that 
place the intentions of artificers and users at centre stage. I turn to two key instances of these 
accounts in section two. The final part of the chapter will be concerned with outlining a key 
attack on intentionalism, due to its inability to adequately explain function shifts, a key 
feature of any adequate artefact metaphysic, and I will conclude by outlining the 
‘intentionalist fallacy’ as it applies to artefacts. This chapter therefore sets the scene for my 
alternative account of artefacts, the optimality account, and I will provide the motivation for 
the shift towards optimality in the final section of this chapter. Before I begin the task proper, 
I will first provide the vocabulary that will guide that discussion. 
2.2. Types, Tokens and Kinds 
Here I set out a division of metaphysical categories such that we can talk meaningfully of 
artefacts being the sort of things that are literally out in the world. This section provides the 
vocabulary that will guide that discussion for the rest of this thesis. 
The first division is the simplest, insofar as the terms in question share an accepted 
usage in philosophical parlance. This is the division between types and tokens. Any given 
artefact is related to all others of its kind, in virtue of sharing a common property (a particular 
interpretation of the aforementioned ‘further fact’ view covered above in section 1.7.2.) 
which explains this relationship. To illustrate, I recently purchased a pack of five pens, each 
one qualitatively indistinguishable from the other. According to philosophical convention, I 
thereby bought one type of object, with five tokens of that type. This said, the type should not 
be identified with the particular brand, make or colour of the pen. This is because these are 
functional types. How finely we carve up types depends on how useful such divisions would 
be for prediction and explanation. In some contexts, as in the case where I sit to mark papers, 
these considerations will matter (only red will do!), but the type ‘red pen’ picks out a sub-
type of the broader type ‘pen.’  
Some notation is needed. Let lower case italicised variables denote token artefacts (x, 
y, z). Types of artefacts are denoted by upper case variables (X, Y, Z). Whenever φ or ψ is 
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used, these represent differing technical functions.73 When I speak of some artefact being a φ-
er, or the artefact φ-ing, I mean that this artefact is defined as something that functions in a 
particular way (φ). Thus, the translation of the statement ‘This thing is either a pen or a 
cigarette lighter’ is: 
  x is either a φ-er or ψ-er74 
Utilising this notation allows us to distinguish two separate senses of the question 
‘What is this thing?’ as follows: 
1. What type (X) is this thing (x) a token of? 
2. What tokens (x) make up a particular type (X)? 
In the case of 1, we are attempting to classify a concrete object. If x is a φ-er, then it is a 
token of the type X, iff X only contains members that are φ-ers. So if I hold in my hand 
something that might be a pen or a cigarette lighter, I am not attempting to understand how to 
classify cigarette lighters or pens. I am trying to ascertain whether this thing is a cigarette 
lighter or pen. I must already have some sense of what tokens of the type do. In contrast, 2 
focuses upon types, in an attempt to understand how an entire class is to be functionally 
understood. This method of questioning is familiar to archaeology, for example, where in 
some cases the researcher is confronted with a plethora of tokens but lacks the capacity to pin 
down what type the tokens are tokens of. 
 It should be clear that the function-bearers are artefactual types rather than tokens. 
Tokens of a type are thus said to inherit their functionality from the type that they are a token 
of. This rules out what could be called accidental or nonce functions (a topic I will return to 
in Chapter Three), which are best described at the token level.75 For example, a novel object 
fashioned out of, say, a tree branch, chewing gum, duct tape and string, utilised by an 
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individual one time to fish keys out of a grate is not a true artefact as it is not a token of any 
artefactual type, despite its relative utility for the task.76 
Next to introduce my particular conception of an artefactual kind. Avoiding some of 
the more idiosyncratic uses of this term, I intend here for it to refer to artefactual types that 
can be grouped together as performing identical technical functions. Therefore, all artefactual 
kinds are also functional kinds. For instance, as a functional kind, ‘pens’ function to 
distribute ink upon a surface in order to facilitate writing.77 Grouping these together as a 
functional kind allows us to collect disparate types under the same basic metaphysical 
category, thereby grouping all Sharpie markers, fountain pens, quills, and so on together 
under the same functional category.78 This distinction should not be taken to imply that kinds 
are separable from types metaphysically. A kind is here regarded as semantically relevant, 
rather than metaphysically.  
A final stipulation is the notion of a ‘primary kind.’79 We may assume that there are 
many functional kinds, and that any given artefact could perform a great number of functions 
due to their physical properties alone. Anything of sufficient weight and solidity could 
function as a paperweight, for example. Due to the fact that we are not thereby moved to dub 
everything that could be used for this purpose a paperweight, we may invoke the notion of 
primary kinds to express why. The definition runs as follows: 
F) Primary kind: of the possible functions of X, X has one (and only 
one) definitive function, such that we can say that all tokens of type 
X have at least one canonical function.80 
A natural response to this definition of a primary kind is to wonder why we must restrict 
artefacts to a singular primary kind. I give this definition due to the fact that all major 
theories of artefacts appear to posit this claim, as when we claim that the primary kind of an 
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artefact is the kind that the designer intended in making the artefact. No attempt will be made 
in these pages to revise this ‘one kind per customer’ view of artefacts here, especially as the 
optimality account I will develop in what follows will go part of the way towards explaining 
why a commitment to primary kinds is acceptable.  
 A related concern is whether it is justified to classify artefacts as having more than 
one canonical function. It may seem less odd when we contrast, say, adhesive tape with a 
Swiss army knife. The tape has a ‘general’ function, namely the function of providing an 
adhesive in a strip form. This is ‘general’ as there are many tasks that adhesive tape can 
perform without any need to claim that each and every one is a ‘canonical’ use in its 
particular form. Meanwhile, a Swiss army knife has as many canonical functions as it has 
attachments, such that we can say its functionality is to be a screwdriver, a bottle opener, a 
pair of pliers, etc. Fascinating as such discussion may be, I do not have the space to address 
these complexities here, although I will return to a related issue in the conclusion. 
It is now possible to be more precise regarding the task ahead. On the further fact 
view of artefact categorisation, there is a definitive answer to questions regarding artefact 
categorisation. This, in turn, requires that artefacts are functional kinds, and that we can 
define an artefact according to its primary kind. The further fact view and a commitment to 
primary kinds, when taken together, commits one to there being some facts about the artefact, 
above and beyond its mere physical form, which settle artefact categorisation. In this chapter 
and the next, I will examine two rival versions of the further fact view of artefacts: the 
ontogenetic and creator’s intended function conceptions of artefacts. 
Part One: Dualism by Design 
2.3.Natural versus Artefactual Kinds 
Until quite recently, many metaphysicians regarded artefacts as ‘ontologically suspect’, and 
somehow less ‘real’ than the natural world. Though their accounts diverge, Van Inwagen, 
Wiggins, and Aristotle each contend that artefacts are ontologically ‘deficient’.81, Such views 
are strictly speaking eliminativist in regards to artefacts, as they regard any non-natural kind 
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as being ontologically duubious.82 This general mistrust has led to a particular view of 
artefacts as metaphysically ‘dependent’ on the intentions of human agents, so it pays to spend 
some time unpacking the arguments that lead to this shift. 
I will, however, be bracketing one of the few anti-realist stances regarding artefactual 
types. This form of artefactual eliminativism proceeds from an endorsement of nominalism, 
which foregrounds the acceptance of tokens while denying that types exist. If no such things 
as types exist, of any kind, it follows that artefactual types do not either. This mirrors the 
nominalist claim that redness does not exist as a type, as the locution ‘red’ refers only to all 
the token instances of red. I will not offer an argument in these pages against a nominalist 
interpretation of artefacts, as this would take us too far afield.83 While nominalist arguments 
are fascinating in their own right, I will not address them beyond claiming that a good 
positive account of the reality of artefact types thereby provides a good argument against the 
nominalist paradigm. However, even if the claims here fail to impress a nominalist, we need 
not be overly concerned. A nominalist conception of artefacts is standardly accompanied by 
broader ontological suspicion of a great many things that we consider ‘natural’ and ‘real’, 
such as the aforementioned colour red. As a result, nominalists are not standardly committed 
to the clam that artefacts are to be regarded with greater suspicion than other objects. 
Nominalist forms of anti-realism aside, antirealism about artefactual kinds is 
ordinarily founded on the claim that artefactual kinds are ontologically deficient when 
compared with so-called ‘natural kinds.’84 The logic runs relatively linearly: if artefactual 
types/kinds do not exist, then we cannot speak of artefact tokens given that there are no types 
for the tokens to be tokens of. The argument is complex, however, and requires some 
unpacking. 
Natural kinds are here defined as follows: 
1. They are things, or kinds of things, that occur naturally, 
2. They are subject to laws, and 
                                                          
82
 I shall use the term ‘eliminativist’ interchangeably with ‘antirealist’. I must also stress that I am speaking of 
contemporary analytic antirealist accounts, and due to issues of space cannot adequately address the Continental 
perspective on these issues.  
83
 For a forceful argument in favour of a nominal interpretation, see: Stephen P. Schwartz, “Natural Kinds and 
Nominal Kinds,” Mind 354 (April 1980): 182–195. For a rebuttal, see: Marzia Soavi, “Antirealism and Artefact 
Kinds,” Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 13, no. 2 (2009): 93–107. See also: David Armstrong, 
Nominalism and Realism, vol. 1, 2 vols., Universals and Scientific Realism (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978). 
84
 Inwagen, Material Beings, 81–97. 
45 
 
3. They have essences.85 
 
Of these three, artefacts appear to clearly contravene both 1 and 3. I will now turn to each 
individually.  
First of all, as already mentioned, artefacts are usually defined as being things that 
were created by an author (or artificer) with some sort of intent. Hilpinen, for example, 
provides the following definition: 
Artefactdef: An object o is an artefact if and only if o has an author.86  
Under this view, which we will return to shortly, it is true by definition that artefacts are 
created by some artificer, and that all things that make up artefactual kinds are those things 
that have an author. I take it that the view of an author here implies human agency, thereby 
eliminating animal artefacts from our ontology. Call this an ontogenetic definition (a view 
that we shall return to, although in a realist context, in section 2.5).87 This definition 
straightforwardly contradicts 1, above. Indeed, no-one claims that artefacts could have come 
into existence without some kind of intentional activity. Meanwhile, natural kinds exist 
independently of our intentions, and paradigmatically endure in the absence of human agents. 
Stones, mountains, quartz deposits, and so on exist no matter what we think of them. On the 
other hand, artefacts would not exist at all had it not been for certain individuals making 
intentional choices. It should be clear, however, that this point is not the relatively banal 
claim that artefacts would not exist in the absence of humans. This genetic point simply 
captures too much: human infants would not exist either had it not been for the often 
intentional activities of their human progenitors. Instead the point relates to 3, above: whether 
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artefacts have essences.88 Points 1 and 3 are taken to be strongly related, such that the essence 
of an artefact includes an ontogenetic claim regarding its origin.  
The difference between the natural and the artefactual has been largely fought out 
over the issue of whether they have essences at all. In the case of natural kinds, it is generally 
accepted that there must be some essential characteristics which instances of a given kind 
share. In other words, the characteristics of cats are explicable, in part, by reference to 
something shared by all cats- a common genetic code being the most likely candidate.89 This 
genetic code explains why we may categorise all cats as part of one kind. The coding on the 
genetic level (plus, perhaps, some information regarding common descent and natural 
selection) constitutes an essence.90 If the coding were to shift significantly, the kind would 
differ. Artefactual kinds, by contrast, do not seem to share an essence in this precise sense.  
 Take, for example, all artefacts commonly referred to as ‘guns.’ Let us suppose that 
all of George W. Bush’s guns share a common feature: each is made out of aluminium and 
steel, which could lead us to conclude that guns share the essence of being constructed out of 
aluminium and steel. But, as is plainly obvious, many guns are not made out of aluminium 
and steel; rather, some are composed of polycarbonate, nickel, stainless steel, carbon fibre, 
and so on. In other words, it is not essential that all guns are fashioned from aluminium and 
steel, and as a result we cannot isolate a common feature shared by all putative members of 
the kind with respect to the materials from which they are made. In the absence of a mutually 
shared property, it seems that we must claim that artefacts have no essence. Or, more 
modestly, it must be the case that artefacts do not have essences comparable to those of 
natural kinds. Guns, like almost all artefacts, have changed their features over time such that 
there is little continuity between early guns and our modern counterparts. Materials, 
mechanisms and use have all changed over time, such that it may appear that the only point 
of continuity has been our use of the linguistic term ‘gun.’91 Meanwhile, cats, infants and 
trees possess features that are shared by all tokens of these types.   
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  In large part, the difference between artefacts and natural kinds has come down to the 
issue of multiple realisability.92 As noted, a gun could be made out of a good many differing 
materials, and have entirely different internal components. Indeed, they need not even have 
triggers, instead utilising buttons or ‘spurs’ in order to fire. Despite this disunity of lower-
level features, each is still a gun, as long as each functions as a gun. The same cannot be said 
of natural kinds, as we have seen. A tiger is not multiply realisable, nor is quartz, or uranium. 
As Krohs and Kroes put it: 
A real kind of physical objects is a kind whose items must share a set of 
common physical features used in explaining their behavior. A functional kind 
does not grant the existence of such a set because of the multiple realizability 
of functions. Hence if artifact kinds are functional kinds, they may bring 
together objects with completely different physical structures. So artifact kinds 
can refer only to nominal kinds.93 
The key difficulty is that if we take the first condition seriously, then the only commonality 
between artefacts is their functionality. To invoke functions, for the intentionalists, we must 
further invoke agency, as we shall see. 
To explicate the difference between natural and artefactual kinds, I here introduce two 
conditions modified from those in Amie Thomasson’s “Realism and Human Kinds.”94 
Thomasson invokes these to articulate the principles under which we can claim that a thing is 
paradigmatically real:95 
i. Ignorance Principle: If something (x) is a real type of thing (X) then the 
conditions that determine whether or not x is an X hold independently of 
whether or not these conditions are accepted by anyone.96 
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ii. Error Principle: If the Ignorance Principle holds, then any beliefs 
regarding the nature of φ-ers could turn out to be fundamentally wrong.97  
The central contention of those who argue that artefacts fundamentally differ from natural 
objects is that artefacts are subject to neither Ignorance nor Error. This explains, so the 
argument goes, our inability to classify artefacts as natural kinds.98 We simply cannot be 
fundamentally in Ignorance and Error regarding artefacts, as our beliefs and desires 
themselves have a large part to play in constituting artefacts.99 If this is right, there is a gulf 
between artefacts and the paradigmatically real. Natural kinds, we may note, are insensitive 
to intentions.100 A tree, shale formation, or tiger exists irrespective of whether we have any 
particular beliefs or intentions towards them. As a result of these considerations, some 
authors have regarded the argument as sufficient to rule artefacts out of our ontologies 
entirely. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz provide an argument along precisely these lines when 
they state: 
[I]f an ordinary physical thing instantiates a substance-kind, then it does so 
necessarily or essentially: for example, a house is essentially a house, a tiger is 
essentially an organism, a snowball is essentially a snowball, and so on. If 
such a substance-kind is a conventional kind, then that substance-kind is not 
instantiated by a real thing. The character of a conventional kind logically 
depends on the beliefs or decisions of psychological subjects. But a substance-
kind whose instantiation is essential to the existence of any of its genuine 
physical instances must express the intrinsic nature of those instances, and the 
character of that substance-kind cannot logically depend upon the beliefs or 
decisions of any psychological subject. Thus, a genuine substance-kind must 
be a natural kind rather than a conventional kind.101 
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Any account that does not mirror the Error and Ignorance Principles appears destined 
to justify ontological claims on the basis of mere beliefs, rather than hardnosed metaphysics. 
A realist metaphysic requires, so goes the intuition, that what is real does not depend upon 
our acceptance of any proposition, and thereby the difficulty enters when we consider 
artefacts. A new paradigm has arisen to tackle this puzzle via the so-called ‘Dual Nature’ 
interpretation of technical artefacts, which endeavours to affirm the reality of artefacts, at the 
cost of accepting the claim that artefacts are partially mind-dependent. 
2.4. The Dual Nature Project 
A familiar thought experiment in the philosophy of mind asks us to conceive of a possible 
world identical to our own (call our world w) in all respects but one—in this zombie world 
(w*) there are no mental events.102 Zombie brains act as they do in w, and yet the feeling of 
pain does not arise. In w* all humans are properly termed zombies (albeit very functional 
zombies, capable of driving buses and flying space shuttles). For pain to be real, so runs the 
argument, someone must feel the pain. Events such as ‘being in pain’ are thus mind 
dependent, as it is possible that there are physical events (P) which in w realise the sensation 
of pain (M), while in w* P occurs without M. The mere conceivability of this view, for 
Chalmers, goes part of the way towards the claim that we can never explain mental events 
solely on the basis of physical events. This leads to the so-called ‘hard problem of 
consciousness’. There are many easy problems of consciousness, which just require the 
positing of some mechanism or another to explain them adequately. Meanwhile, explaining 
why it is that experiences are qualitative will remain elusive if we demand physical 
explanations. 
We can easily repeat this thought experiment with artefacts and replicate these results, 
according to a good many modern philosophers of technology.103 Conceive of the same 
counterfactual worlds, w and w*, and imagine that in the zombie world we see what appears 
to be the outcomes of use and design of tools, o*, indistinguishable from our own design of 
use of tools, o, in w. The intuition goes that just as we would be unwilling to say that the 
zombies are actually in pain when they cry out ‘ouch’ in w*, we should be equally willing to 
say that there is any actual tool use in w* as this zombie world contains no intentions 
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whatsoever and, ex hypothesi, no tools.104 In the same way that pain requires a mind, so runs 
the argument, artefacts are mind dependent. This type of reasoning yields the associated ‘hard 
problem’ of artefacts.105 This is the claim that there is no way to reduce functions to physical 
structures, as a world without goals is a world without functions. Similarly, artefacts cannot 
be regarded as wholly mental objects, as they exist physically in the world and, crucially, do 
things in the world. What is needed is an account that reconciles, without reduction, these two 
accounts. 
Drawing upon the central guiding arguments provided by anti-realists, the so-called 
dual nature project has recently attempted to perform exactly this reconciliation. Rather than 
balking from accepting any kind of dualism, they accept the claim that artefacts are “both 
physical bodies that have geometrical, physical and chemical characteristics, and functional 
objects that have an intrinsic relation to mental states and intentional actions.”106 As such, 
they are hybrid “objects that can only be described adequately in a way that somehow 
combines the physical and intentional conceptualisations of the world.”107 While the function 
of an artefact critically depends on its physical structure, this does not exhaust the analysis. In 
order to determine what a particular artefact is for, above and beyond its mere capacities, we 
must make reference to the fact that the artefact was intentionally produced for its intended 
function. 
The Dual Nature theorists appear to have accepted a Searlean notion of functionality, 
insofar as they reject the notion that functions exist independently of intentions. When we 
consider a screwdriver, its being a screwdriver is down to causal properties of the thing itself, 
rather than any constitutive collective intention directed towards it.108 Nonetheless, Searle 
contends that a screwdriver relies upon human intentionality insofar as we ascribe a function 
to it. As he puts it: 
The important thing to see at this point is that functions are never intrinsic to 
the physics of any phenomenon but are assigned from outside by conscious 
                                                          
104
 Furthermore, in w* there is no explanation for the apparent existence of artefacts, just as there is, seemingly, 
no reason for the zombies to exclaim ‘ouch’ upon being struck.  
105
 C.f. Houkes and Meijers, “The Ontology of Artefacts: The Hard Problem,” 129–130. 
106
 Ibid., 119. 
107
 Kroes and Meijers, “The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts,” 2.  
108
 Peter Kroes, “Screwdriver Philosophy: Searle’s Analysis of Technical Functions,” Techné 6 (Spring 2003): 
134. 
51 
 
observers and users. Functions, in short, are never intrinsic but are always 
observer relative.109 
Observer relativity refers to the notion that an observer of a technical, or biological, artefact 
does not merely ‘read off’ the object in determining a function. If we say the function of a 
heart is to pump blood, this presupposes a background set of value-laden assumptions. For 
instance, if we were a suicidal population we might consider the function of the heart to 
prolong our suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.110 Similarly, Kroes and 
Meijers in their introduction to a special edition of Techné on the Dual Nature thesis state:  
The concept of function never appears in physical descriptions of the world; it 
rather belongs to the intentional conceptualization. This is shown, for one 
thing, by the fact that attributions of function lend themselves to normative 
judgments - artefacts can perform their function well or badly - and normative 
statements make sense only within the intentional conceptualization.111 
The only way, in short, to ontologically distinguish between a ‘normal object’ (i.e. a natural 
object) and an artefact is via the attribution of functionality, insofar as the intention of the 
artificer can be read off the physical constitution of the artefact itself. There is no way, 
according to those who ascribe to the Dual Nature thesis, to eliminate either the physical 
structure or the function of a given artefact. As Houkes and Meijers put it, they take the 
theory to “quite clearly and unabashedly address the ontology of artifacts. It reflects a 
metaphysical view about the nature of artifacts, namely that it is twofold.”112  
 This leads to their accepting a necessary dualism, rejecting both a fully-fledged social 
constructivist account as well as the standard reductionist accounts of artefacts. Artefacts are 
undoubtedly real, but they are neither physical nor mental, but both. Thus artefacts are 
ontologically rehabilitated (although many would balk at the notion of there existing anything 
with a dual nature, especially one that depends on mental states). The Dual-Nature thesis has 
a significant advantage over contemporary anti-realist accounts insofar as there is no slippage 
towards eliminating the most common objects that surround us. Nonetheless, the cost is that 
functionality cannot be fully explicated without the imposition of intentions, leaving the 
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relation between the two deeply mysterious.113 Part of my task in the next chapter will be 
showing how functionality does not require intentionality in order to provide a thorough 
metaphysic of artefacts. 
 In this section I have given a short survey of the primary motivations for accepting 
intentionalism. In order to rehabilitate artefacts from elimination, on this view, we must 
accept that artefacts have a dual nature which is explicable only via reference to both 
intentions and physical structures. This sets the scene for the positive accounts for artefacts, 
and explains their foregrounding of intentions over and above attempts to ground the 
functionality of artefacts in purely material, or system-relative, terms. I now turn to two 
related accounts of artefacts that fall under the heading of intentionalism: the ontogenetic 
criterion and the creator’s intended function theory, both of which I will ultimately reject. 
Part Two: Intentional Accounts of Artefacts 
2.5. The Ontogenetic Criterion Versus the Creator’s Intended Function Criterion 
In the first section of Part Two, I will suggest that one source of the long-standing difficulty 
in providing clear, principled criteria for a neat distinction between artificial and natural kinds 
is that much of the discussion has privileged an ontogenetic perspective on artefacts. This has 
led to the creation of a second, more robust theory: the creator’s intended function (CIF) 
theory. I will outline the ontogenetic criterion briefly before providing an argument for 
rejecting it as an adequate theory of artefacts. I develop the CIF theory in greater detail, and 
provide an example of how an analysis would run within that theory, before addressing the 
desiderata for any account of artefact metaphysics. Finally, I reveal that the CIF account is 
unable to adequately account for function shifts because it crucially relies on the assumption 
that intentions prefigure functions. This assumption will be shown to be false, leading to the 
conclusion that an alternative account of artefact metaphysics is needed. I will conclude by 
discussing the ‘intentional fallacy’ and how it relates to artefacts. This will provide a 
motivation to move towards the optimality account, the topic of the next chapter. 
2.5.1. The Ontogenetic Criterion 
Hilpinen provides the following analysis in his Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy article 
on the subject of artefacts: 
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The art of making something involves intentional agency; thus an artefact may 
be defined as an object that has been intentionally made for some purpose.114 
This definition is significant insofar as it ties the definition of an artefact to the fact that an 
artificer created an object, and intended to create that object, with no explicit requirements 
regarding usage or function.115 Hilpinen is far from alone in regarding these features as both 
necessary and sufficient. For example: 
  Artefacts are objects intentionally made to serve a given purpose,116 
And, 
Artefacts, whatever exactly they are, belong to a genus of artificial entities. 
These are entities that are, in some sense, made—they are products of 
intentional behaviour.117  
If this is correct, intentionally creating an object for some purpose guarantees its status as an 
artefact, with no need to refer to any actual functions of the object in question. As a result, 
this account claims that there is a determinate fact of the matter regarding whether an object 
is an artefact, and this could be ascertained by finding evidence that an artificer set about 
deliberately creating the object in question. Given that the definition has intentional action as 
a necessary part of the account, there will be no actual borderline cases. We can be in relative 
ignorance regarding the function of an artefact, but the designer knows by definition what the 
artefact is: even if knowledge of the designer is forever lost, the fact remains that the object in 
question is an artefact in virtue of having been created intentionally. The artificer intended to 
create something when she set about her activity, and this intention is what determines that it 
is an artefact rather than a mere effect.118 This allows an easy explanation as to why we are 
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reticent to regard either the sawdust produced in the construction of a bookshelf, or the 
castings produced by carving a block of marble as artefacts.119  
By way of precise definition, I offer the following: 
G) Ontogenetic criterion: For all objects o, o is an artefact iff it was 
produced intentionally by a designer for some purpose.120 
This represents a more specific, and defensible, variant of the ontogenetic point outlined in 
section 2.3. As a result we have a neat division between natural and artificial objects, 
although at the cost of reaffirming a fundamental difference between natural and artefact 
kinds. This appears too broad to be acceptable, as focus upon an ontogenetic account divorces 
the nature of artefacts from their actual functionality. Imagine here an inept designer, who 
sets out to create a new, better form of gunpowder, and the only idea he comes up with is the 
(admittedly novel) combination of gunpowder with Pepsi. Intuitively, the fact that he 
intended to create something in this case does not mean that he has in fact created some 
artefact, as the resultant object simply does not function. His intention does not seem 
sufficient to determine that he has actually produced an artefact, as here it appears as if he has 
simply created junk. 
To his credit, Hilpinen foresees this objection, and bites the bullet. He states: 
Let us assume that an agent makes an object with a certain function φ in mind, 
and believes that the object he has made is an φ-object, i.e., the agent accepts 
the product he has made as an φ-object. In such a case it seems reasonable to 
regard the object as a genuine artefact regardless of whether the object actually 
fulfils the function φ.121  
I am unwilling to follow Hilpinen on this point, as I do not share the intuition that it is 
‘reasonable’ to claim that a non-functional artefact remains a genuine artefact (as we saw in 
section 1.7.6). Otherwise, as was previously pointed out in section 1.7.2, children who set 
about creating helicopters from popsicle sticks would be creating genuine artefacts when they 
cobble these items together, with no eye towards fulfilling the function helicopters perform. 
If ‘genuine’ is taken to mean ontologically respectable, it does not seem correct to claim that 
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beliefs and intentions are sufficient to determine something actually is an artefact, at least 
insofar as we require technical artefacts to fulfil certain functional roles.122 Worse still, this 
would allow one to claim to have created a token artefact even in cases where there is no 
associated functional type (as in the case of a purported perpetual motion machine). Hilpinen 
would be forced to claim that these non-functioning objects are still artefacts due to the 
intention of the artificer. If we are willing to claim this, the distinction between normal and 
non-functional artefacts breaks down. No account of artefacts, however, should lose the 
distinction between functional and non-functional artefacts, such that all talk of function is 
lost in favour of intentions, standing alone.  
 Thomasson, noting the problems of accounts like Hilpinen’s, attempts to avoid this 
nasty result by relying upon success criteria to avoid cases like the inept designer.123 Her 
account relies upon the designer having a relatively strictly defined understanding of the 
thing being designed, which further requires that the type is a possible one. By creating x, a 
token of the type X, the designer needs some sense of what is required for x to be a token of 
the type. Thomasson thus provides the following definition: 
Necessarily, for all x and all artefactual kinds K, x is a K only if x is the 
product of largely successful intention that (Kx), where one intends (Kx) only 
if one has a substantive concept of the nature of Ks that largely matches that of 
some group of prior makers of Ks (if there are any) and intends to realise that 
concept by imposing K-relevant features on the object.124 
Success in creating a genuine artefact here relies upon having both a substantive concept of 
what one is attempting to create, as well as having a relatively strict understanding of the 
artefactual kind.125 The problem with interpreting such a view as a variant of an ontogenetic 
definition should be immediately apparent: we must already have a clear understanding of the 
kind in question. Prototype artefacts for unfamiliar tasks cannot be said to exemplify the 
schema presented by Thomasson, given that in creating the token, the artificer has also 
created the type.126 Thomasson responds that what matters is that the artificer has a definite 
artefact kind in mind in creating the object, and furthermore intends to create something with 
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particular functional properties. This, clearly goes beyond a mere ontogenetic criterion, as it 
is not enough to cite an intention to create x. There artefact must function in largely the way 
the artificer intended the artefact to behave. Thoomasson thus provides a clear reason to 
expand our criteria away from mere intentions, and towards artefact behaviour in accordance 
with substantive intentions. Instead we must look at the functions of the thing created, and 
stress what functions the creator intended to bring about in designing the token artefact, in 
order to see if the artificer succeeded in her intention. This leads us to the strongest, and most 
dominant, form of the account: that of the creator’s intended function.127 
2.6. Creator’s Intended Function 
The creator’s intended function (CIF) account foregrounds the intention of the artificer to 
create a particular artefact, with a special emphasis placed upon the function that the artificer 
had in mind when she created the artefact. As a result the theory incorporates the ontogenetic 
conception of artefacts as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for artefact categorisation. It 
is insufficient, as an artefact must actually have some specified function which it was 
intended to perform. Further, the CIF view has a central virtue: it does not rely upon 
intentions in isolation, but instead requires that the intentions of the artificer be fixed upon 
producing a functioning artefact, not just a thing.  
The CIF understanding presents the most straightforward, and common-sense, 
understanding of artefacts.128 It defines the function of an artefact as the function the creator 
had in mind when she set to work designing the artefact in question. This function can be 
termed, following Ruth Millikan, the ‘proper function’ of the artefact, and this proper 
function fixes the primary kind.129 In short, we can provide the following definition: 
H) CIF: The primary kind, K, is defined by the proper function of 
tokens (x) of the type (X) where X was intended to perform the 
function φ, and K contains those artefacts that were intended to 
perform φ. 
Thus, mirroring the natural kind schema in 2.3, the CIF account attempts to plot a course as 
follows, negating the need to speak of artefacts as being anything like a natural kind: 
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1: Artefacts have authors. 
2: They follow physical laws. 
3: The function of an artefact is set by the intended function the artificer had in 
mind in creating the artefact. 
Intended function fixes what can be classified as the proper function of the artefact, where 
“proper function” corresponds directly with what the creator intended to be the functional 
role of the artefact.130 Functionality here is defined as type functionality. A hammer is a 
hammer because the designer of the hammer set out to create a hammer, where ‘hammer’ is 
an artefact type that functions φ-wise in the situations the creator intended. Nonetheless, the 
account is not sufficiently developed at this juncture. We need to specify at least two 
additional features of the CIF account: first, contexts of use, and second, the creation of use-
plans. 
2.6.1. Contexts of Use 
The CIF account regards artefacts as evidently embedded within social contexts, and as a 
result they cannot be extricated from their environmental niches for the following reasons.  
Artefacts are made to be used in real world situations and, as such, a given artefact 
comes with explicit and implicit clues as to its operating environment. Functions within the 
CIF account thus provide clues for proper contexts of use.131 When producing her artefact, an 
artificer designs it to work in certain situations, when the artefact is manipulated in a 
particular way within that situation.132 For instance, an ordinary town car is designed to drive 
on sealed roads at reasonable speeds. Outside of this context (say, if we placed the car in a 
rally championship) the car will not operate as intended. The context of use of such an 
artefact may be signalled directly to the user (via, say, the instructions within a user manual), 
or else signalled via warning lights, or tactile feedback to the driver upon venturing outside 
the parameters the artificer set for the vehicle. Furthermore, the specified context of use 
provides the circumstances under which the function of the artefact can be relied upon, which 
provides users with an idea as to when the artefact should be used, as well as when the 
artefact cannot be relied upon.  
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Context therefore provides limits to the function of the artefact, although such limits 
might be more or less strictly defined.133 For example, a soldier might attempt to use a rifle to 
pick off a distant target without knowing whether the target is beyond the maximum range of 
the weapon. Upon missing his target, the soldier is then aware that the context he finds 
himself in is not one that the artefact is suited for. As Hughes puts it, specification of a 
context of use allows one to choose the right tool for the job, as “[o]ne cannot make reliable 
practical decisions about an artefact’s use unless he can identify situations in which use is 
appropriate, i.e. likely to result in a suitable outcome.”134  
 This analysis yields the following definition: 
I) Context of use: In creating a token, x, of the artefactual type, X, x 
has a context of use where x functions φ-wise in circumstances Cn 
and the artificer intended x to function φ-wise in Cn. 
The specification of contexts of use has a perhaps unexpected result, insofar as it 
allows one to clearly mark the social/technical artefact distinction in certain specialised cases. 
For instance, an artificer could create what looks like a chair, with all the physical properties 
we associate with a chair, and yet claim that it is a Dadaist deconstruction of modern art. This 
is because its context of use does not include standard situations where we would expect to 
use it as a chair- e.g. for sitting. If the chair-cum-artwork was intended to be placed behind 
glass, then removing it from its cage would modify the nature of the artefact, by violating the 
intended context of use. So, while the artefact may appear to the world as a normal, 
functional chair, it is actually an artwork, as it was intended to be such.  
2.6.2. Use-plans 
Upon knowing that an artefact was designed to be used in a given context, we nonetheless 
need to know how to use the artefact before us.135 This means that the CIF account is spared 
the attack so easily levelled upon the ontogenetic criterion (see section 2.5.1), as this account 
demands that the artificer has not just a vague idea of what she is creating, but has 
constructed (even if only for herself) a clear conception of how the artefact is to be 
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manipulated to bring about functional goals.136 Furthermore, artefacts exhibit an interesting 
unifying quality, insofar as all tokens of types are expected to perform the same tasks in the 
same situations in broadly the same way. Rifles share the same basic features the world over: 
a trigger which, when pulled, causes an explosion, which shoots a lead projectile out of the 
barrel. When we are confronted with a novel artefact and we set out to learn how to utilise it, 
we might be compelled to pick up a user manual and simply read off the correct operating 
procedure. For the CIF theorist, this means that we must be willing to posit the existence of 
use-plans to explain this commonality. 
We may define a use-plan thus: 
J) Use plan: In creating a token, x, of the artefactual type, X, x has a 
use-plan iff the artificer, a, intended x to be utilised according to 
some set of implicit or explicit instructions I in circumstances Sn. 
The requirements are somewhat reminiscent of a hypothetical imperative, as when we say ‘If 
you want your car to run, you should replace the oil regularly’. Use-plans stand in a relation 
between a given manipulation of an object and the end-state the user wishes to bring about, 
such that doing φ with x will bring about a particular end-state E.137 Insofar as end-states can 
be more or less difficult to bring about, use-plans can be more or less detailed. For instance, a 
use-plan might be as simple as ‘Turn handle clockwise to start the flow of water’ or more 
specific, such as specific instructions of how to change oil in a particular brand of motor 
vehicle. What unifies the use-plans is that they all are instructive, and communicate to the 
user either via instruction, or visual/aural clues what is to be done to bring about a particular 
end-state.When we take these two features together, they entail that the CIF account defines a 
particular artefact by reference to the successful intentional actions of a designer in creating 
not just an object, but a way of using that object within certain defined contexts.  
It seems there is much to recommend the CIF account. For one, there is an impressive 
amount of empirical evidence to suggest that the CIF account mirrors the ordinary 
understanding of artefacts. Utilising different experimental setups, scientists have found 
evidence that persons from different cultures group together ‘what a thing is’ by reference to 
the intentions of a designer. For example, Matan and Carey devised an experiment in which 
adults, as well as four- and six-year olds, were presented pictures of objects that are partially 
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obstructed from view.138 The experimenters then informed the subjects that each object has 
undergone a function-shift (for instance, that an object now used as a teapot was designed to 
be a watering can). The subjects were then asked whether the object was for this new 
purpose, or whether it retained its earlier functional role. The evidence showed that subjects 
strongly favoured the creator’s intended function, despite the potential suitability of this new 
role.139 This is entirely in line with what advocates of the CIF account would expect to see. 
Indeed, this is what the CIF theory demands.  
 Second, the CIF theory provides clear guidance as to how to categorise unknown 
artefacts, especially in the case of ancient tools where we have little morphological clues to 
guide our categorisation. If an archaeologist comes upon some unknown relic from times 
past, she is well advised to consider what the intentions of the creator were likely to be. She 
should ask herself: what were the dominant beliefs at the time? What tasks were commonly 
performed in this culture that a tool would be likely to aid with? Where would we be likely to 
find evidence regarding the intentions of the designer of this thing? This is not to say that 
archaeologists are likely to find definitive answers to each of these questions, but she is 
compelled to try to build the most plausible story regarding what the intentions of a designer 
were likely to be. Consider the case of the so-called ‘Baghdad Battery’, dated between 250 
BC-640AD (figure 2a): 
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Figure 2b140 
These objects are about 15cm in size, containing cylinders of copper with iron rods in 
the middle. Suggestively, these iron rods show signs of acid corrosion. This lead 
Wilhelm König in 1938 to postulate that these objects might have acted as a galvanic cell, 
and been an example of a very early battery, which would have meant that the discovery of 
electricity occurred a good 1800 years earlier than previously thought.141 A test conducted by 
Jansen et al. showed that if the vessels were fuelled by a contemporary substance, 
benzoquinone, the ‘batteries’ were capable of producing low voltage power.142  
One might be tempted to think that the job is done: the hypothesis has borne fruit. 
Here we have a simple artefact that is capable of performing as advertised. The archaeologist 
would be mistaken in ending the story there, however, as a good historian will not just 
conclude that because a thing is used in a particular way that it is for that use.143 One should 
instead ask why a designer would intend to build an artefact with a putative function. What 
use did the Parthians have for electricity? There is no written evidence to support the claim 
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that Babylonians utilised any sort of powered objects, nor is there any archaeological 
evidence that would point towards electrical power (after all, a battery is not much use 
without something it powers).144  
Instead, we can derive clues regarding the intentions of a designer to satisfy the 
desires of a set of users via the dominant beliefs of the time. Those who accept the CIF 
account would demand a thorough investigation into the dominant beliefs and desires of 
those users.145 Indeed, the dominant, rival theory to the ‘battery’ hypothesis claims that these 
vessels instead were a kind of religious item, which would be filled with parchment inscribed 
with sacred texts, and surrounded by metals which would please the gods.146 The relatively 
complex nature of the construction of these objects is explained by reference to the beliefs of 
the population—copper and iron had special religious significance for those living at the 
time, and an item built out of such objects would imbue the object with the same significance. 
The hypothesis we are left with is that a designer, noting the significance of these materials, 
constructed the ‘batteries’ to provide a kind of religious artefact, which would aid the 
population in their worship. The fact that the batteries were capable of producing a low-
voltage electric charge was a mere coincidence. It is clear that focusing on what a thing could 
be used for can potentially blind us to what it was intended to be for. 
 This is not to say that the CIF account demands evidence regarding the intentions of 
some designer. Instead the claim is that we must explain the features of an artefact by 
reference to the most likely intentions held by some designer, given all the available facts. 
The fact that I have a remote control in front of me which has buttons corresponding to the 
functions on my DVD player strongly implies, if not determines, that the designer of this 
object intended that it be used in concert with my DVD player. The fact that my DVD remote 
does nothing when pointed towards anything other than my DVD player only increases the 
likelihood that this is a correct hypothesis. The fact that when I point my remote at a DVD 
player, made by a rival company to my own DVD player, only to have it do nothing 
whatsoever, implies that the designer of my DVD remote intended that it only work with this 
make of DVD player.  
                                                          
144
 Vaesen and Amerongen, “Optimality vs. Intent: Limitations of Dennett’s Artefact Hermeneutics,” 789–790. 
145
 Ibid., 789. 
146
 C.f. Keyser, “The Purpose of the Parthian Galvanic Cells: A First-Century A. D. Electric Battery Used for 
Analgesia,” 82. 
63 
 
This account is both powerful and intuitive. Nonetheless, it has a key weakness in its 
ability to address function-shifts. Before turning to this problem, however, I will turn to the 
artefactual conditions introduced in the last chapter to illustrate how the CIF account attempts 
to address them. 
2.7. Answering the artefactual conditions 
We are now in a position to meet the conditions for an artefactual metaphysic from the 
previous chapter. To recapitulate, any artefactual account must be capable of explaining the 
following well-founded features of artefacts: 
1) They are best understood as means-to-an-end (MTE). 
2) They are good MTE for the ends in question 
3) Why it is that they seem to have a dualistic nature 
4) We think it appropriate to perform normative locutions regarding artefacts. 
5) The differences between broken, non-functioning and malfunctioning artefacts. 
6) They undergo function-shifts. 
I will examine each in turn. 
2.7.1. Means-to-an-end/ends-appropriateness 
The intentionalist can explain features 1 and 2 with reference to one key fact: artefacts are 
MTE because they were designed to be. The artificer of a particular artefact had some end 
clearly in mind when she sat down to design it. As de Ridder puts it:  
[T]he core of technical design is plausibly reconstructed as a systematic 
transition from a client’s goal to a detailed description of an artefact plus 
instructions on how to use this artefact to achieve the goal. This means that, in 
general, both the starting point and the endpoint of a design process consist of 
intentional descriptions. Design starts with goals or desired functions and it 
ends with a description of an artefact with a function and use instructions.147 
An artefact is a means to an end precisely because, upon being manipulated in the appropriate 
circumstances and in the right way, it has the capacity to bring about a given end-state, just as 
the designer intended. The designer’s intentions can thereby be ‘read off’ the artefact by 
users. Insofar as the designer is both competent and successful in her intentions, the artefact 
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will perform to specification within the intended environments. Assuming that people 
actually want to bring about the end-states that the artefact functions bring about, they have a 
rational reason for utilising it to bring about that end-state. Indeed, that is what the artefact is 
for. Given that each artefact has an associated use-plan, this explains why they are good as a 
MTE for some particular end. The use-plan provides the instructions for one to bring about 
the end, assuming that it is placed into an appropriate context of use.  
2.7.2. The Dual Nature Thesis 
The CIF account, insofar as it accepts that artefactual kinds are not to be regarded as natural 
kinds, inherits the dual-nature thesis. Those who endorse the CIF account are thus compelled 
to accept that artefacts do, in fact, have a dual-nature. They are, at once, physical and 
intentional objects. They cannot be described solely in terms of one or the other aspect 
without losing predictive and explanatory power; one cannot describe the intentional 
characteristics of an artefact in terms of its physical characteristics, nor vice versa. In a way, 
the CIF account is hard-wired to accept the dual-nature account, as a CIF account demands a 
place for intentions in our descriptions of artefacts. As it is of course incontrovertible that 
artefacts are physically instantiated in the actual world, the intentionalist demands that 
artefacts have a twofold character. One cannot talk about artefacts, so runs the argument, 
without talking about a set of objects with a dualistic nature.  
 To accept the CIF account is, by implication, to accept the dual-nature thesis. 
Proponents of CIF do not consider this consequence too worrisome. Thomasson, for one, 
finds the dual-nature thesis acceptable, and insists that this is not at all concerning for 
artefactual realists. Artefacts are not natural kinds, and are always partially intentional, but 
this only renders them ontologically deficient if one accepts that only natural kinds are real. 
Artefacts, much like beliefs or desires, are real, even if they are not explicable in terms of 
natural kinds. The problem, according to Thomasson, is isolatable if we trace this argument’s 
starting point—if we assume, without justification, that the features that typify natural kinds 
must be repeated in the case of artefacts, we are destined to be frustrated if we wish to 
include them in our ontologies. We should instead accept that there are a great many things 
that do not fit the natural kind model that appear to be perfectly real, and we should not be 
surprised that artefacts fail to fit the bill.  
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2.7.3. Normativity and Artefacts 
There is no shortage of examples of normative talk directed at artefacts. For example, it is 
entirely common to overhear the following locutions: 
  This car should get us to the store. 
  Mortars are supposed to provide a light artillery barrage at range. 
  This iron is meant to allow me to rid my shirts of creases. 
Intentionalist artefactual metaphysics allows us to easily capture normative claims. The 
source of our assurance that an artefact is supposed to perform a particular way in particular 
circumstances is the designer of the artefact itself (or else, as previously noted, a community 
of users). Each artefact is not isolated from intentions, according to this theory, but bound up 
with intentions. Artefacts have accepted uses, which correspond with the artefact’s intended 
behaviour.148 A use-plan has been formulated and articulated, perhaps via instruction 
manuals, or verbally. More commonly, an artefact communicates what it is for via the 
inclusion of visual or tactile hints. Think here of the morphological features of an artefact: a 
pistol. We are all quite familiar with what pistols look like, and I hardly need to provide any 
retelling of these features here. We know that they have barrels, a handle, a trigger, a 
hammer, and so on. While this is all true, there is nothing stopping designers from making a 
pistol with entirely different features, perhaps creating one that looks like a tissue box, or box 
of pens. 
 One key reason for refraining from such a radical reimagining is that familiar visual 
cues provide clear guidance of usage. A pistol looks as it does to provide the user with key 
feedback regarding how she is to wield the weapon: a handle is where the hand is supposed to 
go; a trigger is where the finger is supposed to go; the barrel is not where you should place 
your hand, and so on. These visual cues indicate what the designer intends: you place your 
hands where they are meant to go because that is where the designer wanted you to place 
your hands.   
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2.7.4. Broken/Malfunctioning/non-functioning 
The CIF account offers clear guidance on how to carve up the distinctions between broken, 
malfunctioning and non-functioning artefacts.149 I begin with malfunction. 
Malfunction: malfunction, under the CIF, is taken as a situation in which an artefact is 
within its intended context of use, and yet it does not function as expected by the creator in 
that situation. Without the creator’s intended function, so runs the argument, it would be 
impossible to distinguish a malfunction with mere function. As a result, the difference 
between a catastrophic metldown of a nuclear reactor and a differently functioning nuclear 
reactor comes down to what the creator of the reactor intended for it to do. As Kripke puts it: 
How is it determined when a malfunction occurs? […] Depending on the intent of the 
designer, any particular phenomenon may or may not count as a machine malfunction 
[…] Whether a machine ever malfunctions and, if so, when, is not a property of the 
machine itself as a physical object but is well defined only in terms of its program, as 
stipulated by its designer.150 
Broken- An artefact breaking differs from malfunction insofar as failures occur when 
aberrant function eventuates from a context of use that is different from the intended contexts. 
Here we imagine the person that attempts to utilise a ballpoint pen underwater. When the pen 
fails to write anything whatsoever, it has not malfunctioned, but has experienced failure as it 
cannot perform in the situation in which it has been placed. 
Thus the CIF account requires a relatively strict understanding of the context of use 
that a particular artefact will be used in. This context is communicated to the user via such 
mediums as user manuals, labelling, and via the use of affordances (e.g. utilising a switch to 
signal that this is how to turn on the artefact).151 The function of each and every component 
of the artefact is thus ‘fixed’ by the intentions of the designer, and we have a straightforward 
understanding of what an artefact is by reference to the use-plans associated with that 
artefact. The use-plan of an artefact also specifies, in some cases, failure-states of the artefact, 
such as the instruction manual that might come with a rifle in the case of a jam. In such cases, 
the use-plan will specify how to remedy the failure—or, it will communicate to an 
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experienced repairperson how to effect a repair. Other cases of artefacts breaking include 
those where there is general wear-and-tear of the artefact and, again, the use-plan account 
offers an explanation insofar as they specify maintenance conditions so as to avoid 
malfunctions and breakages. 
Non-functioning- An artefact that is non-functional is understood, under the CIF 
account, as one that cannot function under any specified context. Consider again the 
perpetual motion machine noted in Section 1.7.6. Such a machine cannot operate to 
specifications, as its physical makeup does not represent a successful construction on the part 
of the designer. The designer is not free, independent of how the artefact actually functions 
within the desired contexts, to dub whatever she pleases a successful artefact. It is imperative 
that the artefact actually does what it says on the tin, and this is precisely what the CIF 
account demands. There must be a success-state specified by the designer in creating her 
artefact, such that it is possible to tell whether the desired end-state is achieved via the usage 
of the artefact. In the case of a non-functioning artefact, the specified end-state (for instance, 
a wheel turning forever, without the addition of any external power source) is not achieved, 
and cannot be achieved by following the artificer’s use-plan.  
 Note, finally, that non-functioning artefacts are not only impossible types, as when we 
speak of perpetual motion machines. The class of non-functioning artefacts includes non-
functional tokens, as when a designer sets about creating a new chemical adhesive only to 
find that it simply doesn’t work. Adhesives, as a type, exist, but the purported token of the 
type is a non-functional adhesive. The account thus allows for some reference to the original 
intent of the designer, without thereby licencing the artificer to claim that whatever she 
creates is, in fact, a token of an artefactual type. 
2.7.5. Function-Shifts and the CIF Theory  
The key failing of the CIF arises due to its inability to deal with function-shifts adequately. 
Recall from Section 1.7.3 that function-shifts occur when an artefact that once occupied a 
particular functional role comes to have a new role entirely, and where that role is sometimes 
entirely alien from the original intended function of the artefact. For instance, one might use 
an old bayonet as a turkey carver, or a church pew as a child’s swing.152 The CIF account, as 
given above, would claim that in both cases the artefact has not shifted function after all, 
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despite individual appearances. A bayonet is for stabbing people in armed encounters, a pew 
is for seated reflection on the majesty of the almighty, and so on. As the creator intended for 
these contexts, and use-plans, all that is transpiring here is that certain individuals are 
misusing the artefacts, in the normative sense given above. This does not mean that they are 
bad at their new roles: indeed, the bayonet would likely serve as a perfectly good turkey 
carver, and the pew might comfortably seat three children. But the fact that some individuals 
use the bayonet and pew in these ways does not thereby mean that the artefacts are now, 
respectively, a turkey carver and swing. 
 We can call this kind of function-shift idiosyncratic insofar as this new pattern of use 
occurs sporadically, and the new use fails to catch on amongst the general populace. This 
includes those usages that are reasonably common, such as using a tire as a swing for 
children—insofar as the tyres that are used for this purpose are usually bald, and therefore 
unusable for their proper function, we can state that such usage represents the repurposing of 
junk. It is not so easy to dispense, however, with what I will call a global function-shift. 
These occur when an artefact was designed for one purpose, and come to only have one other 
usage, as in the case of of 2,4,5-T, when the compound was utilised successfully solely as a 
component of Agent Orange. In such cases, if we are willing to follow the account to this 
point, the CIF account would motivate us to say that, even in these cases, the artefact has not 
shifted its nature. 2,4,5-T remains a commercial herbicide, with the associated context of use 
that a domestic herbicide entails, even though nobody utilises 2,4,5-T for domestic purposes 
any longer. A CIF theorist might be motivated to claim that the usage of 2,4,5-T as a weapon 
is another case of simple misuse. 
 The problem with this perspective is that any talk of misuse presupposes that there is, 
in fact, a use that fits the use-plan and context of usage that the artificer had in mind. The 
case of Agent Orange does not appear to follow this pattern, as a proper description of a 
commercial herbicide presupposes that such a usage is safe.153 The context of use, after all, of 
a domestic defoliant is to boost yields of usable crops, which is rendered impossible after 
usage of the compound as dioxin contaminates the soil and any crops growing there. Further, 
the compound can negatively effect the ecosystem, such that dangerous levels of dioxin 
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contaminates the wider food chain. Given Galston’s record of opposition to the usage of 
Agent Orange, as well as his efforts to act in accordance with a code of ethics, it could not be 
the case that this was the proper function of the artefact.  
Perhaps the CIF theorist can reply that if this is the case then there are no uses of the 
artefact, and therefore it is simple non-functional junk, akin to a perpetual motion machine. If 
the artefact does not function to specification then there is no artefact, as the intention did not 
meet the success criteria required to create a token of any given type. It should be clear that 
this is a deeply unsatisfactory reply, as there self-evidently is a usage of 2,4,5-T, and that is as 
a weapon, best used in the context of a jungle environment, such as Malaysia or Vietnam, as 
evidenced by the fact that Agent Orange was actually used in these contexts and performed 
admirably.154 
 A better reply is that there is no requirement to only refer to the original creator(s)’ 
intentions when we consider an artefact. In cases of global function-shift we can instead 
consider a community as de facto creators when they find a new use for an artefact. In the 
case of Agent Orange, the military researchers that first did research on 2,3,5-T created new 
use-plans and new contexts of use, and communicated these to others in such a way that they 
took on the role of an artificer, even if they did not initially develop the compound.155 Other 
examples abound: sad-irons became doorstops and book ends, Blu Tack became a method of 
sticking posters to walls when it was intended to be military-purpose mastic, and so on. 
Ordinary people can thus claim to be designers when they engage in these kinds of activities 
as they are active participants in coming up with a use-plan, either explicitly or implicitly.156 
Assuming that new use-plans are formulated and communicated (or are at least 
communicable), and contexts of use can be specified, an artefact can take on an entirely new 
function. What was once an herbicide became a weapon after all, although at the cost of 
widening the definition of ‘designer’. 
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 There are, however, two problems with this view. First, claiming that users act as 
designers when they repurpose an artefact seems to distort the intentional activity that 
represents standard cases of designing. Imagine that in the distant future churches are 
rendered redundant by the sudden conversion of the world’s population to atheism. Around 
the world, various individuals decide that they will attempt to repurpose church pews as 
swings for groups of children. Whereas an engineer or artificer considers a range of usages 
and contexts for her artefact, it is more likely that the average person will instead be 
motivated by simple pragmatism to see whether a given repurposing of an artefact will work, 
working off simple rules of thumb. In the case of the pew-cum-swing, the individual will 
likely see if the rigging is sufficient to ensure that it will not come loose, see if it is capable of 
supporting the weight of three small children, and check if it swings satisfactorily. We can 
call this kind of thinking satisficing a functional goal, rather than exhibiting the kind of 
intentional pre-planning the CIF account appears to demand. If we weaken the demand on 
having a substantive idea of what one is designing, and thus allow cases where there is no 
requirement to explicitly formulate a use-plan and specify a set of contexts of use, we are 
unable to disallow other simple cases of repurposing of objects. Few, including myself, 
would wish to say that a rock picked up and placed upon a sheaf of paper becomes a 
paperweight.157 And yet in picking up the rock, the individual may have an idea that this is 
how one uses a rock as a paperweight, and obviously has in mind a particular context of use.  
 The second problem is far more damaging, and appears to be enough to render the 
CIF account unworkable. Note that in cases of global function-shifts the CIF theorist is left 
with two options: to dig in their heels and claim that the function of the artefact has not 
actually changed at all, despite appearances; or else elevate the general populace to the level 
of artificers.158 The first option appears untenable in the face of common experience, so they 
are left with the second option. I will grant the possibility that a CIF theorist could amend 
their theory such that the above criticisms of the latter position are resolved. Yet this leaves 
the CIF theorist no better off as they are, at best, only capable of providing post-hoc 
explanations of why a global function-shift occurred, while predicating that explanation on a 
series of assumptions regarding the intentions and beliefs of some group of undiscoverable 
individuals. This kind of ‘just so’ story provides plenty of intuitive explanatory power, but 
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lacks traction due to its inability to predict. The CIF theory will always default to original 
intended function, in the absence of the emergence of new, widespread patterns of usage.  
 Diagnosing the source of this issue requires us to note that the focus, as it has been 
throughout this chapter, is in the intentions of designers and users. Under the CIF account the 
designer imposes functions upon the artefacts in question, as Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 
illustrate:  
Of necessity, something which belongs to an artifactual substance kind, for 
example, a knife, essentially has an artificial function or purpose, for example, 
cutting. And by definition, an artifact has an artificial function or purpose 
because of some belief(s) or decision(s) of some purposeful intellect(s). 
Hence, it is not possible for an artefact to exist unless it exists because of some 
belief(s) or decision(s) of some psychological subject(s). For example, it is 
impossible for a knife to exist in a universe that never contains a purposeful 
intellect, though of course it is possible for a mereological compound that 
could constitute a knife to exist in such a possible universe.159   
Importantly, this is not to be read as a rehash of the ontogenetic criterion, revealing the 
relatively banal point that had there never been human beings to create a knife, knives never 
would have existed. The point is that the function of the knife intrinsically depends on the 
intentions of agents, such that the artefact itself, in isolation from these intentions and beliefs, 
exists just as a collection of material matter. A world without the kinds of beings that have 
intentions would therefore mean a world without artefacts. 
  A simple example reveals the problem with this outlook. Suppose that President 
Obama re-attempts to legislate against private gun ownership, and this time he succeeds. The 
legislation ends up being more effective than anyone expected, and as a result the collected 
peoples of the world decide to forgo their obsession with guns. Later, they go further and 
deny the very existence of guns themselves. We all agree that ‘guns no longer exist’ without 
setting about physically destroying anything; instead, the physical things we referred to as 
guns are now repurposed as paperweights, doorstops and wall ornaments. Suppose, further, 
that out of the (estimated) 876 million small arms that now populate the world, some 
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accidentally discharge when placed in their new environments (after all, who would unload a 
paperweight?).  
The mere fact that enough people have come to a decision regarding the functionality 
of weaponry does not remove the real physical capacities of objects. This class of artefacts 
are such as to allow for functionality in the absence of shared beliefs. A gun, as indicated, 
will still fire a bullet even in the presence of humanity’s collective intention that ‘guns are 
harmless paperweights.’ Technical artefacts function by enabling the realisation of an action, 
and this explains why they function as MTE. Furthermore, technical artefacts exhibit a 
capacity to enable repeatable actions, which lead to reasonably reliable outcomes associated 
with the artefact’s primary kind. This feature of technical artefacts is a causal capacity, and 
one that explains why agents would have a reason to use the artefacts in question to bring 
about certain outcomes even in the absence of either collective or individual intentions. 
Knowing that a gun has the capacity to discharge a lead projectile at a lethal velocity is 
sufficient to preclude certain behaviours towards it, such as regarding it as a paperweight. It 
is also enough to suggest reasons to use it, perhaps to commit murder.  
The upshot here is that there appears to be a disjunction between those artefacts that 
functionally depend upon collective intentions, and those that function as a result of their 
physical constitutions, relative to the environment in which they are located. Whereas money, 
laws and other associated social artefacts appear to directly depend on the continued beliefs 
and intentions of users and designers, technical artefacts do not. The failure of the CIF 
account resides in its conflation of the two, and ignorance of the capacities of artefacts in a 
causal sense. Users do not merely impose functions on inert objects, but discover the usages 
of particular configurations of parts and materials. The task of the next chapter will be to 
explicate exactly how this is to be understood. 
2.8. Conclusion  
This chapter began by illuminating the primary motivation behind accepting an intentionalist 
interpretation of artefact metaphysics. As we saw, for many years the default position for 
metaphysicians was to regard artefacts with suspicion, if not outright denial. This is grounded 
in the idea that as artefacts cannot be natural kinds, they must not be ‘real’ in the required 
sense. This lead to a response in the form of the so-called dual nature thesis, where artefacts 
are regarded as real, but mind-dependent, thereby tying talk of intentions to the actual nature 
of artefacts.  
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 I then surveyed variants of intentionalism, starting with the ontogenetic criterion. This 
criterion holds that anything that is made, whether functional or non-functional, is an artefact 
insofar as it was made intentionally by some designer. This position was dismissed for being 
hopelessly broad, as it does not allow us to make a useful distinction between artefacts and 
junk. We saw that a better interpretation of intentionalism requires that the designer have a 
successful intention to build and artefact, on the basis of a substantive understanding of what 
she wishes to build. But to accept this, we must move beyond the ontogenetic account and 
towards the CIF account. 
 I then outlined the CIF account with a special focus placed upon how theorists have 
conceived of the specific intentions in designing their artefacts: i.e. that designers must intend 
particular contexts of use, as well as develop use-plans for their artefacts in order to have 
formulated a substantive intention regarding them. Via the use of a concrete example, we saw 
that the CIF account provides an entirely intuitive account of artefact metaphysics, and 
provides clear instructions in the interpretation of unknown artefacts. We also saw that in 
addressing the artefactual conditions, the CIF account performs admirably, as it is capable of 
easily explaining why artefacts are MTE: they are because in order to be ‘for’ an end 
whatsoever they must have been intended to be such by the designer. It amply explains the 
dual nature thesis, in part because the modern articulation of the CIF theory is derived from 
an acceptance of it. Finally, the CIF account is able to explain via reference to designer 
intentions exactly how and why artefacts can be said to be normative, broken, malfunctioning 
and non-functioning. It is of course a key virtue of the CIF theory that it can explain so much 
with such a modest acceptance of a key intuition that most people accept: namely that 
artefacts are defined by creator’s intentions.  
 However, the CIF account suffers a key failing, as we have seen. The CIF account 
cannot adequately address function-shifts. Whenever an artefact takes on a new function 
without having been explicitly redesigned the CIF account is motivated to broaden their 
notion of ‘designer’ to include communities of users. But if this is to be accepted, the theory 
loses predictive power. The best we can do in the case of a global function-shift is provide a 
post-hoc explanation. Ideally, a robust artefactual metaphysic will be able to explain and 
predict the conditions under which a function-shift is likely, rather than making the intuitively 
dubious claim that disconnected users somehow are granted the status of ‘designer’ when 
making decisions regarding how to use their tools. In the next chapter I will return to Dennett 
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when I construct my alternative to the intentionalist account, the optimality account, which is 
free from the difficulties and problems that beset the former position.  
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Chapter Three: The Optimality Approach 
3.1. Introduction: The Intentionalist Fallacy 
So far we have seen that intentionalism, for all its intuitive support, cannot be said to be an 
adequate account of artefacts. Intentionalist accounts require that we ‘tie’ artefact functions to 
the intentions of either the designer of the artefact, or else some subset of users. As I have 
argued, this means that intentionalism cannot adequately account for the relative insensitivity 
of artefact functions to our intentions. We thereby need a new approach. 
 In the place of intentionalism, I will offer what can be termed the ‘optimality’ account 
of artefacts. This account differs from intentionalism in two crucial ways. First, it focuses on 
the capacities of actual artefacts within particular systems, and attempts to ‘read off’ the 
functions of artefacts via the observation of sustained, fruitful patterns of usage within those 
systems. Second, it claims that intentions of agents, be they designers or a communities of 
users, are distinctly unhelpful (or, indeed, positively misleading) in determining what an 
artefact is for. The optimality account supplants talk of intended, or proper, functions with the 
claim that whatever a thing is for is determined by the capacity of an artefact to perform a 
functional role well. Such an account foregrounds the way in which artefacts are embedded in 
actual environments, as wells as how they are utilised within these environments.160   
My account calls upon the notion of optimality, as first explicated by Daniel Dennett 
in “The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artefacts”.161 This understanding requires 
that we pay attention to both the function of artefacts and the environments within which they 
are utilised in order to understand them. First, I will turn to motivational concerns as to why 
we might wish to divest artefacts of their typically intentional definition, before deflating the 
user/creator distinction. I will then provide a positive metaphysical account of optimality as 
applied to artefacts. I begin with an example.  
It is worth reflecting on the central kind of question that can be asked of a putative 
artefact: what is this thing? At base, an intentionalist account offers guidance at the expense 
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of locating the answer ‘in the head’.162 The picture that intentionalism wishes to draw is 
depicted at figure 2c: 
Fig 2c 
The answer as to what an artefact is can be found only via reference to the intentions and 
beliefs of some agent, or set of agents. These intentions determine the proper function of an 
artefact, and the use plan associated with that function stipulates the use of the artefact. It is a 
neat picture, but the source of the problems is clear. Intentionalism presupposes an 
epistemically privileged position for some agents, thereby rendering the functionality of 
artefacts subordinate to mental states had by agents. 
Intentionalism, as detailed above can be interpreted (following Hilpinen in section 
2.5.1) as conferring artificers (or perhaps communities of users) with the status of authors.163 
I use the term ‘author’ to denote persons who are said to have a defining intention regarding 
the artefact, such that kind-membership is determined by reference to the artificer’s 
intentions. Use of this term highlights a supposed commonality between artificers and the 
authors of texts. Knowledge of the intentions of an author is sometimes regarded as an 
integral part of understanding the meaning of a work of literature, such that interpreters 
attempt to understand a given work of literature in the light of the intentions of the author. If 
we are lucky, the author has left either clues (or outright answers) to resolve any ambiguities 
within the text itself. If we regard artificers as having the same status as that of an author, this 
requires accepting that a designer can provide an final interpretation of the artefact. This 
intention ‘fixes’ the artefact’s category, and allows us to talk of ‘misuse’, as when a steak 
knife is utilised to stab a family member over a dispute. This is a misuse of the knife as it was 
designed to be used for cutting into steaks, not for stabbing family members. We can 
articulate this view as follows: 
A) Designer-as-author: for any artefact x, x is a φ-er iff the designer of 
x intended that x be a φ-er. 
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For the designer-as-author view to be deemed persuasive, we should be able to provide 
reasons why it is reasonable to claim that designers have a privileged status, over and above 
descriptions that match patterns of usage of their technology. In other words, the designer-as-
author conception requires that the activities of a designer determines the canonical 
descriptions of an artefact, such as ‘Designing a weapon’, or ‘Designing a steak knife’.164 
Further, it requires that there is in fact a definitive answer to what a thing is, even if it is 
undiscoverable in principle (such as when the designer of an artefact dies without telling 
anyone what the artefact is).165 Assuming that the artefact functions, it has its canonical 
function because of these intentions (whether they be the intentions of a sole creator, or else a 
community of users who repurpose the artefact).  
In reply to this common intuition, Daniel Dennett argues that a designer, or even a 
community of users, cannot be taken to be the final say on artefact categorisation. Dennett 
draws here upon the intentional fallacy famous within literary studies.166 The central claim 
within literary studies is well accepted: to understand the meaning of a novel, it is not enough 
to ask the author what they had in mind when they put pen to paper. We must assume (in both 
literary and artefactual domains) that the thing in question does what it is supposed to do. 
Dennett quotes approvingly from Wimsatt and Beardsley: 
Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands that it 
works. It is only because an artefact works that we infer the intention of an 
artificer.167 
One should be careful, however, not to mistake this rule of thumb with the over-
reaching claim that the designer’s intentions will always line up with the final function of an 
artefact, or a text. Perhaps when Shakespeare wrote The Merchant of Venice the audience, 
and Shakespeare himself, thought the goings on to be a laugh-out-loud comedy, where the 
ending would leave all involved in stitches. This may be the case (and I hasten to add, I do 
not suggest that this is the case), but this does not thereby render the play a laugh-out-loud 
comedy. Indeed, upon being told that this play was supposed to be a comedy, audiences 
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would not thereby find the play funny. Whether or not the play is funny is down to the 
interaction between the goings-on upon the stage with the audience. While there may be a 
persuasive story to be told regarding what Shakespeare intended, the play is separable from 
these intentions. Knowing Shakespeare’s intentions will underdetermine our judgements 
regarding whether the play is anti-Semitic, funny or successful as a play. It is entirely 
possible (and, arguably, common) for authors to fail in their intentions. There is no singular 
perspective that renders a textual analysis correct, and only over time do good interpretations 
ratify as no better interpretation is available. This amounts to a challenge to the claim that 
authors of texts have epistemic precedence over individual users. 
Dennett’s claim is that the same pattern is repeated in the case of technical 
artefacts.168 Consider here the most banal artefact to hand, a piece of chalk. If I were ignorant 
of the use of the artefact, I would manipulate it, attempting different uses that suggest 
themselves to me. The weight of chalk rules out a number of potential interpretations, 
including its serving as a paperweight, as a car, as shelter for my family, etc. Upon 
manipulating it to mark something suitably dry, dark and undulating, I would then likely 
interpret the object as a writing instrument due to its capacity to perform as one. Of central 
importance here is the point that utilising an instrument (or attempting to) is thereby an 
attempt to interpret the artefact.169 This is what Dennett terms ‘artefact hermeneutics,’ as it 
shares key features with textual hermeneutics. The act of utilising an artefact is that of 
interpreting it just as reading a book involves active interpretation of what the words signify. 
By using the artefact I attempt to interpret its capacities in the light of its likely set of 
achievable ends. If I interpret an artefact to be a φ-er this means the artefact exhibits the 
capacities that enable it to be a φ-er. In short, for an artefact to be what it is depends on 
whether the artefact works in that functional role. 
Upon accepting that the intentional fallacy applies equally to artefacts, it follows that 
there is no significant distinction between artificers and users.170 Dennett provides the 
following argument: 
Inventors of artefacts are no more immune to confusion than authors of texts. 
It is possible that someone setting out with every intention of creating a new 
kind of alarm clock succeeds, in spite of himself, in creating something that 
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can charitably described as merely a new kind of paperweight. Consider how 
the Intentional Fallacy looks when applied to artefacts: the inventor is not the 
final arbiter of what an artefact is, or is for: the users decide that. The inventor 
is just another user, only circumstantially and defeasibly privileged in his 
knowledge of the functions and uses of the device. If others can find better 
uses for it, his intentions, clearheaded or muddled, are of mere historical 
interest. That is, it may indeed be an incontrovertible historical fact that a 
certain artefact was created by someone with a particular purpose very clearly 
represented—both in his head […] and in written “specs” and blueprints, we 
may suppose—but this historical fact, while it establishes something about 
how the artefact was intended at the outset, may shed no valuable light on the 
functions it can and does actually serve. Turing and Von Neumann might 
disavow the use of their computing machine as a word-processor, but so what? 
It is a perfectly marvellous word-processing machine, and many of the 
features of its most recent mutations are clearly designed with that end in 
mind.171 
Dennett’s contention is that it is not possible to claim that artefacts have a static nature, 
insofar as that view entails that tokens of artefactual types will remain associated with their 
original types. If we take canonical categorisations to mean timeless categorisations, 
insensitive to unforeseen future patterns of usage, it is unlikely that anything approximating a 
canonical description exists. It is not the case that anyone is in the position to say, once and 
for all, that any token artefact has found its final functional niche, and this includes users. As 
Dennett puts it:  
what something is really for now is no more authoratively fixed by the current 
user’s “intentions” than by any other intentions[.]172 
 The moral of this account is that interpretation takes place over time, by multiple 
users and designers. For any artefact, this means a lack of fixed functionality, as the same 
artefact can find a new functional niche to occupy.173 This is in sharp contrast to the CIF 
account, which regards any change in artefact function as being a new design event. If an 
artefact is used differently to how the original designer intends, the new use is taken to be 
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users acting as designers. This underpins the ‘use plan’ account surveyed in the last 
chapter.174 Under that account, no artefact is designed without a use plan, which details how 
the technology is to be used by others. The physical design of the artefact can be taken to 
provide clues to the user as to the plan of use, via the use of labelling (as in the case of a 
remote control) or common cues common to other products (such as utilising a handle).175 
Under this account, a new mode of use of an artefact entails the construction of a new use 
plan, which must be communicable to others. Given that in such cases, those users that put an 
artefact to a new use are acting as designers rather than ‘pure’ users.  
The problem with such an account is that a more parsimonious explanation is 
available if we simply reject the distinction between users and designers. Where the use-plan 
account requires the creation of a use-plan (perhaps without knowing that one is doing so, in 
the case of ordinary users) the account offered here only requires that the artefact is good at 
performing its new role, which serves as an explanation for why this mode of usage ‘catches 
on’ among others. Many persons, acting independently, can arrive at the same new mode of 
usage without any communication between them, and without making the further postulation 
that using an artefact in an unexpected way means that they have thereby designed 
something. They merely ‘interpret’ the artefact in a way that the original designer did not 
foresee, and this interpretation may or may not catch on, depending on both how well the 
artefact fulfils this new role.  
The optimality approach suggested by Dennett provides some key insights into how 
we are to understand artefacts when we give up on intentionalism as our working hypothesis, 
although his account suffers from a lack of precise detail. To remedy this, I will discuss what 
Dennett takes to be a key piece of evidence in favour of his account: the actual practice of 
archaeologists.176 I turn to an example Dennett himself provides: the Achulean hand-axe (see 
figure 3a).177 Investigating this example will elucidate some of the working hypotheses that 
undergird the optimality account, and also serve as a general introduction to the themes I will 
explore. 
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Figure 3a: The Acheulean hand-axe178 
 
 This object is possibly one of the earliest artefacts ever used by homo sapiens, and 
many token hand-axes have been discovered throughout Africa, Asia and Europe. Simple in 
design, the hand-axe just consists of a piece of rock, sharpened along two edges, leading to a 
sharp point. Given the ubiquity of the hand-axe, it must have been in common usage, rather 
than acting as a specialist’s tool, suggesting that whatever function it had must have been in 
high demand amongst those communities.179 The orthodox position of archaeologists was that 
the hand-axe was a kind of early Swiss army knife, capable of performing various tasks that 
were needed at the time, such as butchery, scraping out hides, and digging holes in dirt.180 
Other studies instead highlighted the possible importance of the artefact as a social artefact, 
enabling conversation or for impressing potential mates, although such alternative hypotheses 
are generally regarded as suspect due to the lack of evidence available in their favour.181 
Despite the broad consensus that the hand-axe was a general use tool, a controversial 
position gained some popularity: that the so-called ‘hand-axe’ was better understood as a 
thrown weapon, acting roughly like a stone discus.  Ex hypothesi, such a weapon would spin 
on a plane and upon striking a fleeing animal cause a withdrawal reflex, toppling the prey, 
thereby making the animal easier for early hominids to chase down.182 First amongst those 
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who advanced this theory was M. D. W. Jeffreys in 1965, followed years later by W. H 
Calvin.183 Jeffreys provides reasons as to why the general-use hypothesis may be mistaken as 
follows: 
An examination of these Palaeolithic stone implements shows that they (a) are 
elongated tools with a pointed and a blunt end; (b) are worked on both faces; 
(c) have their margins trimmed to a cutting edge all the way round; (d) show 
no signs of wear and tear on the cutting edge. On the principle of least effort 
these characteristics preclude the alleged 'hand-axe' its use as a hand tool. A 
tool to be held in the hand would not be worked to a cutting surface all round 
its edge because this sharp edge would damage the hand as soon as the tool 
was used with any force at all. Furthermore the edges would then show wear 
and tear.184 
We can recast the final two points Jeffreys makes as relating to two separate types of 
considerations. These are: 
Historical considerations: Given the evidence, what usage best fits the 
historical record? 
Optimality considerations: Given the configuration of the artefact, what 
function is it best suited to perform? 
 When Jeffreys claims that the artefact shows no wear in the way that is expected if the 
general-use tool description were accurate, he is claiming that historically the artefact shows 
no evidence of the usage ascribed to it. Accepting this data, we should ask ourselves which of 
the two considerations should be given priority. The guiding intuition here is that optimality 
considerations explain historical patterns. Use-wear reveals that a type of artefact was used 
for a particular function, and our best explanation for this historical pattern of usage is that 
the artefact was well-suited to this use. By extension, if it was not used for this task this is 
partially explained by the expectation that the artefact is ill-suited to perform that task. If we 
are interested in the prior functional role once occupied by an artefact, we are best guided by 
the following line of reasoning, as exemplified by Dennett: 
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[W]e are shown some alien or antique gadget and asked: what is it for? Is it a 
needle-making machine or a device for measuring the height of distant objects 
or a weapon? What can we learn from studying the object? We can determine 
how the parts mesh, what happens under normal conditions, and so forth. We 
can also look for telltale scars and dents, wear and tear. Once we have 
compiled these facts we try to imagine a setting in which given these facts it 
would excellently perform some imaginably useful function.185 
We are fortunate that there have been a number of feasibility studies along much the same 
lines as Dennett suggests. These studies, upon noting the difficulties associated with the 
‘discus theory’, claim that the so-called hand-axe was more likely to be a general purpose 
tool, more akin to a Swiss army knife than a thrown weapon. It was especially suited to 
cleaning hides, however, and this it seems to lend prima facie justification to the ‘general 
purpose’ theory.186 
 In short, the optimality approach is primarily guided by a simple insight: if something 
is good at a given task, it will likely be used for that task. This guides historical inquiry, such 
as that of the hand-axe, as rival theories are able to be tested on the basis of patterns of use, 
rather than attempting to interpret the intentions of an unknown author or designer, which of 
course we have no access to.187 This amounts to a radical overturning of the key position of 
the intentionalists: rather than use following intention, it is far more likely that intention 
follows functional capacities. The capacity of a thing is our clue as to what a thing is, rather 
than a proclamation from some epistemically privileged position.  
  The optimality account as I will develop it approaches artefacts as wholly physical 
objects which exert causal capacities in their operating environments. This will allow us to 
understand that an artefact (due, in part, to its lower-level capacities) must exert the capability 
to change key features of the environment in predictably and reliably. This allows the 
optimality account to hold on to the notion that an artefact is a MTE, not because it is 
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intentionally designed to fulfil some end, but because we can project what the result of using 
an artefact will be. Those tools that bring about a desirable end will provide all the reason 
necessary to utilise that artefact. Of course, artefacts function variably in bringing about 
particular end-states, such as the case of a car that is a slow gas guzzler. We can make sense 
of this within an optimality account by reference to features such as the relative ease of use of 
the artefact, or its reliability. As a result we are in a position to claim that an artefact can be 
optimal at some task, such that for x to be a token of the artefactual type X, x must be best at 
performing the functional role associated with X. I avoid a misconception with the use of the 
term ‘optimal’ in section 3.7 before turning to address the desiderata of an artefactual 
metaphysic. 
I stress that this chapter amounts to a proposal in favour of a fully developed 
optimality account of artefacts, rather than an attempt to provide one. Much more could be 
said about each feature I will discuss, and due to matters of space much will have to be left to 
later research. Nonetheless, this chapter will reveal just how plausible a fully articulated 
account would be, as evidenced by the ability of the optimality account to address the central 
failings of intentionalism at (almost) no cost. The chapter begins with outlining the intuitions 
that will guide the optimality account. 
Part One: The Optimality Account Explained 
3.2. Guiding Intuitions of an Optimality Account 
The account I favour takes this insight seriously and demands that we take artefacts as 
separate from our own existences. As Vaccari puts it: 
Some features of technology suggest an ontological objectivity, a sort of 
autonomy or quasi-agency beyond the grasp of human intentionality, always 
resisting and exceeding it.188 
Agency, quasi or otherwise, might be too strong a word, and I will not endorse its use here. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that artefacts exert a causal influence, often without our willing, or 
even knowing, that they do so. Guns, bombs and chemical compounds all produce particular 
outcomes independently of what we think about their functions (perhaps even contrary to our 
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intentions). What is needed is an account that foregrounds this separability of artefactual 
functions from intentions, whilst providing the grounds for an explanation of why 
intentionalism is such an intuitively plausible theory. This, in turn, requires a willingness to 
refigure how we conceptualise artefacts. This brings us to the optimality account. 
 I argue that, in order to provide a workable theory of artefacts, any account must 
consider artefacts in the following way: 
 O1: Artefacts are wholly physical entities that have causal capacities. 
 O2: The function of an artefact is sensitive to both systems as well as times. 
O3: In order to determine what x is we must determine what function x is optimal at 
performing. 
O4: The fact that x is optimal at φ explains why we use x as a MTE. 
In other words, I claim an optimality account provides a workable account of artefacts if we 
take these intuitions seriously. While the next part of this chapter will involve unpicking the 
finer details of these four features of the optimality account, it will benefit us to note some of 
the key differences in perspective between this account and intentionalism. First, insofar as 
we accept that artefacts are physical objects that exhibit causal capacities, we thereby accept 
possibly the most intuitive understanding of artefacts, although it may be alien to most 
philosophers working in this field. I trust that the problems that beset intentionalism is 
enough to claim that O1 has prima facie support, given that the willingness to regard artefacts 
as dualistic in nature yields insurmountable problems. Second, an optimality account ties 
artefacts to times and places, rather than claiming that they are somehow essentially φ-ers. 
Support for this intuition comes from noting that, as was indicated, no artefact has a fixed 
nature, such that it is immune to function-shifts. Artefacts, as we experience them in 
everyday life, are situated within environments, and inhabit particular functional niches.189 
When their functions change, as they are apt to do, their operating environments change also. 
A tire used as a swing is situated in a very different environment to an ordinary tire, affixed 
to the wheel of a car. It is only by reference to a system that we can understand what a thing 
is for, as we must be able to claim that the artefact will change the system in which it is used. 
                                                          
189
 Kirsh, “Explaining Artifact Evolution,” 122–123. 
86 
 
 The third claim is more contentious, especially given that it appears to conflict with 
common experience of artefacts. When we are confronted with an unknown artefact, few 
people intuitively think that an artefact’s function is determined by how well it performs a 
function. Pennies, despite being effectively useless as currency, are excellent pie weights, as 
they conduct heat while keeping a piecrust flat. Few would thereby claim that pennies are 
actually pie weights in Australia. As a result of this, I will spend some time in the section 3.7 
defending this understanding at length for it is the crucial step in the argument for my 
position. Before I can do this, though, we must accept a few, less contentious claims. The 
first of these is that it is possible that there is one function that an artefact can be best, or 
optimal, at performing. I think this is not so unlikely, even if we are willing to claim that 
artefacts exhibit multiple functions that appear equally optimal. A Swiss army knife might be 
equally good at many tasks, but this should not give us pause as we can happily say that it is 
optimal at being a general use tool.190 More concerning is cases where we have an object that 
is bad at performing its purported function, such as a confusing remote control with far too 
many buttons, and a weak sensor. It will become clear that the difficulty thrown up by such 
an example is no real threat to the optimality account, given that the term ‘optimal’ does not 
mean ideally optimal. I address these concerns in 3.7 in greater detail.  
 The final claim is that the fact that an artefact is good at a particular task provides all 
the reason necessary for one to use that artefact to bring about the ends that the function 
enables. A kitchen knife is a cutting implement because it performs that task well, in the 
situations in which we want to do cut things up. It makes very little sense to claim that knives 
are for cutting while maintaining that they are not very good at that task. While this seems 
entirely intuitive, it entails that we give up on the intentionalistic understanding of 
malfunctioning, broken and non-functional artefacts. Just as we cannot say that we should use 
a hammer for hammering because the designer intended for the artefact to function as a 
hammer, we cannot say that we have a reason to use a broken hammer, as the hammer is not 
optimal at any task. As we will see in section 3.8.6 this leads to some very unintuitive results. 
Features O1-O4 together constitute the motivating claims that yield an optimality 
account. These features, once unpacked and fully explicated, provide a powerful argument 
that the best way to consider artefacts is according to their capacities, located in an 
environment at a time. When taken together, the features of optimality support artefactual 
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categorisations—roughly that for x to be a token of the artefactual type X then x must be good 
at bringing about the function φ that is associated with the artefactual type, X. I will now 
tease out a framework under which we can understand the optimality account more fully.  
3.3. Artefacts as Physical Objects 
To avoid the pitfalls of intentionalism, we must begin by remarking that artefacts do not 
appear to us as otherworldly apparitions, but are instead the sorts of things we manipulate, 
navigate and comport our lives to suit. Thus, rather than considering artefacts as ‘creations of 
the mind’, as a recent book on the subject termed them, optimality considers them to be real, 
physical objects, situated in real environments.191 An optimality analysis can therefore only 
proceed in those cases where we have a concrete token to consider.192 Concrete tokens are 
actual, physical token instantiations of some artefactual type, rather than hypothetical tokens, 
or artefactual types considered in the absence of exemplifying tokens. This restricts the 
theory to considering the capacities of artefacts within real environments, thus emphasising 
the importance of actual functions. Consider pondering the question of which of two 
hypothetical, non-existent books are better at making a reader laugh. It is reasonably clear 
that this is an empty, and pointless, exercise, as a non-existent book cannot be funnier than 
another non-existent book.193 This rules out by fiat cases where a designer creates a design 
with no tokens, or else creates a malformed token, unable to perform its functions. 
There is a further stipulation required: that the concrete token is taken to be a normal 
token. This at first blush appears rather confusing. Ex hypothesi, if x is an object, and it is 
optimal at φ-ing, isn’t x therefore a φ-er? How are we to determine what is normal in advance 
of determining what x is best at? In response, I need to be clear on what exactly is meant by 
‘normal’. I mean that we must assume when presented by an unknown putative artefact that 
we must assume that it functions.194 Practically, this requires that we assume that the artefact 
is not malfunctioning, broken or non-functional (I will return to these in section 3.8.6). This 
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is, I stress, an assumption that is required in order to perform artefactual analysis, as without 
this assumption it is not possible for any analysis to take place.  
 Still, it appears as if this avenue of inquiry leaves mysterious how it is that we can be 
said to know when we are presented with a normal token. It might be enough to say that 
human agents are fully capable of intuiting whether an artefact is functioning properly, even 
in the absence of a determinate answer as to what the function of the artefact ultimately is. 
Some cases are certainly clear: an artefact that appears to be in pieces, or hopelessly rusted, 
will clearly fall under the ‘broken’ category. If an agent is familiar with many tokens of a 
purported artefact type, and none function according to any reasonable specification, perhaps 
one would be justified in claiming that those tokens are non-functional. All of this requires 
that the agent attempting to understand how the artefact functions assumes two key 
conditions are met: first, that an artefact in fact has a function, and, second, that that artefact 
functions are met reliably. In the cases of non-functioning and broken artefacts, the first 
condition is not met. In the case of malfunctioning artefacts, the second condition is violated.  
It is no great challenge to defend these two key assumptions, as we can find largely 
the same assumptions in a common real-world practice: reverse engineering. ‘Traditional’ 
reverse engineers (i.e. specialists working within the engineering arm of a manufacturer) 
attempt to uncover the design process that produced the artefact in front of them.195 As 
Dennett puts it: 
When Raytheon wants to make an electronic widget to compete with General 
Electrics widget, they buy several of GE's widgets and proceed to analyse 
them: that's reverse engineering. They run them, benchmark them, X-ray 
them, take them apart, and subject every part of them to interpretive analysis: 
Why did GE make these wires so heavy? What are these extra ROM registers 
for? Is this a double layer of insulation, and, if so, why did they bother with it? 
Notice that the reigning assumption is that all these "why" questions have 
answers. Everything has a raison d'etre; GE did nothing in vain.196 
Of course, this methodology is specific to the specialised variant of reverse engineering. A 
traditional reverse engineer attempts to uncover answers to various ‘why’ questions, such that 
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they can produce an artefact of their own that will do things substantially the same way as the 
original object, but with key improvements. This is entirely outside the remit of what could 
be termed ‘folk’ reverse engineering. The key difference between traditional and folk reverse 
engineering is the level of specificity. Whereas a traditional reverse engineer will spend time 
uncovering the design of an artefact via fine-grained analysis (to the point of taking apart and 
analysing the functionality of each individual component), folk reverse engineers focus 
instead on the overall teleology of the artefact. Perhaps the folk reverse engineer will place 
the unknown artefact into a variety of situations to see how it behaves. She will work off the 
plausible assumption that if a thing exhibits a good fit between task, environment and 
outcome it is likely to be ‘for’ that use. This provides some grounding for the claim that any 
given artefact is at base a MTE: it exhibits a capacity that we utilise to bring about ends, and 
this capacity is discoverable via manipulation. Where traditional reverse engineers consider 
the structural, lower-level, features of the artefact, a folk reverse engineer has her focus upon 
the ends of the artefact. The essential feature of each approach is that for analysis to proceed 
we must assume that the artefact is in fact functional.  
3.4. System Relativity 
The connection between the causal capacities of an artefact and the systems within which that 
artefact can function is so intimate that we often run the two aspects together, or even leave 
these aspects entirely implicit. It is quite natural to say that “Guns are for shooting” or 
“Paperweights are for weighing down stacks of paper”, but this leaves out the dispositional, 
structural and environmental factors that explain that functionality.197 If we were happy to 
leave the account there, our account would commit to a universal interpretation of 
functionality that has no parallel in reality.198 No artefact can function in all possible 
environments. Guns are not for shooting underwater, nor are they for shooting on the moon. 
In particular, one can reasonably infer that artefacts function within certain systems, insofar 
as those systems do not preclude the function of the artefact.199 Thus every artefact has a set 
of conditions under which it can function, whether these conditions are left implicit or are 
made explicit (as when a designer includes a manual to guide the user).  
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Given this, we cannot talk of artefact functions in isolation from the systems within 
which the function is possible. Artefacts are situated in systems, and have the capacity to 
change their containing systems. In short, we should accept the following: 
B) x functions φ-wise iff x is within a supporting system Sn 
Sn should be taken to refer to a range of systems, environments or circumstances. But how are 
we to conceive of these systems? It is not enough to leave the account to intuition, as we have 
seen that intuition would lead us to posit beliefs about the artefact as being a feature of a 
system: namely, the belief that this artefact was designed to be an φ-er. The account I am 
constructing here takes seriously the notion that the artefact and its environment are 
metaphysically insensitive to our beliefs, even if our practical engagement with the artefact 
may be mediated by beliefs. 
In search of a definition, one might attempt to provide a full account of the actual 
features of a given environment—i.e. attempt to reduce an environment to a set of objects and 
their properties, as instantiated at a particular time.200 For example, imagine a handgun in a 
family home. To produce a full listing of all the objects and their associated properties would 
be impossible here, but we can single out those that appear relevant for the artefact itself. 
Artefactual environments are defined by their causal relevance to the function of x. In any 
given system, most features of that environment will be strictly irrelevant to the function of 
the artefact. There is no need, of course, to outline every feature of a given system when we 
attempt to provide an account for an artefact. It is enough for our purposes to say that there 
are certain systems that enable an artefact function to be realised, and others that inhibit this 
function. We colloquially understand these systems as operating environments for our 
artefacts, as when we say that one should not attempt to utilise a toaster underwater. Much of 
the time the systems under which the artefact performs its function are codified in manuals or 
relayed by salespersons to the user.201 There is no need that this be so. Part of the work of 
interpreting an artefact is performed via attempting to utilise artefacts in different 
environments, to see where the artefact best fits.202 This is where discussions end-states enter, 
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as our ability to pick out a change in an operating environment is our key clue as to what a 
thing is for.  
3.5. End-states 
Just as we should be able to stipulate the system within which an artefact functions, we must 
also be able to stipulate the end-state that an artefact brings about. In its most simple terms, 
an end-state is simply a change to a given system due to the behaviour of an artefact. When 
we use a knife to cut things up in a kitchen, features of that system have changed. Things that 
were not cut at t1 are now cut up at t2. Such an account distorts certain features, however. An 
end-state is more than a change to a system, as there are changes that an artefact brings about 
that we would not consider as an ‘end’ of that artefact. A bandsaw will produce sawdust 
when utilised, and yet we are unwilling to call the production of sawdust part of the ‘ends’ of 
an artefact.203 Cutting wood in a controlled manner is the end of a bandsaw, not the side-
effect of doing so. The difference between the two is best elucidated by drawing a distinction 
between ends and effects.204 A bandsaw can have a great many effects, such as producing 
heat when operated, or making a racket. So we must be interested not just in any change 
within a system, but a particular kind of change. I propose we are interested in are both 
projectable and desirable changes to systems. I think that these two requirements elevate an 
end-state from just an ordinary effect of artefact operation. I briefly explain each in turn. 
 Projectability: In order to utilise an artefact to bring about an end-state, we must be 
able to predict, on the basis of features of the artefact, what aspects of the system will change 
upon successful manipulation of an artefact. This, in turn, requires that the artefact has 
structural features that necessitate certain behaviour within a given environment (an issue that 
I will return to in the next section). But further than this it requires that the behaviour of an 
artefact is such that it will change the default-state of a system.205 More formally: 
C) x functions as φ in Sn relative to the capacity of Sn to bring about En 
just in case x is capable of φ-ing in Sn and the capacity of Sn 
bringing about En is lowered by the non-presence of x in Sn.206 
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This formalisation requires that the function of an artefact is discoverable by reference to how 
the system would have behaved had the artefact never been present. We can assume that a 
system maintains a certain propensity towards En in the absence of x, and this we can term its 
default-state. For example, a home devoid of firearms exhibits no capacity to bring about a 
shooting (the end-state in question). The introduction of a firearm (even one placed into a 
gunsafe, perhaps with the keys well hidden) raises the probability of a shooting from the 
default of nil, although the proportion of the change will vary. As a result, we know that a 
firearm has the capacity to shoot in systems that are relevantly similar to Sn. This is down to 
both the system itself, and the structural features of the artefact. 
In order for the capacity of an artefact to be realised within a system, the system 
cannot contain features that preclude the bringing about of the desired end-state. If we 
introduce an artefact into a situation where its capacity is inhibited by features of that 
environment, the probability of the end-state does not change. So, if I dump a gun into an 
aquarium, the capacity of there being a mass shooting remains at the default of nil, as the 
system has features that inhibit the capacity of the artefact. Meanwhile, if I introduce a 
hammer into a workshop, I can project that the system has changed in relation to the artefact 
in relation to the end-state of woodwork. Upon manipulation, woodwork could occur where 
the default-state of that environment was that no woodwork could go on. Insofar as we can 
project what will occur when we manipulate the environment, we can speak of particular end-
states reachable via the introduction and use of x.  
Desirability: Users of tools are primarily interested in the practical capacities of 
artefacts, as defined by their real-world capacity to bring about end-states within their lived 
environment. This can be contrasted with other, more abstract explanations of functionality. 
One such example, as Jesse Hughes argued, is the framework developed by Millikan.207 
Millikan’s argument amounts to the claim that the function of an artefact is partially defined 
by what a thing was historically selected to do, as well as how the artefact was reproduced to 
continue that function.208 When presented with a new artefact, users are not interested in the 
selection process that lead an artefact to ‘stick around’ as this does not provide any guidance 
as to what the artefact is, strictly, for.209 Given projectability we can easily provide advice in 
the form of a hypothetical imperative. If an agent wishes to bring about ends En then one has 
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a reason for introducing the artefact into the system that will increase the odds of En coming 
about. This goes part of the way towards explaining why we have a good reason to use x to 
bring about En. If we can project that x is good at functioning φ-wise, and φ-ing is one 
method of bringing about En then if we have the desire to bring about En we should utilise 
x.
210
 
 Perhaps the reader may be confused at this juncture, given that I have included a 
feature that appears to be entirely based in mental states of human agents. Why should we 
take any talk of desires seriously, given all that was said against intentionalism? Surely if we 
are willing to call upon mental states in this domain we should have no quarrel with the 
intentionalists introducing mental states in the domain of proper function. Perhaps classifying 
an end-state with an eye towards what people desire places us in no better position than 
classifying artefacts by direct reference to intentions. 
 While it is true that I use intentionalistic language by referencing desires, I make no 
claim that this desiring transforms the artefacts themselves. Intentionalists introduce mental 
language at the level of artefact identity, i.e. no artefact is what it is without the realisation of 
particular mental states that partially constitute the artefact.  The fact that an end-state is 
desirable doesn’t mean that it is, in fact, desired. We can conceive of this understanding (as 
was noted in Chapter one) as being something like a hypothetical imperative. For example, in 
some possible world where woodwork was not valued, but sawdust was revered, using a 
bandsaw would be a means to that end as the production of sawdust. In other words, 
desirability corresponds with an end-state that we standardly wish to bring about via an 
artefact type. It does not mean that our desires determine artefact function, as an artefact can 
have the capacity to bring about an end-state that no-one desires, as when we point out that a 
nuclear arsenal can kill every living thing on earth. 
3.6. Capacities 
Central to our analysis of an artefact is its capacity to bring about an end-state within its 
operating environment. The fact that a landmine, when trodden upon, has the capacity to 
explode is partially explained by the physical structure of the artefact, coupled with the 
circumstances in which it is trodden upon (e.g. in a field, by a human with a certain mass). As 
for what I mean by the term ‘capacity’, the term should be understood as a disposition, or 
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propensity, to begin a causal process which leads to some projectable outcome or end-state 
given certain background conditions are met.  
The key step in accepting that we should foreground the capacities of artefacts can be 
defended via the acceptance of the following claim: the physical base of an artefact realises 
the higher-order property of a capacity to act a particular way within a system. More 
precisely: 
D) The first-order fact that an artefact x has physical structure P 
explains the second-order fact that x functions φ-wise in 
circumstances Sn.211  
These broader circumstances, Sn, can be held fixed in order to focus in on x itself and its 
capacity to φ, when we perform our analysis. For the purposes of such an analysis, our 
stipulations of both S and P must be relatively course-grained. It is obvious that the 
circumstances of a particular function, S, can never be exactly reproduced for us to generate a 
contrast. Instead we must refer to course-grained features of a system, such as ‘The presence 
of oxygen’ or ‘Weighing ten kilograms.’ This is no great impediment, of course, as the same 
basic move is made by evolutionary biologists who endeavour to understand the functioning 
of biological systems. To understand the function of flight, for instance, we can suppose that 
ancestors to modern birds encountered pretty much the same wind resistance, gravitational 
pull and so on as they do today, and that any difference in function is explicable due to some 
difference in either the system-level or else the level of physical realisers. 
As for the physical base for x, P, the same pattern is repeated. We would be badly 
placed if we needed to specify the location, charge and spin of every constituent particle of an 
artefact in order to identify it. This problem directly mirrors the now defunct identification of 
a person with the aggregate of molecules that make them up. As we know that the exact, 
quantitatively identical molecules that we were constituted by at birth no longer exist as part 
of us by the time we are adults, we cannot claim that identity is preserved by reference to the 
precise physical base of particular persons. Neither is such a claim required of artefacts: it is 
enough to talk of middle-sized objects, capable of direct intervention by human agents. 
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 The proper interpretation of a capacity-based approach to technical artefacts is to 
claim that P is some collection of physical properties that together realise the capacity to 
φ.
212
 The exothermic material that makes up a landmine, together with a pressure sensor, bits 
of shrapnel and so on, constitute the capacity to explode in particular circumstances. These 
relatively course-grained properties are gathered together under P, and we could descend a 
layer and talk about the physical properties of exothermic materials, etc., if such a project was 
called for. This allows us to claim that a landmine could be partially constituted by TNT, high 
explosive, ammonium nitrate fertiliser, and yet remain a token x of the type X, and as a result 
φ in circumstances S. This is because the capacity to φ is multiply realisable, even if the exact 
way that x performs its function is open to variance.213 By utilising TNT or plastic explosives, 
different explosions will eventuate even if the initial mass of each explosive is identical. 
Nonetheless, few would claim that bombs, pens or chairs are to be regarded as utterly 
different based upon such variables. The key point here is that the functional description of an 
object is relatively course-grained. Two pens, one ballpoint, the other a fountain pen, are each 
properly classified as pens due to their capacity to function according to the same basic 
specifications. Namely, each has the capacity to change key variables within their containing 
systems in roughly the same way. 
 I do not mean that this disposition should be considered in the absence of human 
involvement. Many, if not most, artefacts require direct agency in order to ‘display’ the 
disposition in question: a rifle needs to be fired, a bomb dropped, etc.214 Others do not require 
this ‘direct’ kind of manipulation: a land mine remains dormant until an unfortunate 
individual treads upon it; a home security system will protect a house from burglars until the 
owners come home from their holiday, and so on. Nonetheless, even these kinds of systems 
require a human agent to begin the process, and perhaps perform periodical maintenance.215 
Thus, when I speak of capacities, they are to be regarded as follows: 
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E) An artefact x has the capacity to φ in Sn iff x has structural features 
α which, when manipulated γ-wise in Sn cause x to φ, 
where γ refers to an intervening, or sustaining, process, either automated or agential.216 Most 
familiarly, this will involve a series of actions performed by some agent that will involve 
manipulating the artefact in a particular way. When I manipulate a pair of scissors, I must 
comport my body in a particular way (angle my arm in such-and-such a way, grip the handle 
with my thumb and fingers, and so on) in order to realise its capacity within the system. It is 
the physical properties of the scissors relative to the capacities of an agent’s body that make 
the scissors manipulable by that agent. These features constitute an affordance. An 
affordance is here defined as the capacity for something to be used in a particular way. For 
example, the shape of a doorhandle is taken to afford pulling, and the handle of a cup affords 
holding.217 Here I mean a capacity that depends solely on some subset of the physical 
properties of the thing in question, and thereby affords various uses in virtue of these 
properties.218 In manipulating an artefact, affordances allow the user to navigate the 
capacities of the artefact successfully. A handle on a door allows one to turn it, while a 
trigger on a rifle affords pulling. There is no requirement, however, to know how ones 
manipulation of an artefact produces lower-level changes in the structure of an artefact. In 
using a computer, I can be completely ignorant of the process leading from my hands typing 
to words appearing on a screen. It remains a fact of the matter that in typing, I am 
manipulating variables on the structural level leading to a discoverable end-state. 
3.7. Optimal function 
Next I introduce optimality, and the next key stipulation should be taken as definitive of the 
optimality approach. Artefacts, according to the optimality account, are tokens of a particular 
type if they are optimal at the function associated with that type. In this section I explain just 
what optimality is. The central claim of optimality is as follows: 
F) x is a token X iff x is best at performing the function associated 
with X. 
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To illustrate, consider the capacity of a chair to function as a footstool within a home office. 
It has this capacity due to its physical structure, and it performs this task well. However, it 
may also serve as an object lesson in interior design; or perhaps as a particularly 
uncomfortable bed after a long writing session. The optimality approach claims that despite 
the performance of these apparent functions—apparent insofar as they can be performed 
utilising the artefact in question—they should be regarded as suboptimal when compared to 
the key function of being an object that enables comfortable sitting.219 ‘The’ function of an 
artefact is provided by considering what that thing is best at performing. A guitar is optimal 
at producing musical sounds; a soda can is optimal at holding fizzy drinks; a kitchen knife is 
optimal at cutting up vegetables and meats. Optimality considerations should guide our 
interpretation of artefacts, such that in order to understand what x is we must ask ‘What task 
is x optimal at?’ 
 Recall the hand-axe from section 3.1. In interpreting this object, archaeologists were 
not content to perform use-wear analysis to decide whether it was a discus or general use 
tool. Instead, various experiments were performed to see whether they would perform well as 
a discus. Hand-axes were thrown and their behaviour monitored. The tests showed that while 
the objects could be hefted a fair distance, they would not land either with the force requisite 
to bring down a game animal, nor with the precision required. When the hand-axes were 
utilised as general use tools, for scraping meat from hide and boning joints, they performed 
admirably. This is a clear case of optimality at work. The hand-axe was good at one task, and 
noticeably suboptimal at the other. As a result we can say, with some certainty, that the hand-
axe was a general use tool. All this without invoking intentions once! In order for this to be 
possible, we must claim that artefacts can perform functions variably: it is not enough to say 
that an artefact performs a function: it must perform a function well.220 But what does ‘well’ 
signify? I take it that it means it performs its function reliably and easily. I briefly turn to 
each. 
 Reliability: An artefact can be more or less reliable. Given what has been said up to 
this point regarding capacities, an artefact is reliable if it exhibits the capacity to φ in the 
right systems more often than not.221 There is no particular number of successful uses to 
deem x reliable, especially as an artefact might be created and never used, despite having the 
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structural features requisite for functionality. Think here of a hobbyist who buys an electric 
train because he has the intention to finally build his toy railroad in his den, but just never 
gets around to it. The train would run reliably, let us assume, if he bothered to set out the 
track and placed the toy upon it. The claim is that the reliability of x is discovered via usage, 
rather than created via usage. If x is reliable it is because certain facts obtain: the structural 
features of x, α, when x is situated within Sn realise a capacity to φ more often than not when 
x is manipulated γ-wise. Obviously the term ‘more often than not’ is rather vague, but this is 
a necessary vagary. It would not do to simply stipulate a number from the armchair. 222 I think 
it enough to claim that if one is epistemically justified to rely on an artefact—due to either 
inducting from prior interactions, or else due to knowledge of the lower-level structure—then 
one is equally justified in claiming that it is reliable.223  
 Ease of use: It is clear, as was shown above, that artefacts require manipulation in 
order to realise their functions. Artefacts are optimal at their function when the manipulation 
required to realise that function is straightforward, or simple. A can opener with rubber grips 
is easy to use insofar as there are few steps to perform to bring about the function, for 
example. A suboptimal artefact, by contrast, might require many steps that to be performed to 
bring the function to fruition, or prone to user error due to how the artefact is constituted. 
Consider here an early computer that required the user to actually program it herself to be 
rendered usable. The artefact functions, but suboptimally insofar as the steps required to 
realise the function are prone to error.  
 Importantly, there is no requirement that all of these features are ideally realised in 
any one artefact. Very few artefacts exhibit these three factors in equal measure, each 
perfectly realised. Rather than impose a definitive threshold limit that all artefacts must 
exceed in order to be optimal at a function. It may be enough to claim that we have an 
intuitive understanding due to our close association with these tools. Some artefacts will be 
reliable and incredibly easy to use, like a paperweight. Other artefacts will be less easy to use, 
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but more reliable, and so on. All that is required is that the artefact optimally performs one 
function in relation to other possible functions that the artefact could perform. For example, 
an ordinary household remote control is reliable insofar as when it is manipulated from the 
couch it will pause, play, and eject DVDs from a distance, and so on. Where the remote 
control appears to be suboptimal is when we consider the mess of unnecessary buttons that 
populate the modern remote, or their confusing layout where the pause and stop button are 
adjacent. The fact that there are so many controls on the remote (and thereby many 
opportunities for error) means that the artefact is suboptimal in these regards. Nonetheless, 
the artefact is an optimal X as the suboptimal features do not render the remote suboptimal as 
a remote overall (recalling that a remote picks out an artefactual type). It can still be used to 
play ones DVD player at a distance, and this suffices to determine that it is in fact a DVD 
remote. 
I will now turn to a possible misconception about optimality. It is important that we 
keep two senses of optimality wholly separate, to avoid a damaging objection based upon a 
misconception of what optimality demands, primarily due to a conflation or confusion about 
how optimality is to be measured and understood. Call the following the no-such-thing 
argument: if optimality is correct, x is a token X iff x is an optimal X. The term ‘optimal X’ 
denotes a token that is the very best example of X, or else that it functions as an X optimally. 
But, to date, engineers, scientists, artificers, etc. have never produced such a thing. Therefore, 
the optimality account fails as there simply is no-such-thing as an optimal X. But this is not 
what I mean by optimality, as I shall now demonstrate by means of the following examples. 
 Take an example of engineering wizardry- the Bugatti Veyron. This, at one point, was 
the fastest road-legal car on earth. Capable of reaching speeds of 408km/h in 42.3 seconds, it 
managed this all while maintaining road reliability, and was praised for the simple fact that 
this was the single greatest feat ever achieved from a vehicle utilising a normal (albeit highly 
tuned) automobile engine, and on standard fuel! A marvel indeed, but was it an optimal car? 
The natural response is to ask the standard against which we are deciding this matter. Let us 
assume that we feel comfortable stipulating that the standard against we measure the Veyron 
is the simplest to measure- top speed. Optimality, according to this objection, demands that 
the Veyron is an optimal token of the type ‘sports car’, if the car were indeed the fastest car 
on earth. But this is simply untrue. It is not the optimal sports car, insofar as the design 
simply could have been better, likely in infinite imperceptible ways. Otherwise Bugatti would 
have been unable to create the Veyron Super Sport World Record Edition (top speed: 
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431km/h). Is this new version, then, the optimal sports car? It is highly doubtful- if history 
teaches us anything, it is that engineers will not rest on their laurels (especially where a world 
record is involved). There simply is no-such-thing as the optimal car, nor optimal gun, house 
or anything else.  
 In reply, the optimality approach does not claim that artefacts are the very best tokens 
of whichever type they are a token of. For instance, a cherry pitter need not be the best cherry 
pitter (or the best subtype of cherry pitter) for it to be optimal as a cherry pitter.224 It just 
needs to be good at pitting cherries. The difference between an optimality account that is 
susceptible to the no-such-thing accusation, and one that is immune, relies on the following 
distinction: 
(a) Optimal token: x is an optimal token iff x has the capacity to bring 
about ends E in E-relevant systems Sn, and x brings about E in Sn 
better, relative to standards I, than all other artefacts. 
(b) Purpose-optimal: x is an optimal token iff x has the capacity to bring 
about ends En in E-relevant systems Sn, and x brings about E in Sn 
better, relative to its capacities C, than all other ends. 
It should by now be obvious what the problem is: if we wish to utilise the optimal token 
interpretation of optimality, we are likely to find ourselves with an empty set. Equally 
obvious is that the optimal token interpretation requires that we stipulate some set of 
standards, I, that we can confidently articulate as ‘the’ standards for the class of artefact in 
question. Think back on our Veyron. I assumed for the sake of argument that top speed is the 
relevant function for a car, but this is far from the case. A more defensible definition would 
be something like: a car is any motorised wheeled object that is optimal at transporting 
passengers speedily and safely upon a road surface. Such a definition fares better in 
according with our experience with automobiles, at the significant cost of including more 
features that are difficult to precisely define, or measure. For instance, the Veyron certainly is 
speedy, but it can carry only two people. In fact, most sports cars are only capable of carrying 
one or two passengers at a time, meanwhile standard sedans are capable of carrying five. The 
stipulation that the car must be capable of driving over roads appears obvious enough, until 
one considers the vast differences in road surface that are possible: a Veyron would likely 
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suffer severe damage if it were driven upon the badly maintained roads of the Australian 
outback, for instance. 
 If we favour, as we must, the purpose-optimal interpretation, we are able to point to 
dispositional features of the artefact within a given system. The fact that an object has wheels 
placed upon an axle, and those wheels roll under certain situations, means that it is likely to 
be suited to tasks that require that part of the artefact to move. The fact that that same object 
contains a motor, capable of producing high revolutions per minute, counts towards that 
object being an automobile, assuming that it includes a seat, steering wheel, etc. These 
features are all indicative that a given artefact is better at that job than other, possible, roles—
such as being a combine harvester, freight van, and so on. If we take this account seriously, 
we can summarise this finding as follows: 
G) x is a token X iff of x’s other possible functions, ψn, x is optimal at 
φ-ing, and X collects those artefacts that φ in situations Sn. 
This makes explicit that our focus should be upon this token within a set of environments, 
rather than comparing the artefact with other artefacts to determine its identity. Whether some 
other artefact can φ more reliably or easily within a given system is strictly beside the point. 
What matters is whether x is best at functioning φ-wise in Sn over its rival potential functions 
ψn. If so, x is a φ-er, despite the presence of something that can perform φ better than x. For 
example, before me I have two pens, one of which is an expensive fountain pen, the other is a 
standard ballpoint. The fountain pen has always been an unsure writer, sometimes scratchy 
and prone to writing haltingly. Meanwhile, the ballpoint seems to always behave unerringly 
well, able to be utilised for long writing sessions without scratching the paper I am writing 
upon, nor does the flow of ink stop and start. It makes perfect sense to say that the ballpoint 
might be better than the other at φ-ing (i.e. distributing ink in a controllable line from a 
point). Nonetheless, the fountain pen still functions φ-wise, even if it is surpassed by the 
ballpoint. We know this because if I tried to use the fountain pen to be a stabbing weapon, or 
a clip to keep chips fresh in its bag, it would not perform these tasks as well as it does φ. It is 
optimal at that function, and this explains why it is that it is for φ. Thus we have arrived at a 
good understanding of optimality, and can now put the theory to the test. 
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Part Two: The Optimality Account Tested 
3.8. Answering the artefactual conditions 
It is now time to test our theory to see how well it meets the conditions for an artefact 
metaphysic and see if it is indeed better than the intentionalist account. It will be recalled that 
any acceptable theory of artefacts must be able to explain the following features. 
1) Artefacts are MTE. This means that artefacts are a type of object that are ideally 
suited to bring about practical ends desired by agents, and this separates them from all 
other objects.  
2) Artefacts are ends-appropriate. An artefact metaphysic must be able to provide an 
explanation as to why an artefact functions to bring about a set of definable ends. 
3) Artefacts undergo function-shifts. This means that an artefact can be for φ-ing at t1 
and for ψ-ing at t2. An artefact metaphysic should be able to not just explain whether a 
function-shift has occurred, but why it occurred.  
4) The ontological nature of artefacts, i.e. why it is that it seems as if artefacts are both 
physical and mind dependent simultaneously. If a theory is unable to accommodate 
the dual nature thesis, it must at minimum provide an explanation as to why the thesis 
appears alluring.  
5) We are normative about artefacts. There are two senses of artefact normativity. First, 
artefacts should perform in particular ways when placed into a system, such that the 
outcome of their use is readily predictable. Second, there are acceptable uses to 
artefacts, as are usually enshrined in user manuals and the like. 
6) The differences between broken, non-functioning and malfunctioning artefacts. It 
appears clear that there is a vast difference between something that no longer works 
(broken), something that never worked (non-functioning) and something that works 
intermittently (malfunctioning). An artefact metaphysic must be able to explain what 
marks out these differences. 
3.8.1. Means-to-an-end/Ends-appropriateness  
I will consider 1 and 2 together, for reasons that will become clear. Intentionalism, as we saw 
in section 2.7.1, appears ideally suited to the task of explaining why it is that x is a MTE. As 
the CIF theory directly invokes what the designer had in mind when she created the artefact, 
we have an easy answer as to why artefacts are regarded as MTE. The intentions of the 
designer can be ‘read off’ the artefact and this guides us in manipulating the artefact in its 
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specified operating environments. This gives the user all the information she needs in order to 
bring about a rational decision to use an artefact. She uses x to perform function φ in order to 
bring about En because this is precisely what x is for. 
Nonetheless, optimality is equally able to explicate why an artefact is a MTE, and as 
readily as the CIF theory. It is because of the capacities of x to bring about end-states, in a 
reliable in projectable way (as we saw in sections 3.5 and 3.7), that x is a MTE. Indeed, 
according to optimality, x can be a MTE without anyone even knowing that this is the case. 
One suspects that there a good many artefacts that will one day find a new functional niche 
that they are better suited for than their current uses. If optimality is right, it is discoverable 
fact that x when in Sn has the capacity to bring about En. This discovery is brought about by 
attempting to bring about the ends in question via the artefact. Insofar as artefacts are causally 
implicated in this process, from manipulation to bringing about a particular end-state, they 
are necessarily MTE. 
Optimality is especially adept at providing an explanation of ends-appropriateness. 
Given the theory provided above, the fact that x is best at bringing about ends En is enough to 
say that this is what it is for. Thus, optimality explains ends-appropriateness because the 
theory invokes this concept as part of the definition of an artefact. If x is an artefact, it is 
precisely because x is good as a means to some particular end. It need not be ideally good, 
nor even the best at the end in question. Rather than requiring that we inquire after the 
intentional states of designers or users, we can simply apply artefacts directly to tasks, and 
insofar as they perform these tasks well, we will value them for this role.  
3.8.2. Function-shifts 
As we saw in section 2.7.5, the CIF account is unable to adequately provide an account of 
function-shifts. This is down to the central claim of intentionalism: that the original intention 
of an artificer determines what an artefact is. Whenever there is a function-shift, the best 
alternative open to the CIF theorist is to claim that a community of users have acted as 
designers. As we saw, this amounts to a post hoc explanation of what occurred, rather than an 
explanation as to why a function shift occurred. This was the key failing of the CIF account, 
as function-shifts are far from rare. Indeed, they may very well be the norm, as it is highly 
unlikely that any artefact will always be utilised for its original intended function. It now falls 
to the optimality account to provide a rival explanation. 
104 
 
Optimality is thankfully especially good at explaining function-shifts given its 
insistence that we focus primarily upon the actual behaviour of artefacts within particular 
systems. Think here of sadiron, utilised as a bookend. Nothing about the sadiron has 
changed—the only difference is how we behave towards it, as we no longer place it into a 
fireplace until hot, and instead merely place it upon a bookshelf. Such cases, as common as 
they are, remain a puzzle to be solved for the metaphysician. To make things easier to follow, 
we can divide up function shifts into the following subtypes: 
FS1: token artefact x at t1 functioned φ-wise, and from t2 onwards functioned 
ψ-wise. 
FS2: tokens of the type X at t1 functioned φ-wise, and from t2 onwards 
functioned ψ-wise. 
FS3: tokens of the type X at t1 exclusively functioned φ-wise, and from t2 
onwards exclusively functioned ψ-wise. 
It may appear to the reader that I am splitting a myriad of hairs over this point, but it is 
important to keep each of these cases separate. A function shift of the FS1 variety can occur 
in cases where a particular user of an artefact simply utilises an artefact in a unique way, 
irrespective of the optimality of such a new usage. Consider someone utilising a wide edged 
knife as a paper spike, à la Sherlock Holmes. It just so happens that Sherlock never disturbs 
the blade, wedged as it is into the fireplace. This is intuitively very different from those cases 
covered by FS2, where a function shift ‘catches on’ amongst the populace. Consider, as does 
de Ridder, the case of aspirin.225 Aspirin remains a useful analgesic for those suffering mild 
headaches, and is widely consumed for this purpose. This is not its only widespread usage, 
however, as it was discovered in the 1970s that low-dosage aspirin can help lower the risk of 
heart attack and stroke in some patients. Indeed, nowadays one can find specific low-dose 
aspirin dosages sold in supermarkets for exactly this purpose. Both patterns of usage are 
commonplace and well-known, and while the painkiller function of aspirin remains 
dominant, neither can be said to be more accepted than the other. 
 Altogether different are cases that follow the pattern depicted in FS3. In these cases 
the function shift renders the original usage obsolete. It is possible to split FS3 further into at 
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least two subcategories: first, those cases where the functions φ and ψ overlap for some time, 
before ψ becomes the dominant function. A prominent example is that of MDMA (the active 
ingredient in the party drug ecstasy). Originally, the drug was used as a psychiatric 
medication to aid with anxiety, depression, and to facilitate communication. As is well 
known, MDMA also functions to provoke elation, heightened sensations, and lower 
inhibitions (as well as attract people towards some awful music).226 Until medical research 
into MDMA was banned in the eighties, there was a significant overlap between these 
patterns of usage, but over time medical usage of the drug tapered off significantly. Compare 
this with the second pattern that conforms to FS3: cases where there is a sudden shift in 
function, such that x once functioned φ-wise and now functions ψ-wise. It is notable that such 
cases are most common in cases where a designer discovers an unexpected potential function 
of her work, and focus turns towards that function. For instance, Blu Tak was designed to be 
a sealant, but this function was quickly dropped when its more familiar usage was 
discovered.227 Having said this, we can also see cases where this pattern is repeated where an 
artefact is simply superseded by subsequent technological advancements, or the availability 
of other artefacts with the same function. Consider here the shift away from using gas lights 
to light London city streets upon the advent of electric lighting, as this provides an easy 
example of the former case. As to the latter case, we find a myriad of examples arising in the 
technology sector. Imagine here the advent of new processing units, leaving older units 
obsolete, or else suitable for museum display. 
 As a result of this, an articulation of when and why function shifts occur is one of the 
key desiderata of any justifiable account of artefact metaphysics. Not only must an account 
explain how function shifts are possible, but why they occur. Upon claiming that a function 
shift has occurred, we are left with a puzzle: what is the artefact we are discussing? If a sad-
iron was once, indubitably, an iron, what are we to call these very same objects when they are 
all utilised as bookends? The answer for the optimality account is that function shifts entail 
kind shifts. Artefacts are identified with the function they perform, and in those cases that 
correspond with FS2 and FS3 the artefacts associated with their functions shift alongside the 
shifts in patterns of usage.228 To clarify, the terms ‘iron’, ‘rifle’, ‘doorstop’, each identify a 
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particular functional kind. That is, anything that fulfils those functions simply is a token of 
the particular type, as artefact types are intrinsically related to functional kinds. 
Recapitulating, a functional kind groups together a set of artefactual types, and their 
correlative tokens. Kind membership is determined by the function of the artefact within its 
containing systems. 
 As for the deeper ‘why’ question, as to why function shifts occur at all, there are two 
possible answers. First, they occur in those cases where a functional niche exists that the 
artefact could fit which few other contender artefacts could fit. Blu tak was a subpar sealant 
while being a good general purpose short-term adhesive, a role vastly less populated. More 
interesting are the cases where an artefact loses its original function and gains a new one. 
This is down to the capacities of the artefact finding a new niche. In many cases, the 
explanation is that the original function has been superseded by other artefacts that do the job 
better than it. Dennett notes that old mainframe computers would serve as nifty boat anchors, 
for example. Often, the new function does not take into account all the capacities of the 
artefact. Anything of sufficient weight and size could be a boat anchor, after all.229 An 
optimality account accepts this consequence, and makes the claim that we need look no 
further than how well an artefact performs its new role to adjudicate whether it has undergone 
a function-shift. In those cases where a use ‘catches on’ we can reasonably infer it is because 
it is good at this new task.  
 In sum, the optimality account appears favourable in addressing this key desiderata. 
Where the CIF account is doomed to provide post hoc, ‘just so’ stories of function-shifts (or, 
worse, denying that they really occur at all), the optimality account is able to both explain 
and, possibly, predict function-shifts.230 Of course, there is no requirement that we actually 
predict beforehand what new functional niche a particular artefact may later inhabit, I think it 
modest to claim that this is at least possible. What is required for such a prediction is that we 
understand the key variables of the environment that a particular artefact may later inhabit, 
and thus work out the capacities of the artefact within that environment. If it turns out that it 
shows a disposition to perform a new functional role in that environment, and better than the 
functional role it now inhabits, it seems plausible that a function shift may occur. So, while 
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the CIF account is largely backwards-looking in cases of function-shifts, the optimality 
account can be utilised to predict. This is a key feature in favour of the optimality account.  
3.8.3. Artefact Dualism Explained Away 
We now need to address the ‘dual-nature’ of artefacts. Recall that on the intentionalist 
account there is a willingness to classify artefacts as hybrid objects. That is, objects that are 
not wholly physical or mental, but a combination of each. This is down to the fact that 
intentionalists tie the intentions of the artificer inexorably to the nature of the artefact itself. 
In part, this is anchored by the claim that there are no functions ‘in the world’. In order to 
claim that something functions at all, we need to invoke intentionality. As unsatisfying as this 
may sound, the CIF theorists assure us that we should not be overly concerned, as this 
amounts to nothing more than saying that beliefs, desires, and the like are real features of the 
world. As we saw in sections 2.3 and 2.4, the motivation behind accepting artefact dualism is 
primarily via the challenge of the natural kind critique. Without artefact dualism, 
intentionalism cannot find the grounds to affirm the reality of artefacts due, in part, to their 
commitment to intentions partially defining the nature of artefacts.  
Given what has been argued to this point, we are in a very different position to 
intentionalism. While intentionalists must find a place for artefacts in our ontology that 
includes, somehow, the intentions of the artificer, an optimality approach claims artefacts are 
wholly physical objects. To start to make sense of this, I think we can usefully call the 
optimality account a functionalist theory. That is, optimality ties the nature of an artefact to 
its function within a system, such that artefact identity is determined by its function. Artefact 
functionalism does an admirable job addressing the artefactual correlate of the above 
desiderata. As we will now see, this is the key to dealing with artefact dualism. 
Inanimate objects, such as rocks, exhibit no function simply because they are not 
functional types of things. Anything of sufficient weight can be used to weigh down paper, 
but this does not mean that this is its function. In the case of functional natural entities (that 
is, non-artefactual, functional entities, such as trees and rabbits) are already nested into a 
particular niche, and as a result they exhibit indifference to our desires and goals (as we saw 
in section 2.3). The default state of a natural system is a complex interrelation of functional 
relationships between parts and these functional relationships are maintained until human 
interference one way or another. Of course, in the case of artefacts the particular domain 
within which we can speak of their ‘function’ is far removed from the indifferent natural 
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world. The domain within which artefacts find their niche is the domain of human affairs- 
making bookcases, fighting wars, and so on. A teleological understanding provides some 
insight as to why. Under a teleological understanding of artefacts we must relativise our 
investigations into the nature of artefacts to an appropriate ‘level’ of reality. Any attempt to 
understand what artefacts are for invariably requires the stipulation of the environment of the 
artefact in question.231 This specification requires the stipulation of human goals and 
interests. A hammer only makes sense against a background of human ends and interests. The 
common-sense claim that hammers are for hammering requires some description of 
carpentry, woodwork, and so on. More precisely, an artefact only makes sense within a 
context.  
This contextualisation explains why there seems to be a vast difference between 
artefacts and natural functions, as well as inert natural objects, and thereby undercutting the 
central motivation for accepting artefact dualism. First, natural objects that are not involved 
in realising any higher-order function differ from artefacts for precisely that reason: they have 
no functions. They have no function, even if they can be used to do something. As I have 
been stressing, a rock can be used to hold down paperwork that we do not want to see 
fluttering around the room, but it does not follow that it is for this purpose.232 An artefact, in 
contrast, functions to bring about an outcome and this function determines its identity. 
Second, a natural function (for example, the capacity of a heart to pump blood) has a purpose, 
but this purpose is insensitive to human ends.233 As a result, trees, hearts, rabbits and so on 
inhabit a different level of description to artefacts, as they tend towards biological outcomes, 
while artefacts realise human ends. Functionalists can therefore claim that indeed there is a 
difference between artefacts and natural functions. The difference is the realm in which the 
functions arise- in one case, the biological (or physical, or neurological, etc.), the other the 
realm of human ends. The same way we cannot explain the mentality of an individual in 
terms of neurons, we cannot explain artefacts on any other level other than the one in which 
artefacts function. This, then, is why they appear so different to natural objects and functions- 
because of a lack of explanatory power.   
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 Nonetheless, there is no reason to suppose that we should replicate the error on the 
basis of this insight. Artefacts are not hybrid objects, as we can reverse the direction of fit. 
Where a dual nature theorist will insist that functionality follows intention, the optimality 
theorist insists upon the converse. Explanatorily, the reason why we form intentions 
regarding artefacts is due to their capacities which are insensitive to what we think about 
them. Whether we utilise or recognise an artefact’s capacities are a different matter: we can 
be fundamentally ignorant about some object that we possess. If the artefact is good at a 
particular function, we have a prima facie reason to suppose that this is its function, but this 
recognition is not an act of creation. 
3.8.4. Artefact Normativity 
Recall from the first chapter that we often consider artefacts normatively in two distinct 
ways.  The first is what we can call ends normativity. This class of normativity is tightly 
related to practical rationality, as when we state that if one wishes to clear an area of 
vegetation for a later military incursion, one should use Agent Orange. In short, this variant is 
involved with providing means that are suited to bringing about desired ends. Optimality can 
accommodate this variant by reference to the capacities of an artefact within a system, 
justified via induction. The reason we can say truthfully that ‘A car should provide relatively 
high-speed transport on sealed road’ is traceable to the fact that cars have been good at 
bringing about this end in the past. We can, if we wish to be more precise, explain this pattern 
by reference to both the system and the structural features of the artefact, but this is not 
necessary. Given that end-states are course-grained, it is enough to build a pattern of usage 
from prior events without requiring that one explain how it is that these end-states came 
about. This stands opposed to the intentionalist account, as they have no need to point to 
inductive support, as they can directly claim that because the artificer intended x to be used in 
a particular way, that is the way one should utilise x to bring about the desired ends. 234 As a 
result, intentionalism is able to accommodate this feature arguably easier than the optimality 
account can, but at an associated cost. Whereas optimality closely ties normative locutions to 
how an artefact has behaved in the past, intentionalism places faith in the designer that they 
have a good idea as to how an artefact should be used. As we have seen, this is not always the 
case. 
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 As for the second form of normativity, ‘acceptable usage’ this is the conception that 
artefacts should be used in particular ways to bring about the desired ends, as when we say 
that if you want to fire a rifle, you should hold it just so, and squeeze the trigger rather than 
pulling it. Intentionalism posits use-plans that give clear instructions for agents regarding 
how to manipulate artefacts so as to ensure functionality in a strictly defined context of use. 
When one deviates from the use-plan, one cannot expect that the artefact will adequately 
function, and this explains why we say you should follow the use-plan. Optimality is able to 
accommodate this feature via the invocation of considerations of practical rationality. Given 
the structural features of an artefact, its environment and the desired end-state, the user 
should manipulate the artefact in such a way as to bring about that end-state. Admittedly, 
much of the time this may involve acquiring specific direction—via a manual, say—but it 
need not. Consider again the hand-axe. The interpreter of that artefact can come to understand 
the acceptable use of that artefact via trial and error. Once it is clear what usages the artefact 
is precluded from performing, one should restrict oneself to using it the way that brings about 
a reliable, projectable, outcome. Thus, intentionalism and optimality are both able to 
explicate acceptable usage, although in the case of optimality we must make reference to 
prior behaviour of the artefact.  
3.8.5. Differences between broken/non-functioning/malfunctioning 
The final desiderata of an artefact metaphysic is the capacity to mark the difference between 
broken, non-functional and malfunctioning artefacts. The argument to this point has been 
guided by the key claim that artefact types are function-bearing. That is, for any token x to be 
a token of a functional type X, it must be the case that x exhibits the capabilities that render it 
a token of the type, and this capability is ‘to φ in situations Sn’, a claim that ties artefact 
identity with functionality. One of the major conceptual difficulties associated with a 
function-based approach is that it does not allow for cases where the artefact (qua physical 
entity) persists in a given system, while having lost its functionality. Before revealing the 
difficulties associated with this view, it is worth recapping a key claim of the optimality 
account. A particular token artefact can be said to inherit the function of its type, such that: 
H) for any artefact x, x is an artefact of the kind Kφ iff x has the 
function to φ, where Kφ is the functional kind constituted by those 
types having φ as their function235 
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recalling that functional kinds collect types that share a broad functional role. Call this view, 
following de Ridder, the ‘Standard View.’ The Standard View is not restricted to 
metaphysically uninitiated persons (as de Ridder himself points out), and we find David 
Wiggins largely echoing the sentiment when he states: 
A clock is any time-keeping device, a pen is any rigid ink-applying writing 
implement, and so on’.236  
Mumford follows suit, claiming  
Roughly, for something to be a thermostat it must be sensitive to changes in 
temperature and be able to trigger a switch if a pre-calibrated temperature 
threshold is crossed. Anything which has this disposition […] is a thermostat 
regardless of the constitution that affords such an ability.237 
Similarly, Soavi provides the following definition, that for artefacts of kind S: 
An object O belongs to S if and only if O has the function F.238 
This position holds some intuitive appeal, and is likely to be the way that the majority of 
people think of the artefacts that surround them. Artefacts are what they are because of what 
they do, under this understanding. Pistols are whatever handheld weapons that shoot bullets; 
tanks are whatever vehicles that transport heavy artillery upon treads. As de Ridder puts it, 
this intuitive understanding is fuelled by the intuition that “an artefact is a φ-type artefact 
because it has the function to φ.”239 Despite the fact that this is a standard view on the matter, 
it poses some unique difficulties in explaining the differences between broken, non-functional 
and malfunctioning artefacts. The difficulty optimality has in explaining the difference 
amounts to the key objection to optimality, and so it will serve our account well to spend time 
in showing how my account can be salvaged (at the unfortunate cost of losing some intuitive 
pull).  
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 Recall from section 2.7.4 that intentionalism has no great problem with marking out 
the distinctions between the classes. In the case of broken or malfunctioning artefacts, the 
artificer has predefined under what conditions the artefact is to be used, and how it is to 
function in those conditions. When the artefact is in the right conditions to function, and yet it 
does not, this is a case of malfunction. Meanwhile, a broken artefact occurs when the artefact 
is in its intended context and is rendered unusable thereafter. Non-functioning artefacts, on 
the other hand, covers those artefacts that are not the product of a successful intention to 
create an x. So, when someone sets out to create a perpetual motion machine, given that such 
a construct is impossible the artefact is non-functional. While there is some difficulty in 
accepting that this mirrors our everyday understanding of these categories, it remains the case 
that as a division, it marks out a neat set of distinctions. Each is defined by reference to what 
the artificer intended, and thus it provides a plausible account of how we are to understand 
the differences. 
 The optimality account is quite unable to replicate the intuitive pull of the 
intentionalist account on this topic, largely because of the insistence on tying artefactual 
descriptions to the continued capacity of an artefact to function. de Ridder sums up the 
problem as follows: 
We say a broken fountain pen is still for writing. And even though a defective 
car will not get you where you want to be, we readily affirm it is for driving. It 
is also normal to ascribe functions to malfunctioning early prototypes. None of 
this happens within the physical perspective.240 
The problem broken artefacts present to the optimality account is becomes apparent when we 
consider an example first canvassed by Jesse Hughes: a bicycle.241 Bicycles, we may 
suppose, constitute a particular class of artefact, which are optimal at providing transportation 
via the use of pedals on sealed and dirt roads. A particular bicycle might be left to rust in its 
owner’s garage, such that the chain is rendered unusable to the point where pushing the 
pedals does nothing to produce any forward momentum. An optimality analysis of this 
artefact, if one accepts the argument to this point, will determine that this is not a token of the 
type at all! If ‘bicycle’ denotes an artefactual type, and artefactual types are functional types, 
then if a putative bicycle is unable to provide pedal-powered transport, then it cannot be a 
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bicycle as it fails to exhibit the required function. Few would contend that an unusable 
bicycle ceases to be a bicycle, especially given the metaphysical quandaries that this claim 
entails. Imagine a bicycle has that has a hopelessly rusted chain, rendering it unrideable, but 
the rest of the bicycle is untouched by rust. We dutifully replace the chain, and ride off into 
the sunset. If we take this demand for function seriously, it appears that there is a temporal 
gap in the existence of this bicycle. For the period during which the bicycle lacked the 
capacity to function, the bicycle qua artefact did not exist, only reappearing once the repair 
job was complete. If so, then what were we working on when we replaced the chain? Where 
exactly did the bicycle go during the repair process?  
 This case represents a challenge to the optimality account, but it can be met. To begin, 
I suggest that we conceive of broken artefacts as follows: 
I) Broken= o is a broken x iff it is a historical fact that o was a token, 
x, of the artefactual type, X. 
A broken artefact would be any artefact that used to function, or else a component of an 
artefact that used to contribute to overall system functionality, but now no longer functions 
due to either system changes or cases where a necessary component has lost function. If this 
is so, then during the so-called ‘gap’ the bicycle was reduced to being a mere object, with no 
function, with an associated historical fact that this thing used to be a bicycle. Upon being 
repaired, it was a bicycle once again.242 If this is right the term ‘broken artefact’ is a 
misnomer—there is no such thing as a broken artefact, just objects that were artefacts.  
 The optimality account therefore entails a revision of the way we talk about artefacts. 
Part of the explanation is found when we consider just how much of the artefact is still intact 
in such cases. When we consider simple artefacts, such as a snowglobe, it seems reasonable 
to say that being broken renders the object non-existent. This is because there are so few 
components involved in the function of the artefact: a base with a glass globe. A bicycle, 
automobile or rifle each has many components, each of which can break in isolation to other 
parts. So perhaps the intuition is that in cases where an object is made up of many functional 
components, the artefact can withstand the subtraction of n number of components before it 
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ceases to exist.243 I make no claims here in favour of the plausibility of this intuition. There is 
the air of a Sorites paradox here, as there are clear cases of ‘bald persons’ and ‘non-bald 
persons’ and yet it is very hard to say when a person has crossed that threshold.244 Of course, 
such common intuitions are not to be regarded as reliable indications of how our ontology 
should be drawn. In cases where we have good reasons for claiming that a particular property 
should be regarded as definitive, we should leave intuition behind. I take it that functionality 
is one of these cases, especially as artefacts are already intuitively defined as things which are 
functional, whilst simultaneously believing that something that has lost its functionality is 
still an artefact. The fact that our intuitions lead us into such contradictions is already a good 
clue that something has gone wrong with our intuitions. 
I accept that many would maintain that a broken bicycle to be a bicycle. To challenge 
this intuition, imagine that we break the artefact down further, until the parts are laid out on 
the floor. Perhaps one would still claim that ‘the bicycle’ still exists, so take it one step 
further: imagine each piece is mailed to a separate distant location. Now it is likely that no-
one is willing to claim that ‘the bicycle’ that existed should still be included in our ontology. 
It appears that we require the parts of the artefact to stand in a functional relation with each 
other part, such that they together work together to realise the function. I.e. it is not enough to 
possess the individual parts of a bicycle. These parts must be arranged in such a way that they 
could work when manipulated—a requirement that a bicycle in parts fails. By the same token, 
a bicycle fails this test. I think it is reasonable to say that we are engaging in loose talk when 
we claim that a broken bicycle is still a bicycle. It is instead comparable to the use of the 
phrase ‘dead person,’ insofar as a person requires particular mental capacities that dead 
bodies lack.245  
A non-functioning artefact, in contrast, is an artefact that simply does not have a 
function, as follows:  
J) Non-functional= o is non-functional iff o was never a token, t, of 
any artefactual type, T. 
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Consider here the elusive quest to develop a perpetual motion machine. Many attempts have 
been made to make a working artefact, and indeed there actually are many physical objects 
that have been paraded as tokens of this type. Of course, none of these function to 
specification, and all are either hoaxes, or else cease in their movement eventually. So here 
we have a further conceptual difficulty, as it is natural enough for an inventor to state “I am 
designing a perpetual motion machine!” If functional analysis is to be believed, then this 
statement is paradoxical—nothing can function as a perpetual motion machine, and thereby 
nobody can design one.  
 The difficulty with this latter case can be traced to the claim that ‘designing’ can be 
regarded as a success verb. When one ‘designs x’ the syntax of the sentence takes it as given 
that x is the sort of thing that can be designed, and that tokens of the type can be made.246 
Empty classes of functioning artefacts, such as perpetual motion machines, are thus easily 
explained away by pointing out this linguistic quirk. The reason why it sounds odd to our ears 
to say that one is not designing a perpetual motion machine when one sincerely believes that 
this is what one intends is that common usage of the term implies that the goal is attainable. 
In the case of non-functioning artefacts, this pattern is not repeated. Strictly, when one builds 
a non-functional object one has designed nothing more than junk. 
Finally, malfunctioning artefacts are to be regarded as follows:  
K) Malfunctioning=x malfunctions iff x is a token of the artefactual 
type X, and x no longer reliably bring about φ in situations Sn. 
While it is possible to give relatively precise definitions of non-functioning and broken 
artefacts, malfunctioning artefacts are more of a challenge. In order to determine whether an 
artefact malfunctions it is necessary that one can check the behaviour of the artefact relative 
to a prior pattern of usage. Imagine a car that has fading brakes, where once the car had 
excellent braking. As the car used to be reliable under braking, the car can be said to be 
malfunctioning. Of course, this does not align with our everyday understanding of 
malfunction. Most would wish to claim that if an artefact does not perform reliably out of the 
box that it is malfunctioning, in spite of the fact that the artefact has never been used reliably 
in the first place. Nonetheless, I bite the bullet here and state that an artefact that does not 
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perform reliably from the get-go is not malfunctioning, as it never performed its function 
better.  
 The optimality account claws back some respectability when we consider that as 
agents, and consumers, we are not wholly concerned with artefact functionality. When we 
purchase an artefact to do a job, it can fail to meet our expectations without being claimed as 
malfunctioning. A person that purchases an iPod can form the reasonable expectation that the 
battery will last as long as the advertisements say it will, and that the sound quality of their 
iPod will match the version they tried in store. If it fails to perform according to these 
specifications, they can reasonably claim that this artefact is not how they expected, even if it 
doesn’t strictly malfunction by failing to live up to expectations.  
3.9. Conclusion 
This goal of this chapter has been to introduce the optimality account, and show that it meets 
the minimum standard set for an artefact metaphysic.247 I argued that it makes sense to regard 
artefacts as real, ontologically respectable, physical objects. Furthermore, artefact functions 
were shown to require supporting systems, within which the artefact can exert its causal 
capacity. As a result, the capacity of x to φ is system-dependent, in a way that intentionalism 
cannot capture. There was no need, as we saw in section 3.5, to give up on the claim that 
artefacts are primarily for bringing about the ends desired by human agents.  
 Most importantly, we saw in section 3.7, that optimality should be narrowly defined. 
An artefact is optimal relative to a task, and this can shift over time. In order to determine 
whether an artefact is a token of a particular type we need to ask whether it is better at 
performing the function associated with that type than it is at performing the function 
associated with any other artefactual type. This avoids a simplistic understanding of 
optimality under which an artefact can only be optimal if it is, in fact, the best at its putative 
function.  
 Intentionalism and optimality are largely as good as each other at meeting the 
majority of the desiderata for an artefact metaphysic. Nonetheless, only the optimality 
account is capable of explaining function-shifts in a satisfying way. We saw in section 3.8.2 
that the optimality account provides an easy response as to why function-shifts occur, 
primarily due to tying of artefactual identities to their functional capacities. Any artefact x at 
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t1 can have function φ, function ψ at t2, and finally no function whatsoever at t3, thereby 
turning to junk. As we saw in section 3.8.5, this leads to the unintuitive position that a non-
functional or broken artefact is not, strictly speaking, an artefact at all. This, as I noted, was 
an unhappy result, but nonetheless cannot be considered fatal. The proposal offered here 
offers enough benefits that an unpalatable bullet to bite might be enough to pay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
Chapter Four: The Artefactual Metaphysics of Weapons 
4.1. Introduction 
This thesis began with the case of Galston and his unwitting contribution to the development 
of Agent Orange. It appears as clear a case as any of a researcher that had no intention of 
making a weapon—indeed, it appears that he had intentions not to create weaponry, which 
explains his subsequent actions to control the use of Agent Orange after its deployment in 
Vietnam.248 We are now in a position to address this case directly and endeavour to provide 
an answer as to what, exactly, 2,3,5-T is by turning to artefactual metaphysics. 
Weapons are, as I noted in Chapter One, exceedingly common, and yet they have had 
no sustained attention placed upon them by metaphysicians. As weapons are a subclass of 
artefacts, any acceptable artefactual metaphysic ought to be able to provide a compelling 
account of how to understand weapons. This chapter serves to canvas the means-to-harm 
account of weaponry first proposed by John Forge from both the standpoint of intentionalism 
and optimality.249 Under his interpretation, weapons are defined by the intention of the 
designer to provide a means-to-harm. This sets the ‘primary purpose’ of a weapon. This will 
serve as a test of the adequacy of both theories of artefact of artefact metaphysics. I will begin 
by addressing the question of whether or not substances, such as 2,3,5-T, can be regarded as 
artefacts at all. I then address Forge’s account and find it wanting insofar as it invokes 
intentionalism, and is thus unable to deal with cases where a function-shift brings about a 
weapon, contrary to the intentions of the designer. Nonetheless, I accept Forge’s claim that 
weapons are means-to-harm and provide an optimality analysis on the basis that a weapon is 
defined by being optimal as a means-to-harm. I end with an objection to my account: if a 
weapon is whatever is optimal at acting as a means-to-harm, then Bob Hope should be 
classified as a weapon.  
4.2. Substances as Artefacts 
One might be unwilling to grant that chemical compounds are artefacts at all, as these appear 
to be substances akin to H20 or chlorine gas, rather than things that are used, such as 
hammers, automobiles, and so on. Use implies active engagement with the artefact, such that 
artefacts require agential interaction in order to function, and it does not seem immediately 
obvious that we use chemical agents in this sort of way. We may assume that there is a 
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difference between deploying something and using that thing.250 Human agents use a gun to 
shoot others, while we might deploy a pride of hungry lions against an enemy, if we felt so 
inclined. We don’t use the lions, at least not in the same sense that we use a hammer: i.e. via 
physical manipulation. The hungry lions just do what they would always have done in the 
given situation: hunt for prey. Rather than manipulate the lions to bring about an end-state, 
we manipulated the environment by introducing the lions into it. Similarly, the argument 
might run that we do not use poison gases, we just deploy poison gases, after transporting 
them to our target in bomblets or canisters. 
 This seems enough to claim that some chemical compounds might not be best 
described as artefacts: H2O being a pertinent example.251 H2O is routinely made in labs 
around the world, and used for various purposes after being artificially created. It is clear that 
we should not feel entitled to claim that there are two distinct classes of H2O, one artefactual 
and the other natural, even though there is no way to distinguish the two on anything other 
than historical grounds. Instead, it seems better to claim that H2O is not an artefact at all, even 
when created in a lab.252 All we do in this case is recreate a particular substance and then 
deploy it for some practical use. Some might be impressed by the historical differences 
between some ‘natural’ bit of H2O and another quantity manufactured in a lab.253 No doubt, 
each bit of the same substance has a decidedly different historical origin in each of these 
cases. Nonetheless, we cannot claim that the mere fact that there is some historical difference 
is enough to mark out a metaphysical one. Otherwise we might be tempted to mark out a 
difference between infants that are the product of IVF versus those that were conceived 
‘naturally’.  
 Perhaps this implies that if a chemical compound is unique (i.e. not naturally 
occurring) it might count as an artefact. For example, superglue (cyanoacrylate) is a unique 
substance, discovered by Harry W. Coover in 1942, as part of research developing materials 
for a clear plastic gunsight.254 As cyanoacrylate does not occur in nature, this provides prima 
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facie support for the claim that the compound might count as an artefact. There is, of course, 
a further stipulation: that the chemical compound has some practical use, i.e. that it is optimal 
at something. For some time after its initial discovery, cyanoacrylate was subject to research 
but no practical uses were discovered for it. In 1951 Coover discovered the usefulness of 
cyanoacrylate while attempting to develop heat-resistant polymers for jet canopies.255 There 
are two conflicting ways for us to think about this. The first is that the compound was not an 
artefact until the practical use was discovered, so there was a temporal gap between its 
creation and its attaining artefactual status. The second possible view is that cyanoacrylate 
was always an artefact, which explains why a practical use was eventually discovered. I think 
the latter of these is the better understanding, especially given the work done in Chapter 
Three. No baptismal act occurred in 1951 to dub cyanoacrylate an artefact. We simply 
discovered a capacity to perform optimally at a particular task. If we were to accept the 
former claim, we lose the association between artefacts and their functional nature.  
 Of course, many substances we standardly classify as weapons are not unique, and 
this threatens their artefactual status. Consider the bacterium Bacillus anthracis. Anthrax is 
merely living bacteria that has some nasty effects when digested. We can salvage the account 
by noting that a naturally occurring substance can be manipulated such that it becomes an 
artefact. This explains why a hand-axe, despite being constituted by one object (a rock) is still 
an artefact, as it has been manipulated so as to be optimal at a particular function. 
Weaponised anthrax is not just anthrax spores placed into some container. Instead, the spores 
need to be modified: they are dried, ground down to a size of anywhere between one and 
twenty microns, and sprayed with a chemical to prevent clumping.256 These procedures lead 
to the spores being able to hang in the air for extended periods without dissipating, as well as 
being able to penetrate many older varieties of gas mask. While still essentially a bacterium, 
there has been enough done to say that weaponised anthrax is an artefact, in much the same 
way we can do enough to a tree to turn it into a table. Weaponised anthrax functions 
optimally at its given task, in a way that the spores do not.257 The spores just so happen to 
bring about a harmful outcome, whereas weaponised anthrax has this end-state as its raison 
d'être. This leads us to a better answer. Chemical compounds or bacteria qua naturally 
occurring substances are not artefacts, but particular mixtures of substances arranged, or 
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manipulated, ω-wise are artefacts. As a result, we can be confident in saying that Agent 
Orange, anthrax, and so on, are weapons, and we may apply the same basic argument to the 
case of  poisons. Agent Orange is an artefact as it does not appear in nature, and has a clear 
optimal function; anthrax is an artefact due to the manipulations necessary to produce a 
useful function. This allows us to claim that 2,3,5-T is at least an artefact. Now I turn to the 
question of whether Galston could be said to have created a weapon. 
4.3. John Forge and Weapons 
John Forge’s account of weaponry serves as the only philosophically rigorous account of 
weaponry available (in fact, one of the only accounts simpliciter).258 His metaphysic is firmly 
intentionalist, insofar as he explicitly defines artefacts as objects “made with some purpose or 
function in mind”.259 I outline John Forge’s account of weaponry in this section, highlighting 
the difference he draws between primary, derivative and secondary purposes. Weaponry, 
Forge claims, is distinguished by the intention of a designer: the designer must intend that a 
weapon is a ‘means to harm’.  
Forge’s account of weaponry hinges upon a tripartite division between primary, 
secondary and derivative purposes of weapons (and artefacts more generally). All artefacts 
have at least one primary purpose, as this is the purpose that the artefact was designed to 
perform. So, Forge states “an artefact’s primary purpose is what it is supposed to do, what its 
creators intend that it do.”260 Kitchen scissors, for instance, are designed for “all manner of 
domestic cuttings-up” and this is explicable by pointing to the intentions of the designer of 
the scissors. For Forge, weapons have a very particular primary purpose: that of being a 
means to harm. 261 This is their primary purpose because this is what the designers intended 
that the artefact would be used for. Meanwhile, unexpected uses (such as utilising rifles for 
paperweights) are deemed ‘secondary’ purposes. Such purposes are independent of the 
primary purposes of the artefact, and are only explicable by reference to the properties of the 
artefact. For example, a torpedo could be used as ballast for a submarine, due to the weight of 
the ordinance.262 Finally, any use of a weapon that relies upon their primary purpose is 
‘derivative’.263 For example, the capsicum spray in the belt of a security guard is only capable 
of deterring crimes because of the harmful nature of the spray itself. It is impossible to design 
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a weapon that can only serve as a deterrent, as without the potentiality and capacity for 
harming, a weapon cannot deter.264 Thus, primary purposes are necessary for derivative 
purposes, such as deterrence, but the relation is unidirectional. 
What does it mean for a thing to be a means to harm (henceforth MTH)? We should, 
first, distinguish between things that have the mere capacity to harm due to their physical 
constitution, and those that harm as their raison d'être.265 Any rock of sufficient size can 
serve the purpose of harming, and it seems perverse to suppose that the world is filled with 
undiscovered weaponry. This is due solely to the physical constitution of a rock, rather than 
any function. Rocks do not have functions, after all.  
In the case of weapons, the distinguishing feature is the intention of the designer to 
create a MTH.266 Due to the knowledge of the designer, and the choices she made during 
research, the purpose of a weapon is thereby ‘fixed’ as enabling persons to harm other 
persons (or, in the case of weapons designed for hunting, nonhuman animals). The single 
factor that fixes the categorisation of weapons is placed upon the intentions of the weapons 
researcher. If the weapons researcher intended to create a weapon, they thereby intended to 
create the means to harm- something that will serve primarily to harm others. By extension, 
Forge would consider the engineer who intends to create a powerful new handheld laser for 
cutting sheet metal has not created a weapon, even when the armed forces distributes the very 
same artefact to the troops.267 Instead, others have repurposed her artefact in ways that she 
neither foresaw nor endorsed. It is they who have created the weapon. 
If my interpretation of Forge is correct (and he tells me that he is happy to agree that, 
essentially, it is) I believe his account to be mistaken. Imagine the evil, but inept, scientist 
who constantly intends to create a new nuclear superweapon, and devotes his energies to this 
project. Sadly, for him, his invention actually does not sustain the reaction required to 
produce a destructive explosion. Other scientists, however, notice his creation and utilise it 
(unchanged!) to create a cleaner form of nuclear power. Here, I think it makes more sense to 
ask whether our attempted superweapon is best understood as proving a MTH. The intention 
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remains, let us suppose, to create a MTH, and yet it cannot harm, and never harms in fact. As 
such, it seems clear that the intention to create a MTH does not determine whether the thing 
itself is a MTH. 
Heather Douglas’ critique of Forge goes part of the way towards articulating my 
concern with his position.268 There she states: 
How one describes and understands a technology is more malleable than 
Forge seems to realise. Just think of how we can understand Alfred Nobel’s 
dynamite—as an explosive that is a tool to build roads or as an explosive that 
destroys things that we value. What is the correct description?269 
Oddly, this comes after the claim that Forge’s tripartite distinction might make sense 
‘ontologically.’ I am unsure how, given the very example goes on to provide a 
counterexample. Dynamite might have been created with only benign goals in mind, and yet 
the invention itself yielded results that cut against this original intention. Once again, we can 
return to Agent Orange. Galston did not know, at the time of conducting his research, that it 
would only be useful as a key component in a chemical weapon. Indeed, judging from his 
subsequent work (he was instrumental in the effort to convince Nixon to abandon the use of 
the weapon, and went on to work at the Yale Institution for Social and Policy Studies, before 
founding a centre of Bioethics) he would have made every effort to destroy his research had 
he known of this possibility. As we have seen, the people of Vietnam were not so lucky.  
 Ultimately, Forge’s account falters on the key point of being capable of handling 
function shifts: by relying on intentions rather than functionality. A designer of an artefact 
does not decide that an artefact is a weapon. Everything that she does to develop the artefact 
is in furtherance of a particular goal: to make something that functions. She may fail in this 
endeavour, as the history of weapons development reveals with an ever growing list of quasi-
weapons that do not make it through the testing phase. She may succeed, but what determines 
that she succeeds is that it actually can do harm to others, and that the artefact is optimal at 
this purpose, as I shall argue in the next section. 
 This captures a broader failing in Forge’s account: namely that his account of 
primary, derivative and secondary purposes—a central plank in his analysis of weaponry and 
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artefacts more generally—only categorises artefact functions, rather than explaining why it is 
that these functions exist at all. Weapons are not MTH because they were the successful 
product of an intention, rather it was because they exhibit the capacity to harm in a range of 
situations, and they are distinctly suboptimal at other tasks. The errant suggestion to utilise 
nuclear bombs to make room for canals being a pertinent example.270 A nuclear bomb might 
be able to make a very large hole, but at the cost of causing radioactive material to dissipate 
over a large distance rendering them suboptimal at this task. Similarly, a rifle might be used 
for target shooting, but it is a distinctly dangerous object in all situations (including target 
shooting itself). 
 At this point I address Forge’s reply to the intentional fallacy as interpreted by Don 
Ihde.271 Ihde’s account does not exactly mirror Dennett’s, nor my own, but it mirrors the 
central importance of recognising the intentional fallacy to draw out the conclusion that 
should be familiar by now: that what the designer intends does not define what the artefact is 
for. Ihde provides a real-life example where security systems did not perform as they were 
intended to perform, rebelling against the intentions of the designer. They were designed in 
such a way that they would put through an automatic call to police whenever the alarm was 
tripped. This resulted in an inundation of calls through to police, which resulted in home 
break-ins actually increasing due to the diverting of police resources towards false alarms.272 
Ihde claims that this is evidence that artefact behaviour is relatively unpredictable, even to the 
designer. Forge’s attempt to salvage the intentionalist account runs as follows: understand the 
primary function of a security system to be to be the automatic dialling when a sensor is 
activated in a given way—by a large human-sized object with a given heat signature.273 
Forge’s contention is that if we understand the primary purpose of a security system to be like 
this, we can claim that it performed its function according to specification. The fact that it is 
used as a ‘security system’ at all is its derivative purpose: it depends on the primary purpose, 
plus certain environmental features in order to function this way. The fact that break-ins 
increased is not down to a failure of designers to produce an intended artefact, but is down to 
certain contingencies that were instantiated in Philadelphia at that time. 
 In reply, I begin by pointing out that Ihde’s example is not particularly revealing, as it 
does not appear that the artefacts have undergone anything akin to a function-shift. A security 
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system is a highly complex artefact, suitable for largely one task. There is no requirement for 
a security system to be particularly excellent at providing security for one’s home. All that is 
required is that it is better at this task than any other. Given that no particular house that 
contained a security system was worse off for having the security system installed, as all 
houses in the area became less safe in the wake of their installation, it still functioned as a 
security system—especially as the failure might be traced to how the police reacted. 
Nonetheless, there is a danger in Forge’s willingness to move down a level in functional 
analysis of the security systems. Recall from Chapter One the perils associated with this 
argument. If we are happy with the fine-grained description in the case of a security system, 
why not claim (as Fotion, amongst others, does) that weapons are not MTH at all? Under 
Fotion’s description fine-grained description, rifles are merely objects that allow one to 
deliver a disabling agent on target.274 If we are willing to drop down levels in our description 
of security systems, perhaps we should claim that the capacity to harm is a derivative 
function of the putative primary purpose, namely the primary purpose of delivering disabling 
agents. We should be unwilling to make this shift in focus, as we cannot pick out a purpose, 
or function, if we shift from course-grained to fine-grained accounts. If someone states that 
the primary purpose of a security system is, in fact, to act as a sensor, it is much like claiming 
that the primary purpose of an automative engine is to burn gasoline. Not so: the primary 
purpose of an engine is to provide locomotion.  
 Nonetheless, I think that Forge’s account is largely correct, save for the intentionalist 
missteps. Weapons do not function as mere destructive objects, as they are for harming.275 
His MTH account has much to recommend it, especially given the features noted in chapter 
one: namely, that there are non-incidental features of weapons that render them very good at 
harming, not just destroying things. Thus, we are well placed to ask whether there is a way to 
accommodate the MTH account within an optimality framework. The optimality account I 
will provide in the next section will capture the key insights of Forge’s position, without the 
intentionalist baggage. 
4.4. Weapons Optimised 
The key insight of the MTH approach is a deceptively simple one: weapons are the types of 
things that one should use if one wishes to harm another sentient creature (whether nonhuman 
animal, or human). Assuming that one has this end in mind, a weapon is the rational choice to 
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make. Further support is found if we cast back to Chapter One of this thesis, wherein I 
provided the following uncontentious definition of something being a MTE: 
D) x is a means to an end, e, iff x is such that if an agent A wishes to bring 
about e then A has a reason to use x. 
Agent Orange was a means to a particular end: that end was the large-scale, rapid destruction 
of crops. But ends are best described, as noted, in terms of course-grained ends. Rational 
people don’t go around spraying chemicals around for no reason, especially in a military 
scenario. They sprayed jungle with Agent Orange to produce rapid deforestation, to allow for 
easier engagements with hitherto hidden enemies. This is Agent Orange acting as a MTH, 
even if the harm is not immediate. I will come back to the case of Agent Orange shortly. 
An immediate question that needs answering is why we should characterise weapons 
as being the means to harm, rather than some other morally neutral characterisation, under 
the optimality account. Perhaps it would be better to characterise weapons as anything that 
has the capacity to disable or destroy, as Fotion appears to endorse.276 After all, in order to be 
optimal at harming, a rifle must be optimal at shooting simpliciter.  
Not so, I claim. Recall the claim from section 3.7: 
x is an optimal token iff x has the capacity to bring about ends En in E-relevant 
systems Sn, and x brings about E in Sn better, relative to its capacities C, than 
all other ends. 
To claim that a rifle is to be described as being optimal at shooting in isolation from its being 
optimal at harming is to ignore too many features, such as its environment, as well as its 
general capabilities. It also ignores structural features, and how the artefact is manipulated, as 
per the following condition from section 3.6: 
O) An artefact x has the capacity to φ in Sn iff x has structural features α 
which, when manipulated γ-wise in Sn cause x to φ, 
Rifles, bayonets and other weapons are such as to demand particular ways of manipulation to 
bring about the function within a system. It is not enough to claim that because you could use 
a bayonet as a kitchen knife that it is optimal at this task (as we saw in sections 1.4 and 1.5). 
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Structural features of the bayonet, rifle and so on, as well as its environment determine that it 
is better at harming than any so-called neutral task. The features of a weapon and their 
capacities render them optimal at harming, and distinctly suboptimal at all other tasks. This 
explains the patterns of usage of weapons, as well as why we value them for the end-states 
they bring about. As we saw in section 1.5 we need to preserve the ‘harming’ notion of 
weaponry, and optimality demands it here. 
 Perhaps a reply suggests itself. Perhaps we can claim that a weapon is optimal at 
defence, and therefore it is not a MTH. If we assume that defence is always justified, then a 
weapon does not harm when it defends, as the term ‘harm’ is morally loaded.277 For instance, 
a can of mace disguised as a key ring might be useful to defend oneself from attack, but less 
useful if one were to attempt to menace a passer-by, primarily because it does not look like a 
weapon. In order to menace, the victim must understand the threat. As Forge rightly points 
out, for any artefact to be a weapon it must, first and foremost, be a MTH, which explains 
why x is a defensive weapon.278 In order to deter attack, or defend against it, the weapon must 
be optimal at harming whatever is in the way. Perhaps one could retort that a weapon might 
be for justified shootings, as in the case of a police officer’s Glock, which might be in a 
special holster such that only the officer can draw it, with a camera attached at the end to 
record every bullet fired by the weapon. Surely no-one would claim such usages are harms as 
such usages are defensive, or to prevent the harm to others. Harm requires that the action is 
unjustified. To kill an intruder in a home, or a drug crazed maniac, is not to harm, but to do 
the right thing. The argument, in short, is that I, and Forge, have poisoned the well. Again, 
not so. ‘Harm’ does not mean that the artefact has been used unjustly, or any correlate. The 
claim is that the artefact was used to cause physical pain and tissue damage, or to restrict the 
freedom of some human or animal that had a preference not to be stopped in this way. This is 
a harm to be justified, or excused, but remains a harm nonetheless.279 In short, a gun is 
relatively ‘dumb’ artefact, unable to differentiate between offense and defence. 
Further evidence comes when we look at the capacity of weapons. Guns, due to their 
particular characteristics, are not particularly good at firing upon tin cans, even though guns 
can be used for this purpose. This is due to the fact that they fire a projectile at a high 
velocity, the target of this projectile could be just about anything, including tin cans, barn 
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doors and flipped coins. This makes guns inherently dangerous things to keep around, even if 
we intentionally restrict our usage to firing at things that cannot be harmed. Presumably, even 
if guns are kept the singular usage of firing upon tin cans, the behaviour that is necessitated 
by their presence will be one of caution, explicable on the grounds of their causal capacities. 
Guns kept for target shooting would likely be left unloaded, or under lock and key, rather 
than leaving them around as one might with an airgun.280 This is down to the fact that a 
weapon is might be good at shooting at tin cans (a job that it is rather overqualified to 
perform), while it is excellent at harming.  
So what of Galston and his creation? As we saw in Chapter One, 2,3,5-T was only 
optimal as a weapon. The fact that 2,3,5-T contained dioxin rendered it unusable as a 
domestic herbicide, and unable to perform the associated function well (or, indeed, at all). 
This seems sufficient to determine that it is not an herbicide, but is it enough to determine 
that it is a weapon? It appears that 2,3,5-T and the more potent 2,4,5-T are weapons due to 
their utility in clearing jungles for engagement. They worked admirably well at this purpose, 
and were used until the U.S. military ceased spraying in 1971 following concerns regarding 
the safety to their own soldiers. The fact that no government has used the weapon in 
engagements since should not give us pause; if there was a situation calling for the rapid 
defoliation of a jungle, Agent Orange would be a useful means to that end. The same can be 
said of poison gases from WWI, no longer in general use. They remain weapons even if there 
are better options on the table.281 
The reader may be unwilling to grant that Galston created a weapon on the grounds 
that he created 2,3,5-T, not 2,4,5-T. Agent Orange contains no 2,3,5-T whatsoever, only 
2,4,5-T and 2,4-D in equal measures. As we saw in Chapter One 2,4,5-T was a more potent 
form of the compound 2,3,5-T. Claiming that Galston worked on Agent Orange therefore 
could be akin to claiming that Carl Scheele, the first to create chlorine gas in a lab 
environment, produced a weapon. Scheele’s work predated the advent of weaponised 
chlorine gas by some one hundred and fifty years. Still, without Scheele’s work on the gas in 
the 1770s, Haber and Farben might never have developed the chemical weapons deployed at 
Ypres.  
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  I think the difference is one that can be drawn on the basis of manipulation. 2,4,5-T is 
merely a more potent form of 2,3,5-T, and developed on the basis of the results of Galston’s 
results. The mixture of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D only required spraying over foliage to be effective 
as a weapon, without manipulation beyond the initial mixing. The difference in potency 
between 2,3,5-T and 2,4,5-T is largely irrelevant, as we can see via a simple analogy. It is 
possible to increase the amount of gunpowder in a bullet, and home enthusiasts regularly 
swap out their loads. By increasing the amount of gunpowder in a bullet it does not appear 
that they have created an entirely new weapon. The bullet was a MTH before their 
interaction, and they merely made the bullet more capable of harming. Meanwhile, Scheele’s 
synthesising chlorine gas and its eventual use as a weapon was not enough to render a usable 
weapon. Poison gases during WWI were delivered via canisters which functioned to release 
gas in a largely invisible cloud, capable of hanging in the air for extended period of time.  
It seems that we have succeeded in capturing the important insights of Forge’s 
account. Indeed, we have outlined an improved account of the nature of weapons, and this 
most certainly is an important achievement. Have we therefore vindicated the optimality 
account? Very nearly! But it is still possible to object to my account, albeit via an avenue that 
might be a little artificial. I shall now address it here. 
4.5. The Bob Hope Objection282 
Let us grant that the preceding was broadly correct and that x is a weapon iff it is optimal as a 
MTH. Furthermore, grant that there is no significant difference between indirect and direct 
weapons. If we take this conjunct of notions seriously, it leads to some drastically counter-
intuitive results. Call the following the Bob Hope Objection: 
Bob Hope, the famous American comedian, flew to entertain the troops during World 
War II, the Vietnam War, the Iran-Iraq war and the first Gulf War. This task he 
undertook under the purview of the United Services Organisations (USO), in service 
of their goals of providing a home away from home.283 Indeed, a conscious effort was 
made by the army to utilise USO entertainment to buoy the troops, and improve their 
fighting spirit.284 Let us assume that Bob Hope, in his formidable capacity as a 
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comedian, did indeed buoy troops and was maximally effective in raising morale, in a 
situation when he was the only one who could do so. Without Hope (no pun intended) 
their efficacy in battle would be, to some significant degree, undermined.285 As a 
result, Bob Hope is an indirect weapon. 
Obviously, the step that really matters in a means to harm analysis is whether Bob 
Hope was efficacious in the right sort of way. I think he was, or at least he could have been. 
Entertainers who are sent to entertain the troops, à la Bob Hope, are sent with to fulfil a 
specific military purpose. This purpose is to raise morale, insofar as morale directly 
influences the ability of soldiers to fight. 286 Without Bob Hope, and those of his ilk, 
entertaining the troops, we may hypothesise that the subsequent military activities would 
have reduced fighting efficacy. So let us grant three claims: first, that Bob Hope was causally 
efficacious, and his presence actually raised morale; second, that morale aids soldiers in their 
military operations; third, that Bob Hope was optimal at raising morale. If we accept the 
claim that he was optimal, and this meant that soldiers fought harder and longer, the 
optimality account appears destined to claim that Bob Hope was a weapon. Just as we might 
say that military satellite technology connected to an operation renders those satellites 
weapons, as this allows the soldiers a distinct edge in battle, the same can be said of Hope. 
Without him, the objection runs, the soldiers would be disadvantaged just as surely as if they 
went to battle without satellite imagery to guide them. 
This, of course, is completely unintuitive and would present a straightforward 
reductio to my position.287 If the preceding is correct, the consequences are far reaching. Bob 
Hope would be a weapon, as are soldiers (over and above the weapons they carry), as well as 
the chef who keeps the soldiers fed. At the very least, it would appear that our ontology 
would need to expand rapidly to include the amount of new weapons I appear to have 
discovered. This could, for some, be enough to rule my account out wholesale. 
This said, it does not only threaten the optimality account. We can easily recast the 
objection to encompass intentionalist positions such as the one presented by Forge, as there is 
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no contention that the USO put together these shows out of the goodness of their hearts. The 
goal was—and remains—to bolster the morale of soldiers so as to strengthen group cohesion 
under fire, fighting longer and harder than they would otherwise. This pragmatic approach 
was not a secret to performers such as Hope. Upon the outbreak of WWII, Hope attempted to 
enlist into the armed forces but was persuaded to drop his application, as he could ‘best 
serve’ them as an entertainer rather than as a soldier.288 During the Vietnam war, Hope had 
no sympathy for those who were anti the war, stating: 
Can you imagine returning from a combat patrol in a steaming, disease-
infested jungle, tired, hungry, scared and sick, and reading that people in 
America are demonstrating against your being there? That people in America 
are burning their draft cards to show their opposition and that some of them 
are actually rooting for your defeat?289 
Indeed, Hope saw his primary role with the USO from WWII onward was one of boosting 
morale to aid the armed forces, and made an effort to perform wherever personnel most 
needed the boost. Appearing often in army fatigues, Hope revealed his sense of identification 
with the military, as if there was an overlap in purpose.  
Immediately, one response suggests itself—Bob Hope is not an artefact. 
Ontologically, Bob Hope is wholly separate from mere functional things.290 The point of 
demarcation is that we are not designed and, furthermore, we have no optimal function 
(unless one classifies survival and sexual reproduction as our essential function). Describing 
Bob Hope as a weapon is akin to calling Cindy Sherman an artwork. Even while they both 
can be said to contribute to their respective fields, they never reduce to ‘mere things’. Each 
remains a person that cannot literally be described as a functional thing, as when we call x a 
φ-er. 
Of course, it is by no means obvious that humans are separate from artefacts more 
generally. Dennett, as possibly the most well-known exemplar of this view, considers humans 
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to be optimally designed for survival; designed, it must be noted, by natural selection.291 I 
will have no more to say on the subject of humans as artefacts qua humans, as the argument 
is long and complicated and involves the breadth of Dennett’s professional research.292 
Instead, I wish to highlight that humans often act as if they were artefacts on certain 
occasions. Consider a person who works at a checkout counter in a supermarket. Ideally 
(from the point of view of the employer) the employee serves as a causal mechanism, 
working such that the customer spends the least amount of time waiting at any one counter. 
Perhaps this is still enough to grant some initial plausibility to the claim that one can act as an 
artefact. 
Supposing that we are artefacts, an interlocutor may still assert that we are not 
technical artefacts. Where technical artefacts serve to bring about our purposes, we do not 
share this character. Or so goes one line of thought. I find this problematic, in that it seems to 
simply define the problem away. Why can we not regard persons as technical artefacts in a 
particular context? Surely in certain circumstances we are, to use Kant’s phrase, ‘solely a 
means to an end.’ We may slip out of this role, of course, as when the mechanic downs tools 
at five p.m. Of course, most technical artefacts have this character. A good screwdriver at t1 
may end up being a good paint-tin opener at t2, and only useful for this latter role.  
A more convincing avenue of avoiding the reductio is to claim that Bob Hope 
himself, even if he is an artefact, is not a weapon. Instead, the focus can shift to the 
performance itself. This, we may suppose, is what boosts morale, rather than Bob Hope 
himself. Presumably, if Bob Hope stood stock still upon a stage and didn’t utter a word the 
desired effect would not occur. As his performance is the product of human agency, and is 
non-reducible to Bob Hope himself, we can properly call it an artefact. His one-liners, bodily 
movements, and so forth are all optimal at doing at least one thing: entertaining the troops 
and, by extension, improving their morale. Bob Hope without his performance is, by contrast, 
inefficacious. Few will think of this as a successful response to the Bob Hope reductio, at 
least if we take our intuitions as a guide. A performance of a comedy routine appears about as 
far removed from weaponry as anything we care to name. Indeed, it seems far removed from 
being regarded as an artefact at all. Of course, intuitions are fickle things, and are no 
substitute for arguments. 
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We are better placed if we instead turn our attention back to the concept of 
entanglement: 
C) component c is entangled with the functionality of artefact x iff it were the 
case that if c were not present, x would be less capable of performing its 
function in situation(s) Sn, where Sn specifies the normal operating 
environment(s) of x. 
Presumably, no one would contend that Hope was a weapon on his own, which leaves the 
claim that Hope acted as an indirect weapon. We are now in a position to answer the Bob 
Hope objection. It appears that the objection is largely down to the suppressed premise that 
Bob Hope is entwined in the right sort of way as to be classified as a weapon, much like a 
rifle scope is. This is unconvincing, I think, as there are multiple interfering factors that divest 
Bob Hope of this kind of relationship. For one thing, buoying the troops is insufficient to 
bring about harm, as they can be as buoyed as they like, but they must be armed, relocated 
and supplied with food and drink.293 Short of claiming that whatever a soldier drinks and 
wears (after all, their boots enable their activities) we can utilise this criterion as a necessary 
dividing line. In other words, the agency of the soldiers themselves intervenes to explain why 
it is that they are better at fighting after a Bob Hope show.294 The boost in morale, in short, 
makes them feel better about the situation they are in, which then means they can exercise 
their agency to harm. This does not equate Hope with being an artefact, although it may be 
sufficient to be complicit with their activities through his display of support. 
4.6. Conclusion 
The question I posed at the outset of this thesis is whether Galston could have unwittingly 
created a weapon, and the goal of this chapter was to demonstrate how artefactual 
metaphysics allows us to answer this question. This chapter began with answering the 
question whether or not a naturally occurring substance could count as an artefact, given that 
this would seem to include naturally occurring substances, such as H2O. Two options 
suggested themselves. First, if a compound is unique and has a practical purpose; second, if 
the compound is manipulated in some way, for example via grinding down anthrax spores to 
hang in the air. 
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 Next I turned to Forge’s account of weaponry as those things that have a primary 
purpose of being a MTH. The primary purpose of an artefact is set by the intentions of the 
designer, such that the designer cannot be in error regarding her creations. I questioned the 
veracity of this claim as this amounts, once again, to a denial of the possibility of function-
shifts. Furthermore, I showed that Forge’s tripartite account can only categorise weapons, 
and thus appears to repeat Fotion’s error discussed in sections 1.4 and 1.5. If we are to 
understand the purpose of weaponry we must defer to usage. If something is a MTH it is 
because it performs this function well, not because it was intended to be. 
 I suggest that optimality rescues the MTH account, and largely captures the central 
claims Forge wishes to make. For something to be a weapon it must be optimal as a MTH, 
and this explains the ends that weapons are put to. Importantly, weapons are such that they 
have a capacity to harm even when we have contrary intentions towards them, as when we 
use a rifle to shoot at tin cans. Due to the capacity of the artefact, explicable via reference to 
structural features, weapons are such as to be preclude certain behaviours directed towards 
them. I also rejected the contention that we should prefer a neutral description, which 
attempts to do away with all mention of harm. I resisted this conclusion on the grounds that 
even if we wish to say that firearms are for defence, this neglects the fact that defending 
oneself still involves a harm, even if this harm is a justified one. 
 Finally, I turned to a key objection: if optimality is right, Bob Hope was a weapon as 
he buoyed morale during WWII and thereby acted as a MTH. If Hope buoyed morale, and 
morale aids fighting effectiveness, there seems to be nothing to stop the optimality theorist 
from claiming that Hope is a weapon. After all, a scope on a rifle also aids fighting 
effectiveness, and it is for this reason we are happy to include it as a weapon. In reply I noted 
that this relied upon a supressed premise that Hope was entangled with a weapon system in 
largely the same way a scope is. This was revealed to be a dubious assumption, given that 
there are intervening steps between Hope’s performance and any eventual harm.  
 In sum this chapter revealed that we can make sense of weapons by applying a slight 
twist to Forge’s understanding that they are MTH. The optimality account is able to 
demonstrate that weapons are MTH because they good at serving this role, even in cases (as 
with Galston) the designer had no idea that this was the case. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis began with the example of Galston and his unruly creation 2,3,5-T. How were we 
to understand his creation of this artefact, given that it had only one useful purpose: to be part 
of a weapon? Galston himself wished to play no part in weapons research, and intended to 
develop a benign herbicide for domestic use. The question that began this thesis was whether 
it is possible to create an artefact unwittingly. Following detailed examination of this 
question, I arrived at the conclusion that Galston’s case is far from unique. Artefacts often 
rebel against the intentions of the designer, sometimes sooner, sometimes later. I have 
reached this conclusion in two stages. First, I investigated the dominant theory of artefact 
metaphysics, intentionalism. Second, I sketched an alternative in the optimality account, and 
showed how such an account allows us to better understand Galston’s creation, and weapons 
more generally. 
My investigation of intentionalism proceeded with an account of the motivations 
behind it. Due to the differences between artefactual and natural kinds, many have been 
moved to regard artefacts with suspicion. To save artefacts from ontological elimination, the 
intentionalists are moved to accept the claim that artefacts have a dual nature. On this 
construal artefacts are not entirely physical, nor are they mental, but a mixture of both. This 
view motivates the intentionalists to claim that functionality only makes sense if we invoke 
intentionalistic language to explain the proper function of artefacts, via reference to beliefs 
and desires of creators. Thus intentionalists are artefactual realists, but at the cost of a 
necessary dualism.  
I then moved on to canvas the ontogenetic and CIF accounts of intentionalism. The 
ontogenetic account was revealed to be hopelessly broad, as it allowed non-functional 
artefacts (such as perpetual motion machines) to count as artecacts. The CIF account fared 
better, as it demanded that the intention of the designer be successful in bringing about a 
functioning artefact. So long as the artefact performs the intended function, irrespective of 
how well it performs the task, it is a token of the intended artefact type. As we saw, 
intentionalism is largely capable of meeting the desiderata for an artefact metaphysic save for 
one key failing: its inability to explain function-shifts adequately. 
What an artefact is, it turns out, cannot be determined by intentions alone. While it is 
undeniable that intuitions favour the intentionalist account, it is not enough to claim that any 
successful artefact metaphysic must respect the intuitions driving the account. As a 
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metaphysical outlook, intentionalism rests upon the assumption that designers cannot be in 
ignorance nor error regarding what they create. Simply put, if I create something, and it 
functions the way I intended, it is neither here nor there whether that thing is good at the role 
I intended for it. It is whatever I intended it to be, or at least it is whatever a community of 
designers intended it to be. An adequate explanation of how and why function-shifts occur is 
thereby cut off from theories that invoke intentionalism. This is largely because of the 
motivation underlying the intentionalist account, to respect the idea that artefacts have a dual 
nature. By ultimately decoupling artefacts from their physical natures intentionalism loses 
sight of a key fact: artefacts exhibit capacities independent of our thoughts about them.  
Chapter Three concerned itself with sketching the optimality account. This proposed 
alternative to intentionalism holds that in order to determine what artefactual type a token x 
belongs to, we must investigate what x is best at. As I argued, artefacts are entirely physical 
constructions that have causal capacities when situated in particular environments. These 
capacities exhibit functionality when we can rely upon the artefact to act in predictable ways, 
in order to bring about a particular desired end-state. Artefacts can perform a putative 
function variably under this account, such that token artefact might be more or less reliable at 
bringing about ends E1 than it is at bringing about E2. As I cautioned in section 3.7, we must 
be careful to avoid conflating this understanding with the claim that optimality requires that x 
be best at functioning φ-wise when compared to other artefacts. All that is required is that x 
be better at performing φ than it is at performing functions ψn. As a result we have a 
convenient answer as to why function-shifts occur, and under what circumstances. They 
occur when an artefact exhibits a desirable capacity distinct from its historical function, and 
this is down to its capacity to perform this new function well. Thus the optimality account 
succeeds where intentionalism falters.  
 Chapter Four addresses the class of artefacts that began this thesis: weaponry. I asked 
whether or not a substance could be an artefact, and provided reasons for accepting that this 
is entirely reasonable in cases where the chemical substance is suitably manipulated. Next I 
turned to John Forge’s impressive work on weaponry and found that he was right to conceive 
of weapons as means-to-harm. Unfortunately, as Forge ties his account to intentionalism, he 
is unable to account for cases like Galston’s, as Galston did not intend to create a means-to-
harm (MTH). Galston created an herbicide under such an account because this is what he 
intended to create, even though it is only useful as a component in a weapon. I offered the 
optimality account to salvage the MTH account, as there is no need to conceive of a weapon 
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as being necessarily intended. What matters, as I hope to have shown, is whether it is best as 
a MTH. I then addressed two key concerns with such an appraisal and showed them wanting. 
The overriding purpose of this thesis was to offer a new way of thinking about 
artefacts, drawing upon the sketch provided by Dennett. I showed, in chapters Three and 
Four, that optimality is able to accommodate most of the claims demanded of it, while having 
a particular weakness. Due to its insistence on ‘reading off’ an actual function, optimality is 
unable to map our intuitive understanding of broken, malfunctioning and non-functioning 
artefacts. Given that broken and non-functioning objects do not exhibit any actual function, 
on my account they are, strictly speaking, not artefacts at all. In reply, I suggested that we 
recast the meaning of these terms. When someone says an ‘artefact’ is broken or non-
functioning, all we can say is that this thing was an artefact with a particular function, or else 
that it never was a bone fide artefact. 
As I have noted throughout this thesis, any view that attempts to trace back intentions 
to decide on artefact categorisation can be regarded as suspect. In order to properly categorise 
an artefact we must be able to determine which of its potential functional descriptions it best 
fits. In the case of weapons, we now have an answer: a weapon is optimal as a means to 
harm. Further, we know that no agent, whether designer or user, has a definitive say 
regarding the nature of artefacts. Like it or not, artefacts have capacities that determine usage, 
not vice versa. I emphasise that this represents a challenge to much received wisdom 
regarding weapons, and artefacts more generally. In sum, I have argued that optimality offers 
a better metaphysical outlook on weapons than intentionalism, especially due to the centrality 
it places upon the capacities of artefacts to act in environments. I hope to have shown the 
positive contributions possible once we jettison the intentionalist account in favour of 
optimality.  
Still, there is work to be done if optimality is to be regarded as a sufficient account of 
artefacts. I do not claim that the account offered here is the whole story, and there are a good 
many directions that further research could take us. One important discussion that was 
sidelined here is whether nonhuman animal artefacts are, strictly speaking, artefacts. After all, 
nonhuman animals manipulate naturally occurring materials to produce usable tools. 
Philosophical voices on artefact metaphysics have largely disavowed such objects as bone 
fide artefacts, as the bar seems to be set too low in such cases.295 It appears if we accept 
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 C.f. Gould, “Animal Artifacts``.” 
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optimality we may need to reconsider this intuition, as a good many nonhuman animal 
artefacts appear to meet the conditions developed in Chapter Three. For example, 
chimpanzees have been observed manipulating branches to create spears for hunting, via the 
removal of excess branches before sharpening to a point. This certainly seems to meet the 
‘manipulation’ criteria as in sections 3.6 and 4.2.296 If we accept optimality over 
intentionalism it appears as if we may have to revise our ontology to include these objects. 
After all, we accept that shillelaghs count as artefacts, and these too are ‘just’ blackthorn 
branches manipulated to form a club. Perhaps if we accept the one as an artefact, we should 
be moved to accept the other. 
 A fully fleshed out account of optimality would offer clear advice in determining how 
an artefact is best classified when it appears to have multiple optimal functions. 297  Consider 
(once again) a Swiss army knife, which standardly comes with a corkscrew, can opener, 
series of knives, and so on. Assuming that the army knife functions optimally as a can 
opener, corkscrew, etc., what is it? Is it a corkscrew and a can opener and a knife? Earlier in 
the text I stated that we can classify such an artefact as a general use tool, and this seems 
intuitive enough, but requires further argumentation to explain why we should accept this 
intuition, especially as we have jettisoned so many intuitions along the way. I suspect that the 
answer is that some artefacts types are defined by having a higher-order function that is made 
up of multiple lower-order functions. If so, we might say that there are artefacts with 
composite functions, such that we cannot usefully reduce the functionality to any one lower-
order function. Further work would investigate this notion of whether something can have an 
optimal composite function, as well as explore whether composite functions are a 
metaphysically respectable notion.  
Finally, I wish to briefly address the potential my foregoing account has for a detailed 
ethical examination of weaponry. As I indicated in Chapter One, the assumption that the 
proper function of a handgun is to defend rests upon the pre-reflective acceptance of 
intentionalism.298 Upon overturning the intentionalist paradigm, as I think we should, we are 
in a position to revaluate the ethics of weaponry in the light of optimality. If weapons are not 
just neutral tools which can harm, but are just those things which are best at harming, we 
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might be motivated to change the arguments in favour of gun control. I note that John Forge 
has tackled the question of weapons research in depth in his recent books, and I endorse 
much of what he said there. Nonetheless, his account is focused upon the ethics of scientists 
and weapons researchers, rather than the ethics of personal ownership of weapons.299 I think 
it likely that further work from the point of view of optimality might render the judgement 
that weaponry, as a particularly morally problematic class of artefact, cannot be possessed 
without a strong justification—perhaps one that does not regard the capacity of a weapon to 
be used for self-defence as ethically sufficient. Perhaps via this avenue of inquiry we might 
have an adequate answer to the NRA slogan that ‘Guns don’t kill: people kill people.’ In its 
place, we might be able to retort ‘Guns don’t just kill people, they make it very easy to kill 
people.’ 
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